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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
13-433
Ruling Below: Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), cert
granted, 134 S.Ct. 1490 (U.S. 2014).
Former employees brought putative class action against former employer, alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Nevada labor laws. The United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge granted employer's motion to
dismiss. Employees appealed.
Question Presented: Whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act.

JESSE BUSK; LAURIE CASTRO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on April 12, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
THOMAS, Circuit Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the
district court erred in dismissing the
plaintiffs' state law claims for unpaid wages
because those claims would be certified
using different class certification procedures
than their federal wage and hour claims. We
also consider whether the plaintiffs have
alleged plausible claims for unpaid wages
under federal and Nevada law for
undergoing a security screening meant to
prevent employee theft and for unpaid lunch
periods shortened by five-minute walks to
the cafeteria. We affirm the district court in

part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
I
Plaintiffs Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro are
former employees of Integrity Staffing
Solutions, Inc., which provides warehouse
space and staffing to clients such as
Amazon.com. Busk and Castro worked as
hourly employees at warehouses in Las
Vegas and Fernley, Nevada, respectively,
filling orders placed by Amazon.com
customers. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued
Integrity on behalf of a putative class of
workers in both warehouses, claiming
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violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and Nevada labor laws.
Busk and Castro alleged Integrity violated
federal and state labor laws by requiring
them to pass through a security clearance at
the end of each shift, for which they were
not compensated. Employees waited up to
25 minutes to be searched; removed their
wallets, keys, and belts; and passed through
metal detectors. The plaintiffs alleged the
clearances were “necessary to the
employer's task of minimizing ‘shrinkage’
or loss of product from warehouse theft.”
The plaintiffs also sought compensation
under FLSA and Nevada law for their entire
30–minute unpaid lunch periods because
they spent up to 10 minutes of the meal
period “walking to and from the cafeteria
and/or undergoing security clearances.”
They said it took them about five minutes
after punching out “to walk to the facility
cafeteria and/or pass through security
clearances” and “approximately five minutes
to walk from the cafeteria to the time
keeping system to clock back in.”
Additionally, managers would frequently
“remind” workers to “finish their meal
period quickly so that they would clock back
in on time.”
The district court granted Integrity's motion
to dismiss the amended complaint for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the
time spent clearing security was not
compensable under FLSA, relying on outof-circuit cases finding the time employees
spent passing through security screenings
noncompensable. The court also held that
the plaintiffs' allegations about shortened

meal periods did not state a claim under
FLSA because the plaintiffs did not allege
that they performed “any duty related to
their job as warehouse workers” during their
lunch breaks.
The district court also held that the state law
claims “must be dismissed” due to
“conflicting” class certification mechanisms,
namely that while plaintiffs must opt into a
collective action under FLSA, plaintiffs
must opt out of a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Alternatively,
the court dismissed the state claims on the
merits. It held that since the claims were
based entirely on the security clearance and
lunch allegations, the “Plaintiffs have failed
to allege fact scenarios that would support a
valid claim” under Nevada law.
II
We review de novo the district court's
conclusion that a FLSA collective action and
state law class action are inherently
incompatible as a matter of law. We agree
with all other circuits to consider the issue
that such actions can peacefully coexist.
Therefore, the district court erred in
dismissing the state law claims based on a
perceived conflict.
Under FLSA, a potential plaintiff does not
benefit from (and is not bound by) a
judgment unless he or she “affirmatively
‘opts in’ ” to the lawsuit. This rule is in
contrast to a typical Rule 23 class action,
where a potential plaintiff must opt out to be
excluded from the class. Although some
district courts have held that a FLSA
collective action cannot be brought in the
same lawsuit as a state-law class action
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based on the same underlying allegations, all
circuit courts to consider the issue have held
that the different opting mechanisms do not
require dismissal of the state claims.
Our sister circuits have correctly reasoned
that FLSA's plain text does not suggest that
a district court must dismiss a state law
claim that would be certified using an optout procedure. Its opt-in requirement
extends only to “any such action”—that is, a
FLSA claim. FLSA also expressly permits
more protective state labor laws. This
savings clause provides further evidence that
a federal lawsuit combining state and federal
wage and hour claims is consistent with
FLSA.
Nor does the legislative history of Section
216(b) support the view of some district
courts that allowing both actions to proceed
simultaneously “would essentially nullify
Congress's intent in crafting Section 216(b)
and eviscerate the purpose of Section
216(b)'s opt-in requirement.” We agree with
the Third Circuit that the “full legislative
record casts doubt” on the contention that
Section 216(b) was intended to eliminate
opt-out class actions. When Congress
created Section 216(b)'s opt-in requirement
as part of the Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947,
it was responding to concerns about third
parties filing “representative” FLSA actions
on behalf of disinterested employees.
Accordingly, it amended FLSA “for the
purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs
to employees who asserted claims in their
own right and freeing employers of the
burden of representative actions.”
This purpose does not evince an intent to
eliminate opt-out class actions for state wage

and hour claims brought in federal court.
Even if it did, Congress has expressed a
contrary intent in the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, which confers federal
jurisdiction over class actions where certain
diversity
and
amount-in-controversy
requirements are met. Because the Class
Action Fairness Act provides that federal
courts should exercise jurisdiction over
certain class actions (including those
alleging violations of state wage and hour
laws), and these class actions are certified
pursuant to Rule 23's opt-out procedure, we
cannot conclude that Congress intended
such claims be dismissed simply because
they were brought in conjunction with FLSA
claims.
Integrity argues that allowing both classes to
proceed simultaneously would cause
“unnecessary confusion” for potential class
members who would receive notices “stating
both that they must opt in to have their
compensation issues adjudicated and that
they must opt out to avoid having their
compensation issues adjudicated.” While we
do not minimize this practical concern, we
agree with the Seventh Circuit that district
courts should be able to “work[ ] out an
adequate notice in this type of case.”
Furthermore, “if these actions were to
proceed separately—the FLSA in federal
court and the state-law class action in state
court—an entirely different and potentially
worse problem of confusion would arise,
with uncoordinated notices from separate
courts peppering the employees.”
In sum, we agree with the other circuits to
consider the issue that the fact that Rule 23
class actions use an opt-out mechanism
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while FLSA collective actions use an opt-in
mechanism does not create a conflict
warranting dismissal of the state law claims.
III
Turning to the merits, we review de novo a
district court's dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Accepting the plaintiffs' allegations as true
and construing them in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, we may affirm a
dismissal only if the complaint fails to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Applying this standard, we hold that the
district court erred in holding that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim under FLSA
for passing through security clearances at
the end of the day. But, under the facts
alleged, we affirm its dismissal of the claim
for shortened lunch periods.
A
FLSA, as amended by the Portal–to–Portal
Act of 1947, generally precludes
compensation for activities that are
“preliminary” or “postliminary” to the
“principal activity or activities” that the
employee “is employed to perform.” But
preliminary and postliminary activities are
still compensable under the Portal–to–Portal
Act if they are “integral and indispensable”
to an employee's principal activities. To be
“integral and indispensable,” an activity
must be (1) “necessary to the principal work
performed” and (2) “done for the benefit of
the employer.”
In Alvarez, we held that putting on and
taking off protective gear was necessary to
the principal work of employees at a meat

packing plant because the gear was required
by the employer's rules, by federal
regulators, and by the “ ‘nature of the work.’
” Moreover, the donning and doffing
benefited the employer by preventing
“workplace injury and contamination.” But
in Bamonte v. City of Mesa, we held that
donning and doffing police uniforms was
not necessary to police officers' principal
work because they could change at home
and chose to do so at work for their own
benefit.
Here, Busk and Castro have alleged that
Integrity requires the security screenings,
which must be conducted at work. They also
allege that the screenings are intended to
prevent employee theft—a plausible
allegation since the employees apparently
pass through the clearances only on their
way out of work, not when they enter. As
alleged, the security clearances are
necessary to employees' primary work as
warehouse employees and done for
Integrity's benefit. Assuming, as we must,
that these allegations are true, the plaintiffs
have stated a plausible claim for relief.
In holding otherwise, the district court relied
upon out-of-circuit cases holding that time
spent clearing security was not compensable
under the Portal–to–Portal Act. But these
cases are distinguishable because, in these
cases, everyone who entered the workplace
had to pass through a security clearance. In
Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., the
Second Circuit held that security procedures
at a nuclear power plant were part of
noncompensable travel time under 29 U.S.C.
§ 254(a)(1) in part because the “security
measures at entry are required (to one
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degree or another) for everyone entering the
plant,” including visitors. In Bonilla v.
Baker Concrete Construction Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit held that construction
workers employed by a subcontractor to
work on an airport construction project were
not entitled to compensation for passing
through a security clearance. Because the
Federal Aviation Administration mandated
the security process, the court held that the
screening did not benefit the employer.
Gorman and Bonilla do not concern a
security screening put in place because of
the nature of the employee's work. But here
Integrity allegedly requires the screening to
prevent employee theft, a concern that stems
from the nature of the employees' work
(specifically, their access to merchandise).
Therefore, the district court erred in
assuming Gorman and Bonilla created a
blanket rule that security clearances are
noncompensable instead of assessing the
plaintiffs' claims under the “integral and
indispensable” test.
Because we hold that the plaintiffs have
stated a valid claim for relief under FLSA
for the time spent passing through security
clearances, we also reverse the district
court's dismissal of the parallel state law
claim.
B
The district court also held that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under FLSA for their
shortened lunch periods. Under the facts as
alleged, we agree.
FLSA does not require compensation for an
employee's lunch period, but an “employee

cannot be docked for lunch breaks during
which he is required to continue with any
duties related to his work.” An “employee is
not relieved if he is required to perform any
duties, whether active or inactive, while
eating.” For example, “an office employee
who is required to eat at his desk or a factory
worker who is required to be at his machine
is working while eating.”
Here, Busk and Castro alleged they were not
“completely relieved from duty” because by
placing the time clocks far from the
lunchroom, Integrity forced upon them the
“duty to walk to the lunch room in order to
eat lunch.” But the district court correctly
held that walking to the lunchroom is not a
work duty. Walking to the lunchroom is not
necessary to the plaintiffs' principal work as
warehouse employees. Moreover, though the
Portal–to–Portal Act does not clearly
preclude compensation for walking to the
lunchroom, as it only expressly applies to
walking before the workday starts and after
it ends, it would be incongruous to preclude
compensation for walking into work on the
employer's premises, but require it for
walking to the lunchroom.
Busk and Castro also argue they are entitled
to compensation for their entire 30–minute
lunch periods because supervisors would
frequently “remind” workers to “finish their
meal period quickly so that they would
clock back in on time.” They rely upon
cases
noting
that
“very
frequent
interruptions” might make meal periods
compensable. But these cases concern
whether employees are entitled to
compensation for lunch periods when they
remain “on call.” They use the term
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“interruptions” to refer to instances where
the employee has to resume a work duty—
for instance, when emergency medical
service employees fielded emergency calls,
or maintenance workers responded to
maintenance problems. That supervisors
may have “interrupted” Busk and Castro in
another sense of the word does not make
their lunch periods compensable absent any
claim that they performed a work duty.
Finally, the first amended complaint alleges
that employees had to pass through a
security clearance on their way to the
lunchroom. Assuming that the time passing
through the security clearance on the way to
lunch constitutes compensable work, the
time alleged in this case is de minimis. As
alleged in the first amended complaint, the
walk to and from the cafeteria takes
“approximately five minutes” each way,
though employees pass through security
only on their way to the cafeteria, not on the
return trip. The relatively minimal time
expended on the clearance in this context
differs from the 25–minute delay alleged for
employees passing through security at day's
end. Therefore, the district court correctly
dismissed this claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
The plaintiffs also argue that even if the
district court correctly dismissed their FLSA
claim relating to the shortened lunch
periods, it should not have dismissed their
state law claim because Nevada law would
require compensation even when federal law
does not.

Nevada law requires that an employer
provide a half-hour meal break if it employs
a worker for a continuous eight-hour period.
The law provides, “No period of less than 30
minutes interrupts a continuous period of
work for the purposes of this subsection.”
But there is no private right of action to
enforce this section. The Nevada Legislature
has entrusted the enforcement of this statute
to the state Labor Commissioner by
expressly providing that the “Labor
Commissioner or the representative of the
Labor Commissioner shall cause the
provisions of NRS 608.005 to 608.195,
inclusive, to be enforced.”
Nevada Revised Statute § 608.140 does
provide a private right of action to recoup
unpaid wages. Thus, the district court
correctly focused on whether Busk and
Castro alleged they were required to “work”
during their lunch periods. However, the
plaintiffs raised for the first time on appeal
their argument that Nevada defines “work”
differently than federal law, such that their
lunch periods might be compensable under
state law even if they were not compensable
under federal law. Because the district court
has not considered this argument, we
remand for it to do so in the first instance.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
PART; REMANDED. Each party shall
bear its own costs on appeal.
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“Amazon Warehouse Worker Pay Suit Heads to Supreme Court”
Fortune
Claire Zillman
March 3, 2014
Security lines. They are the worst. And
many workers have to pass through them
every day. The U.S. Supreme Court decided
on Monday to tackle the question of whether
the time spent waiting in those lines is
deserving of hourly pay.
The Supreme Court said that it would hear a
class action lawsuit filed in 2010 by former
employees of Amazon contractor Integrity
Security Systems who claim that, under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), they
deserve back pay for the time they spent in
security checks at the beginning and end of
the day, which the warehouse mandated to
prevent employee theft.
The workers were “required to wait at least
10 to 15 minutes each day, and often more
than a half hour, at the beginning and end of
each shift without compensation whatsoever
in order to undergo a search for contraband
and/or pilferage of inventory,” the complaint
says.
Integrity Security contends that the security
screenings are similar to other tasks — such
as waiting to punch the clock or walking to
and from the workplace — that are noncompensable under the FLSA. Amazon said
on Monday that it doesn’t comment on
pending litigation.
The Supreme Court never explains why it
accepts or rejects a case, but the widespread

use of security checks in workplaces likely
carried a lot of weight.
In petitioning the Supreme Court to take the
case, Integrity’s lawyer, Paul Clement,
argued that “in the post-9/11 world, security
screenings have become ubiquitous in the
American workplace and are routinely
required for employees working in
skyscrapers, corporate campuses, federal,
state, and local government officers,
courthouses, sports arenas, museums,
airports, power plants, theme parks, and
countless other places.” Allowing the
Nevada workers’ suit to go forward,
Clement argued, “opens employers up to
billions of dollars in retroactive damages.”
Indeed, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit let the Nevada workers’ case
continue, other employees filed similar
nationwide class actions against Amazon
distribution centers in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Washington state. Workers at a regional
distribution center sued CVS Pharmacy in
September 2012 over its security checks,
and tens of thousands of workers sued Apple
in July 2013 because it requires its hourly
retail employees to go through bag searches
and clearance checks.
Wage and hour lawsuits in general — in
which workers accuse their employers of
unfair pay practices — is one of the few
areas of workplace litigation that’s on the
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rise. There were 7,882 lawsuits filed under
the FLSA last year, up about 3% from 2012,
according to the Annual Workplace Class
Action Litigation Report from law firm
Seyfarth Shaw. Many of the lawsuits hinge
on what sort of activity constitutes the
compensable
workday,
says
Gerald
Maatman, a labor and employment lawyer at
Seyfarth, who is representing a third-party
contractor in one of the Amazon lawsuits.
The Supreme Court’s decision in the
Integrity case will at least give a definitive
answer to the question of whether security
checks should be included in the payable
workday. Other courts have tackled this
issue before: the Eleventh Circuit evaluated
whether airport employees deserved pay for
their time in the security line, and the

Second Circuit decided the issue as it related
to workers at a nuclear power plant. In both
cases, the courts sided with the employers.
But the Integrity case is different and a fairer
test of the issue because it’s the employer
itself — Integrity Security — that mandated
the security checks, not an outside authority
like
the
Transportation
Security
Administration.
That means the outcome of the Integrity
case will apply to a “greater variety of
companies,” says Mark Batten, a labor and
employment lawyer at Proskauer Rose. “It
will have a lot of impact on a lot of
businesses.”
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“Supreme Court May Finally Clarify Compensable Time”
Law 360
Kenneth W. Gage
April 2, 2014
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
had multiple occasions to address whether
— and under what circumstances —
employers must compensate employees for
their time going from point A to point B and
back. Most often, this question has arisen in
“donning and doffing” cases, in which point
A is the place where uniforms or protective
gear are put on and taken off and point B is
the location where employees perform their
principal duties.
The question revolves around the distinction
between activities that are “integral and
indispensable” to an employee’s principal
activities, which are compensable under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and activities that
are
merely
“preliminary”
and
“postliminary,” which are excluded from
compensable time by the Portal-to-Portal
Act.
On March 3, 2014, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case of Integrity Staffing
Solutions Inc. v. Busk, which presents a new
twist to this issue, that is somewhat a
creature of the modern age. Integrity
Staffing is not a donning and doffing case.
Instead, it relates to the time employees
spend going from point B (i.e., where they
fill customer orders for retail goods) back to
point A (i.e., where the employer requires
them to pass a security screening before
leaving the facility).
Framework of Existing Case Law

The FLSA, as originally passed, was
interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946)
to require compensation for all time during
which an employee was required to be on
the employer’s premises. Congress quickly
responded to a sharp increase in litigation
that arose after that decision by passing the
Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, which excludes
two categories of activity from compensable
time: (1) traveling to and from the place
where employees perform their principal
activities, and (2) “activities that are
preliminary to or postliminary to” “the
principal activity or activities which” the
individual is employed to perform.” This left
for the courts to define in any given case
what employee activities are “principal.”
The Supreme Court subsequently held that
activities which are “integral and
indispensable” to an employee’s “principal”
activities are themselves principal activities
and therefore compensable. In 1956, the
high court addressed the issue in two cases.
In Steiner v. Mitchell, it held that changing
clothes and showering were compensable
activities for employees who worked in an
environment where caustic and poisonous
chemicals were used in their work. In
Mitchell v. King Packing Co., the Supreme
Court held that knife sharpening is “an
integral part of and indispensable to” the
butchering activities for which the
employees were principally employed.
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Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court held in
IBP v. Alvarez, that employee time spent
walking at the end of the day from the
location where they performed their meat
processing activities back to the area where
they removed their protective gear — an
activity the employer conceded was integral
and indispensable to the meat processing
duties — was compensable.
The Supreme Court explained that “during a
continuous workday, any walking time that
occurs after the beginning of the employee’s
first principal activity and before the end of
the employee’s last principal activity” is
compensable. Applying these rules, lower
courts have held that time spent waiting to
punch in and out on a time clock, walking
from an employer’s parking facility to the
workplace and even changing clothes or
showering, where those activities could be
performed off-site, is not compensable under
the FLSA.
The Challenge of Security Screenings in
the Workplace
Integrity Staffing supplies warehouse
workers on a contract basis to various
clients; the plaintiffs worked for Integrity
filling customer orders for retail goods at
warehouses owned by Amazon.com in
Nevada. At the ends of their shifts, the
plaintiffs and their fellow order-fillers were
required to pass through a security screening
station designed to reduce employee theft.
The screening process itself appears to have
been relatively simple — employees were
required to empty their pockets and walk
through a metal detector. According to the
plaintiffs, however, the security stations
were badly understaffed, resulting in wait

times of up to 25 minutes as hundreds of
employees’ shifts ended simultaneously.
Seeking compensation for the time they
spent in this process, the plaintiffs filed a
class action complaint on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated.
The U.S. district court in Nevada granted
Integrity’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss; the
Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit
applied a two-pronged test to determine
whether the activity at issue was “integral
and indispensable,” considering whether it
is: (1) “necessary to the principal work
performed” and (2) “done for the benefit of
the employer.” Because the security
screening process was allegedly required by
Integrity for the purpose of preventing theft
by employees with access to retail
merchandise, the circuit court explained, the
plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to conclude that the
screening was integral and indispensable to
their principal activity of filling customer
orders. Put slightly differently, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that if the screening was
not aimed at all employees, then it must be
related to the work performed by those
employees to which it did apply. Relying on
the allegation that all employees were not
required to participate in the security
screening, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
the case before it from a Second Circuit
case, Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp.,
and an Eleventh Circuit case, Bonilla v.
Baker Concrete Construction Co.
Gorman involved nuclear power plant
employees seeking compensation for the 10
to 30 minutes a day spent in security checks
at the plant’s entrance that were required for
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all persons entering the plant, including
visitors; the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court’s Rule 12 dismissal. The
Second Circuit’s analysis was different from
the Ninth Circuit’s in Integrity Staffing; it
explained that “’[i]ndispensable’ is not
synonymous with ‘integral’,” and therefore
the fact that an employer required
employees to engage in certain activity only
establishes indispensability.
The Second Circuit did not consider whether
the activity benefited the employer. To be
integral, the activity at issue must be
somehow joined or linked in other ways
with the employee’s principal activities, the
court explained. The court held that the
security activities required were “necessary
in the sense that they are required and serve
essential purposes of security; but they are
not integral to principal work activities.”
There are two things worth noting about
Gorman, however. First, the plaintiff’s
complaint did not “even mention what kind
of work [p]laintiff” did at the power plant.
Second, the court of appeals explained in a
footnote that the result may be different for
an employee whose principal activity was
“monitoring, testing and reporting on the
plant’s infrastructure security.”
Bonilla
involved
construction-workers
seeking compensation for time spent in
FAA-mandated security checks at the
entrance to a restricted portion of the airport
where they were working; the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the
employer. Like the Second Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that the necessity
of going through the security screening was

insufficient standing alone to make the time
compensable. The court concluded, in order
to be compensable “the activity in question
must be work in the benefit of the
employer,” and the FAA-mandated security
screening was not.
The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to
Clarify What it Means for an Activity to
be "Integral and Indispensable" to an
Employee’s Principal Activity
In today’s environment, it is the rare
employer that does not have some sort of
security process for employees entering
and/or leaving the work location, even if that
process merely involves swiping an
identification badge. Participation in such
security processes is invariably required of
employees, and those processes undoubtedly
benefit the employer. The Portal to Portal
Act clearly excludes the time an employee
travels to and from the place where she
performs her principal activities from
compensable time, however.
But, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
employee participation in a simple security
screening may be sufficient to support a
claim that the time traveling from point A
(i.e., the security screen at the beginning of
the workday) to B (i.e., the place where the
employee performs her principal activities)
— and the time traveling from point B back
to A at the end of the workday — is
compensable.
Integrity Staffing provides the Supreme
Court an opportunity to more specifically
articulate what it means for an activity
occurring at the beginning or end of an
employee’s workday to be integral and
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indispensable to an employee’s principal
work activity. The court’s existing case law
requires that there must be some relationship
between the activity at issue and the
principal activities the employee is paid to
perform. But, as the Eleventh Circuit
observed in Bonilla, the statute “does not
allow for a clean analytical distinction
between those activities that are ‘integral
and indispensable’ and those that are not.”
Whatever test the Supreme Court may
adopt, it should not be sufficient, as the
Ninth Circuit suggests is the case, that the
activity be required by and for the benefit of
the employer in order for it to be
compensable — something more should be
required.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Integrity
Staffing is unworkable and inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. If the
activity is required by someone other than
the employer, as the court in Bonilla
observed, then that activity certainly should
not be compensable. But the fact that an
activity is required by an employer does not
logically lead to the conclusion that the
activity is integral and indispensable to the
employee’s principal activities.
The activity may be required by virtue of the
employment relationship itself (e.g., all
employees must swipe a security badge to
enter the building) or by virtue of the
employee’s work location (e.g., all
employees assigned to work in a particular
location must pass through security for
safety reason). In either case, performance
of the activity may not facilitate the
principal activities the employee is paid to

perform, other than to allow him access to
his workplace. The question, instead, should
be whether the activity is required (i.e.,
indispensable) for the employee to carry out
his or her job, as was the case in Mitchell
where the evidence revealed that
“[s]harpening the knife is integral to carving
a carcass.” Or in the case of an employee
participating in a security screening, as
suggested by the Second Circuit in Gorman,
where the evidence reveals that her principal
activity was “monitoring, testing and
reporting on the plant’s infrastructure
security.”
Similarly, the fact that an activity benefits an
employer also does not logically lead to the
conclusion that it is integral and
indispensable to the employee’s principal
activities. Rarely does an employer require
anything of its employees without deriving
some benefit. Requiring employees to park
at the back of a parking lot, for example, so
that customers can park closer to the facility
benefits the employer, but has nothing to do
with the employee’s principal activities.
Requiring employees to wear a specific
uniform certainly provides a benefit to the
employer, and many employers require
uniforms for all employees, regardless of
their duties. But, it is already wellestablished that such a uniform requirement
does not start the time clock running for all
employees the moment they get dressed at
home before their shift.
However the Supreme Court rules in
Integrity Staffing, its decision will
potentially have a wide-ranging impact on
most large employers.
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“Amazon Workers Want Pay for Time Spent at Security Checkpoint”
Lawyers.com
Aaron Kase
April 25, 2013
Warehouse workers subcontracted to
Amazon.com can move forward with a
lawsuit seeking wages for the time it takes
them to pass through a security checkpoint
at the end of their shift, a court ruled this
month.
After the workday is over, employees
at Integrity Staffing Solutions who spend the
day at a warehouse filling Amazon orders
are required to wait in line for a search to
make sure they aren’t stealing anything. It
takes about 20 to 25 minutes to get through
the checkpoint, plaintiffs say, after they’ve
already clocked out.
That’s nearly two hours or more every week
spent at work that isn’t being compensated.
Alleging that the practice violates federal
labor rules, former employees Jesse Busk
and Laurie Castro initiated a class action
lawsuit against Integrity to recoup the
difference.
A district court stepped in and dismissed the
suit, but earlier this month the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals gave the class
action the green light to advance. The
plaintiffs “allege that the screenings are
intended to prevent employee theft – a
plausible allegation since the employees
apparently pass through the clearances only
on their way out of work, not when they
enter,” the opinion says. “As alleged, the
security clearances are necessary to
employees’ primary work as warehouse
employees and done for Integrity’s benefit.”

However, the 9th Circuit upheld the District
Court’s dismissal of a portion of the suit
seeking compensation for the time it took to
walk to the employee lunch area.
Time on the Clock
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act
mandates that workers get paid for “all time
during which an employee is necessarily
required to be on the employer’s premises,
on duty or at a prescribed work place,”
which may “be longer than the employee’s
scheduled shift, hours, tour of duty, or
production line time.” Work time includes
periods during which an employee is
“engaged to wait” for an employmentrelated activity.
Other courts have found that employees do
not have to be compensated for the time it
takes to pass through security. However, in
those instances the checks were made
uniformly in the interest of safety, such as
for workers at an airport or other sensitive
facilities.
The distinction in the Busk-Castro suit is
that the checks were made solely to protect
the employer’s interest in not having
merchandise stolen, and therefore could
count as time on the clock, the 9th Circuit
reasoned.
“Postliminary
activities
are
still
compensable . . . if they are ‘integral and
indispensable’ to an employee’s principal
activities,” the opinion states, comparing the
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Integrity checks to situations in which
employees are required to put on and take
off specialized outfits on the premises of a
job.
If Integrity doesn’t want to pay for the extra
20 minutes, they could reduce the amount of
time it takes to leave the warehouse. “There
are thousands of employees all going
through the gates at the same time,” says
Mark Thierman, a labor and employment
attorney at the Reno-based Thierman Law
Firm, which is representing the plaintiffs.
“They could relieve it by opening more
checkpoints or staggering releases.”
Head of the Class
The class potential could be huge. “We
estimate there’s over 38,000 Amazon
workers employed by Integrity or other
subcontractors,” Thierman says. Taking into

account employee turnover, the total number
could approach 100,000 members.
The statute allows for compensation to be
sought for the previous three years, although
the attorneys are hoping to extend the period
to five years given the time it took to appeal
the dismissal.
Most of the workers affected make between
$9 and $12 an hour. “If you want to take the
pencil to paper we’re talking hundreds of
millions of dollars,” the lawyer says.
Current or former Integrity employees
eligible to join the class need to opt in to the
lawsuit by filing a consent to sue form or
contacting the attorneys. “The bottom line,”
says Thierman, “is people are going to get
some serious money if they participate.”
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“FLSA Actions Can Coexist with State Class Claims: 9th Circ.”
Law 360
Ben James
April 12, 2013
The Ninth Circuit ruled Friday that Fair
Labor Standards Act collective action and
state law class action claims were not
inherently incompatible, reviving a lawsuit
accusing Integrity Staffing Solutions Inc. of
illegally failing to pay warehouse workers
for time spent waiting to clear security
checkpoints.
A three-judge appellate panel issued a
published opinion that partially reversed a
Nevada district judge's ruling that said
former Integrity workers Jesse Busk and
Laurie Castro failed to state valid claims
under the FLSA and that their Nevada law
claims had to be dismissed because of
conflicting class certification mechanisms
under the FLSA and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, which governs class actions.
The panel fell into step with its sibling
circuits' reasoning that the text of the FLSA
— which calls for class members to opt in to
the suit — doesn't suggest that a district
court had to dismiss state law class claims
governed by the usual opt-out mechanism,
under which class members are covered
unless
they
affirmatively
exclude
themselves.
“We agree with all other circuits to consider
the issue that such actions can peacefully
coexist. Therefore, the district court erred in
dismissing the state law claims based on a
perceived conflict,” the panel held.
The panel — ruling on a challenge to an

order granting a motion to dismiss — also
shot down the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs hadn't stated a valid FLSA claim
based on post-shift time workers had to
spend passing through security checkpoints
allegedly meant to deter theft. However, the
panel agreed with the trial court that the
plaintiffs hadn't stated a claim under the
FLSA for shortened lunch periods.
Busk and Castro worked at warehouses in
Nevada
filling
orders
placed
by
Amazon.com customers, court papers said.
Busk filed the suit in October 2010, and
both plaintiffs lodged an amended complaint
in December 2010, alleging that workers
had to wait up to 25 minutes at the end their
shifts to passed through a theft-deterrent
“post 9/11 type” of security clearance that
involved removing wallets, keys and belts,
and passing through metal detectors.
They also sought compensation under the
FLSA and federal law based on the fact that
they had to spend 10 minutes of their 30minute unpaid meal breaks moving to and
from a cafeteria. The plaintiffs and others
like them were entitled to regular pay for all
hours worked and premium pay for any
overtime hours, the amended complaint said.
Although the question of whether there's a
conflict between the opt-out FLSA claims
and opt-in state law class claims is
interesting, the Ninth Circuit's ruling was
very significant because of what it said
about whether time spent waiting to clear
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security checkpoints was compensable, said
Mark Thierman of the Thierman Law Firm
PC, which represents the plaintiffs. Making
employees wait to go through security
without paying them after shifts is a
common practice, according to Thierman.
“It's a huge case for the real world, and not
just the legal world,” Thierman said of the
Integrity Staffing matter.
The panel said that the district court dropped
the ball by assuming that there was a
“blanket rule” that security clearance time
isn't compensable, as opposed to applying
the appropriate test.
The appeals court said that the lower court
had found that the plaintiffs' waiting time

wasn't compensable based on “out-of circuit cases.” Here, the plaintiffs' allegation
that the security screenings are meant to stop
theft is plausible, because they only had to
go through such screenings when they left
work, not when they arrived, the appeals
court noted. In the cases the district court
relied on, employees had to pass through
security when entering the workplace, the
panel said.
“As alleged, the security clearances are
necessary to employees’ primary work as
warehouse employees and done for
Integrity’s benefit,” the panel held.
An attorney for Integrity declined to
comment.
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Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean
13-894
Ruling Below: MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security, 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
cert granted, 2014 WL 297729 (U.S. 2014).
Federal Air Marshal petitioned for review of a decision of Merit Systems Protection Board, 116
M.S.P.R. 562, which sustained his removal by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
for his unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information. He argued that the
Whistleblower Act of 1989 barred the government from disciplining any federal employee for
exposing information that the individual worker believed would be “a specific danger to public
health or safety.” The respondent argued the information petitioner disclosed was protected by
law from exposure, and therefore, the Whistleblower Act of 1989 does not apply.
Question Presented: Whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A),
which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,”
can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally
discloses Sensitive Security Information

ROBERT J. MACLEAN, Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
Decided on April 26, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
MOORE, Circuit Judge
Robert J. MacLean petitions for review of a
final decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board (“Board”), which sustained
the Transportation Security Administration's
(“Agency's”) removal of Mr. MacLean from
the position of Federal Air Marshal
(“Marshal”). Because the Board incorrectly
interpreted the Whistleblower Protection Act
(“WPA”), we vacate and remand.
BACKGROUND

Mr. MacLean became a Marshal in 2001. In
July 2003, all Marshals received a briefing
from the Agency that there was a “
‘potential plot’ to hijack U.S. Airliners.”
Soon after that briefing, however, the
Agency sent an unencrypted text message to
the Marshals' cell phones cancelling all
missions on flights from Las Vegas until
early August. After receiving this directive,
Mr. MacLean became concerned that
“suspension of overnight missions during a
hijacking alert created a danger to the flying
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public.” He complained to his supervisor
and to the Office of Inspector General, but
they responded that nothing could be done.
Dissatisfied, Mr. MacLean told an MSNBC
reporter about the directive so as to “create a
controversy resulting in [its] rescission.”
MSNBC published an article criticizing the
directive, and the Agency withdrew it after
several members of Congress joined in the
criticism.
In 2004, Mr. MacLean appeared on NBC
Nightly News in disguise to criticize the
Agency dress code, which he believed
allowed Marshals to be easily identified.
However, someone from the Agency
recognized his voice. During the Agency's
subsequent investigation, Mr. MacLean
admitted that he revealed the cancellation
directive to an MSNBC reporter in 2003.
Eventually, Mr. MacLean was removed
from his position because his contact with
the MSNBC reporter constituted an
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security
information (SSI). Although the Agency had
not initially labeled the text message as SSI
when it was sent, it subsequently issued an
order stating that its content was SSI.
Mr. MacLean challenged the SSI order in
the Ninth Circuit as a violation of the
Agency's own regulations and as an
impermissible retroactive action, but the
court rejected Mr. MacLean's challenges. It
held that substantial evidence supported
designating the text message as SSI under
the applicable regulations, and that the
Agency did not engage in retroactive action
because it “applied regulations ... in force in
2003” to determine that the text message
was SSI.

Mr. MacLean challenged his removal before
the Board, arguing that his disclosure of the
text message was protected whistleblowing
activity. After an interlocutory appeal from
the Administrative Judge (AJ), the full
Board determined that Mr. MacLean's
disclosure fell outside the WPA because it
was “specifically prohibited by law.” The
Board reasoned that the regulation
prohibiting disclosure of SSI, upon which
the Agency relied when it removed Mr.
MacLean, had the force of law.
The AJ then upheld Mr. MacLean's removal
and the Board affirmed in MacLean II, the
decision now on appeal. Reconsidering
MacLean I, the Board explained that a
regulation is not a “law” within the meaning
of the WPA. Instead, the Board held that the
disclosure of the text message could not
qualify for WPA protection because it was
directly prohibited by a statute, the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).
The Board also determined that the AJ
applied the correct regulation in upholding
the Agency's removal of Mr. MacLean, and
that the penalty of removal was reasonable.
Moreover, the Board upheld the AJ's finding
that the Agency did not terminate Mr.
MacLean in retaliation for his activities on
behalf of the Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association (FLEOA) because the
unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a nonretaliatory reason for removal. Therefore,
the Board sustained the removal.
This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
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We must affirm the Board's decision unless
it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (2) obtained without procedures
required by law, rule, or regulation having
been followed; or (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.” We review the
Board's legal determinations de novo.
I. Application of Agency Regulations to
Mr. MacLean's Removal
The Board explained that, “[u]nder the
regulations in effect in July 2003,
information relating to the deployment of
[Marshals] was included within the
definition of SSI,” and concluded that, as a
result, Mr. MacLean's communication with a
reporter constituted an unauthorized
disclosure. Mr. MacLean argues, however,
that the Board erred by upholding his
removal because he was not charged under
the right regulation. He explains that the
regulation quoted in the initial charge, 49
C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), was not in force in
2003 and only became codified in 2005. Mr.
MacLean contends that the Board wrongly
concluded that the regulation it ultimately
relied on to uphold his removal, 49 C.F.R. §
1520.7(j), which was in force in 2003, is the
same as the 2005 regulation. Mr. MacLean
argues that the Board violated the rule
of SEC v. Chenery Corp. because the Board
affirmed his removal on grounds different
from those under which he was initially
charged by the deciding official.
Mr. MacLean also maintains that, although
the Ninth Circuit upheld the Agency's
eventual designation of the text message as
SSI, his removal violated his due process
rights because the message was not labeled

SSI when it was sent. He argues that the
termination was improper because he did not
know that he was violating any Agency
rules by revealing the content of the text
message. Mr. MacLean admits that he
signed a nondisclosure agreement as a
condition of his employment, which states
that Marshals “may be removed” for
“[u]nauthorized release of security-sensitive
or classified information.” He argues,
however, that he believed that the message
was not SSI and that, in any event, he was
protected as a whistleblower. Repeating the
argument rejected by the Board, Mr.
MacLean thus insists that he tried in good
faith to proceed within the law.
We do not find Mr. MacLean's arguments
challenging the Agency's charge to be
persuasive. The regulation that the Board
ultimately relied upon to uphold Mr.
MacLean's removal is no different from the
regulation under which he was initially
charged. The earlier regulation bars
disclosing “[s]pecific details of aviation
security measures,” including “information
concerning specific numbers of [Marshals],
deployments or missions,” while the latter
prohibits revealing “specific details of
aviation ... security measures” and
“[i]nformation concerning deployments.” In
fact, the regulation's history shows that §
1520.5(b)(8)(ii) is simply a recodified
version § 1520.7(j). Because the Agency
removed Mr. MacLean for revealing SSI,
and the Board affirmed the termination for
that same reason, the Board did not violate
the Chenery doctrine.
We likewise reject Mr. MacLean's due
process and “good faith” arguments. Both
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the applicable regulation and the
nondisclosure agreement that Mr. MacLean
signed put him on notice that revealing
information concerning coverage of flights
by Marshals could lead to termination. Thus,
the Agency did not violate due process even
though it formally designated the text
message as SSI only after it was sent.
Furthermore, we agree with the government
that, because the regulation prohibiting
disclosure of SSI does not include an intent
element, Mr. MacLean cannot be exonerated
by his subjective belief that the content of
the text message was not SSI or that he was
protected as a whistleblower.
II. Reasonableness of Mr. MacLean's
Removal
Mr. MacLean argues that the Board failed to
adequately analyze the factors listed
in Douglas v. Veterans Administration for
possible mitigation of the penalty of
removal. Mr. MacLean contends that the
Board did not take into account the fact that
he was a one-time offender and otherwise
had an unblemished record. Mr. MacLean
also argues that Douglas's “comparative
discipline” factor did not weigh in favor of
removal because other Marshals were not
terminated even though they disclosed SSI
regarding specific flights. Mr. MacLean
contends that the Board ignored the fact that
other Marshals' disclosures were for
personal gain, while his disclosure exposed
and led to correcting an Agency mistake. He
thus argues that revealing the text message
to a reporter served the public interest, and
that his termination undermined the
efficiency of the service.

The government counters that the Board did
not abuse its discretion when it determined
that Mr. MacLean's termination promoted
the efficiency of the service. The
government argues that there is no evidence
that Mr. MacLean's actions made the flying
public safer. The government contends that,
because even a possibility that a Marshal
may be onboard is an important deterrent to
terrorist activity, Mr. MacLean's disclosure
compromised flight safety and forced the
Agency to reallocate scarce resources to
address this new vulnerability. The
government explains that, although Mr.
MacLean was a first-time offender with a
clean record, he was properly removed
because his disclosure could have had
catastrophic consequences. The government
argues that Mr. MacLean differs from the
Marshals who kept their jobs in spite of SSI
breaches
because
those
Marshals
compromised only individual flights and
showed remorse.
We agree with the government. The Board
analyzed the relevant Douglas factors and
did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that Mr. MacLean's removal was not a
disparate penalty. Unlike other Marshals,
Mr. MacLean revealed that multiple flights
would be unprotected, and we cannot say
that it was unreasonable for the Board to
find that Mr. MacLean's belief that he was
doing the right thing was outweighed by the
resulting threat to public safety. Moreover, it
was not unreasonable for the Board to
determine that Mr. MacLean's conduct
“caused the [A]gency to lose trust in him,”
because Mr. MacLean admitted that he has
“no regrets” and “feel[s] no remorse for
going to a credible and responsible media
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representative,” Given these circumstances,
the Board did not abuse its discretion by
upholding Mr. MacLean's removal.
III. Mr. MacLean's Prohibited Personnel
Practice Claim
The Board rejected Mr. MacLean's
argument that the Agency violated the Civil
Service Reform Act by investigating him in
retaliation for his FLEOA activities. The
statute at issue prohibits individuals in
positions of authority from discriminating
against a government employee “on the
basis of conduct which does not adversely
affect the performance of the employee ... or
the performance of others.” The Board
concluded that Mr. MacLean's prohibited
personnel practice challenge failed because
he did not “meet his burden to establish that
the reason articulated by the [A]gency was
pretextual and that the real reason
underlying that decision was his FLEOA
activities.” Mr. MacLean reasserts his
discrimination argument on appeal. He
contends that the Agency investigated him
because of his 2004 appearance on NBC
Nightly News, which he made as part of his
advocacy on behalf of FLEOA.
We agree with the government that
substantial evidence supports the Board's
conclusion that the Agency did not
discriminate against Mr. MacLean on the
basis of his FLEOA activities. Agency
Policy Directive ADM 3700 “regulate[s]
and prohibit[s] [Marshals'] unauthorized
contact with the media,” and record
evidence is consistent with the AJ's
determination that Mr. MacLean was
initially investigated for his unauthorized
media appearance, not for his FLEOA

activities. Indeed, it is undisputed that the
Agency began to investigate Mr. MacLean
“within days of his unauthorized
appearance” on NBC Nightly News, which
was “approximately 22 months after he
began organizing and leading the [FLEOA]
chapter.” Although the Agency ultimately
did not pursue the media appearance charge
and focused on the SSI disclosure charge,
the initial investigation does not appear to be
frivolous or pretextual because it was
justified by Directive ADM 3700.
IV. Mr. MacLean's Affirmative Defense
Under the WPA
The WPA prohibits individuals in positions
of authority from taking a “personnel
action” against a government employee in
certain circumstances, particularly
because of any disclosure of
information by an employee ... which
the employee ... reasonably believes
evidences ... a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety, if such
disclosure is not specifically prohibited
by law ...
Board rejected Mr. MacLean's affirmative
defense that his disclosure of the text
message was protected whistleblowing
activity because it determined that the
disclosure was “specifically prohibited by
law” within the meaning of the WPA. The
law that the Board relied upon is the ATSA,
which states, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5
..., the Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe
regulations
prohibiting
disclosure of information obtained or
developed in ensuring security under
this
title if
the
Secretary
of
Transportation decides disclosing the
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information would ... be detrimental to
transportation safety.
Because its conclusion that revealing the
content of the text message was specifically
prohibited by the ATSA made further WPA
inquiry unnecessary, the Board did not reach
the question of whether Mr. MacLean
“reasonably believe[d]” that this information
“evidence[d] ... a substantial and specific
danger to public ... safety.”
The parties do not dispute that, in order to
fall under the WPA's “specifically
prohibited by law” proviso, the disclosure
must be prohibited by a statute rather than
by a regulation. Thus, the core of the
disagreement is whether the ATSA
“specifically prohibit[s]” disclosure of
information concerning coverage of flights
by Marshals within the meaning of the
WPA.
Mr. MacLean and his amici (three members
of Congress) argue that the Board
erroneously concluded that the ATSA's
mandate to the Secretary of Transportation
to “prescribe regulations prohibiting
disclosure” of certain kinds of information is
a specific prohibition under the WPA. They
contend that the phrase “specifically
prohibited by law” in the WPA can only
refer to explicit statutory language that
identifies
specific
classes
of
information. They argue that the ATSA's
“detrimental to transportation safety”
language does not establish particular
criteria for withholding information and
leaves a great deal of discretion to the
Agency, which is inconsistent with the
WPA's requirement of specificity. They
contrast the ATSA with the Trade Secrets

Act, which directly authorizes removal of
any federal employee who divulges
information that falls into particular
categories.
The government counters that Mr. MacLean
violated a regulation promulgated pursuant
to an express legislative directive in the
ATSA, which made his disclosure
“specifically prohibited” by a statute. It thus
argues that Mr. MacLean's disclosure does
not qualify for WPA protection. The
government contends that Mr. MacLean's
reading of the WPA eviscerates laws that
provide for any Agency discretion in
classifying information as SSI, and thus
disables Congress from directing agencies to
pass nondisclosure regulations. Lastly, the
government argues that it does not make
sense for Congress to order an agency to
promulgate nondisclosure regulations and at
the same time prohibit that agency from
disciplining an employee for violating those
regulations by providing a defense under the
WPA.
We agree with Mr. MacLean that the ATSA
does not “specifically prohibit” the
disclosure at issue in this case. The ATSA's
plain language does not expressly prohibit
employee disclosures, and only empowers
the Agency to prescribe regulations
prohibiting disclosure of SSI “if the
Secretary decides disclosing the information
would ... be detrimental to public safety.”
Thus, the ultimate source of prohibition of
Mr. MacLean's disclosure is not a statute but
a regulation, which the parties agree cannot
be “law” under the WPA.
Notably, Congress changed the language
“specifically prohibited by law, rule, or
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regulation” in the statute's draft version to
simply “specifically prohibited by law.”
Congress did so because it was concerned
that the broader language “would encourage
the adoption of internal procedural
regulations against disclosure, and thereby
enable an agency to discourage an employee
from coming forward with allegations of
wrongdoing.” Congress explained that only
“a statute which requires that matters be
withheld from the public as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or ... which
establishes particular criteria for withholding
or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld” could qualify as a sufficiently
specific prohibition. In contrast, the
“detrimental to transportation safety”
language of the ATSA does not describe
specific matters to be withheld. It provides
only general criteria for withholding
information and gives some discretion to the
Agency to fashion regulations for
prohibiting disclosure. Thus, the ATSA does
not “specifically prohibit” employee conduct
within the meaning of the WPA.
The ATSA's insufficient specificity becomes
even more apparent when it is contrasted
with statutes that have been determined to
fall under the WPA's “specifically
prohibited by law” proviso. For example, the
Trade Secrets Act, which the Board
in Kent held to qualify as a specific
prohibition, is extremely detailed and
comprehensive. That statute penalizes
federal employees who “divulge[ ] ... any
information coming to [them] in the course
of [their] employment ... which information
concerns or relates to the trade secrets,
processes, operations, style of work, or
apparatus, or to the identity, confidential

statistical data, amount or source of any
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of
any person, firm, partnership, corporation,
or association....” The same is true of § 6013
of the Internal Revenue Code, which the
Ninth Circuit in Coons v. Secretary of the
Treasury held to fall within the meaning of
the WPA's “specifically prohibited”
language. That statute prohibits federal
employees from “disclos[ing] any return or
return information obtained by him in any
manner in connection with his service,” and
then goes on to define “return” and “return
information” in explicit detail, mentioning
such things as “a taxpayer's identity, the
nature, source or amount of his income,
payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions,
credits, assets, overassessments, or tax
payments ...” Thus, when Congress seeks to
prohibit disclosure of specific types of
information, it has the ability to draft the
statute accordingly.
Nonetheless, we note that the ATSA's
charge to the Secretary of Transportation to
prescribe regulations pursuant to specific
criteria (i.e., only information that would be
detrimental to transportation safety) makes
this a very close case. Indeed, the ATSA
appears to fall in the middle of the spectrum
of statutes flanked at opposite ends by (a)
those that fall squarely under the WPA's
“specifically prohibited by law” proviso,
such as the Trade Secrets Act and § 6013 of
the Internal Revenue Code, and (b) those in
which Congress delegates legislative
authority to an administrative agency
without circumscribing the agency's
discretion.
Regulations
promulgated
pursuant to Congress's express instructions
would qualify as specific legal prohibitions.
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In this case, given the clarity of the statutory
language and legislative intent behind the
WPA's
specificity
requirement,
the
parameters set by Congress are not enough
to push the ATSA over that threshold.
We are similarly unpersuaded by the
government's argument that a parade of
horribles necessarily follows our adoption of
Mr. MacLean's interpretation of the WPA.
The government argues that, if Mr.
MacLean is allowed to pursue his
whistleblower defense, the WPA would in
effect prohibit later Congresses from
directing agencies to pass nondisclosure
regulations. The government is concerned
that, under Mr. MacLean's reading, the
WPA would prohibit agencies from
disciplining employees for violating
nondisclosure regulations and thereby
prevent agencies from enforcing such
regulations.
The government is mistaken. In spite of the
WPA, Congress remains free to enact
statutes empowering agencies to promulgate
and enforce nondisclosure regulations, and it
has done so in the ATSA. The government
ignores the fact that the ATSA covers a wide
range of conduct that would not qualify as
whistleblowing. For example, no one
disputes that the ATSA empowers the
Agency to promulgate regulations that
enable it to discipline employees who reveal
SSI for personal gain or due to negligence,
or who disclose information that the
employee does not reasonably believe
evidences a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety. The WPA also
does not prohibit the Agency from following
the ATSA's mandate to regulate public

access to information that the Agency might
otherwise be forced to disclose under the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
(FOIA). Indeed, it appears that the
paramount goal of the ATSA is to empower
the Agency to reject the public's requests for
Agency intelligence because the statute
recites that, “[n]otwithstanding [FOIA] ...,
the Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure
of information obtained or developed in
ensuring security under this title.” Our
interpretation of the WPA does not deprive
the ATSA of meaning.
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. MacLean's disclosure is not
“specifically prohibited by law” within the
meaning of the WPA, we vacate the Board's
decision and remand for a determination
whether Mr. MacLean's disclosure qualifies
for WPA protection. For example, it remains
to be determined whether Mr. MacLean
reasonably believed that the content of his
disclosure evidenced a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.
VACATED AND REMANDED
WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Mr. MacLean presented substantial evidence
that he was not motivated by personal gain
but by the desire to protect the public. He
averred proof that he sought direction from
his supervisors before making allegedly
protected disclosures. While I join in the
analysis and the result of the majority
opinion, I concur to emphasize that the facts
alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the core
of the Whistleblower Protection Act.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Air Marshal Should be Protected as
Whistleblower”
Washington Post
Robert Barnes
May 19, 2014
The Supreme Court said Monday that it will
decide an important question of when a
federal employee may release to the public
sensitive information from his agency that
he feels endangers fellow citizens.
The court agreed to a request from the
Obama administration that the justices
review a lower court’s decision that a
federal air marshal may have been unfairly
fired for going to the media about a security
plan with which he disagreed.
Robert J. MacLean was an air marshal in
2003. Just after being briefed about a
potential terrorist attack, MacLean said he
received another message from the
Transportation Security Administration: that
because of a budget shortfall, the agency
was cutting back on overnight trips for
undercover air marshals.
MacLean said he went to his boss, who told
him to keep quiet. Instead, he leaked the
information to a reporter for MSNBC. This
caused a congressional uproar, and the
Department of Homeland Security canceled
the order within 24 hours, calling it
“premature and a mistake.”

in a brief, “effectively permits individual
federal employees to override the TSA’s
judgments about the dangers of public
disclosure.”
MacLean’s response was that he should not
have been fired for actions that others found
heroic and were not unlawful.
“Robert MacLean was a federal air marshal
who spoke up about the consequences of a
dangerous
and
possibly
unlawful
government decision,” wrote Washington
lawyer and former deputy solicitor general
Neal Katyal.
“Because he blew the whistle, the
government changed policy and a potential
tragedy was averted. But Mr. MacLean paid
a hefty price.”
According to MacLean’s brief, Sen. Barbara
Boxer (D-Calif.) thanked the anonymous
tipster “who came forward and told the
truth.”
MacLean’s identity was not discovered until
three years later, when he appeared on an
NBC Nightly News program about a
different incident.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit said MacLean was entitled to argue
that he was protected by whistleblower laws
after he was fired by the TSA in 2006.

His disguise on that broadcast “proved to be
inadequate,” the government’s brief says,
and the TSA fired him for disclosing
sensitive security information.

The lower court ruling, U.S. Solicitor
General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. told the court

The
appeals
court
said
MacLean was entitled to argue that he was
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protected as a whistleblower and that his
disclosure had not been “specifically
prohibited by law.” The government said the
regulations passed by the agency, which it
contends prohibited MacLean’s actions,
were authority enough to fire the air
marshal.

considered sensitive by the agency; it had
been sent unencrypted to his cellphone.
The case, Department of Homeland Security
v. MacLean, will be heard sometime during
the court’s term that begins next October.

MacLean had contended that the plan about
eliminating overnight trips was not
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“Is Hike in Whistleblower Claims a Sign of Progress or Growing Mistrust?”
Federal News Radio
Jack Moore
May 20, 2014
Not quite two years ago, President Barack
Obama signed into law a sweeping update to
whistleblower protections for civilian
federal employees.
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act expanded the authority of both the
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit
Systems Protection Board to review
employees' claims of agency wrongdoing
and made it easier to discipline agency
officials
who
retaliate
against
whistleblowers.
Both agencies have seen their caseloads
skyrocket since the law went into effect.
But are the growing claims of retaliation
evidence of a crackdown on whistleblowing
employees or that more employees actually
feel comfortable coming forward to report
agency misconduct?
The heads of both OSC and MSPB told
Federal News Radio as part of the special
report, Trust Redefined: Reconnecting
Government and Its Employees, that their
increasing workloads could actually be a
sign of progress — that more employees feel
protected now to make disclosures.
"If people can come forward and report
waste, fraud or abuse — or health and safety
problems — it makes our government
stronger," said Carolyn Lerner, head of the
OSC, in an interview with Federal
Drive hosts Tom Temin and Emily Kopp.

"When we have an environment and an
atmosphere where employees are rewarded
instead of punished for coming forward, I
think that creates a better culture and it
certainly creates a more effective
government."
Still,
an
exclusive
Federal
News
Radio survey reveals a wide chasm of trust
remains when it comes to feds blowing the
whistle at work. Just 16 percent of
respondents to the survey said they felt
protected enough to report waste, fraud or
abuse at their agencies even with the recent
changes in law.
"Retaliation for whistleblowing is alive and
well, despite supposed legal protections,"
one respondent said.
Agencies hit with
whistleblower claims

wave

of

new

Lerner said OSC has seen an incredible
uptick in its caseload over the last year or so
as more employees come to the agency
alleging that they've been retaliated against
for reporting agency misconduct.
Very often, "after somebody blows the
whistle, the terms or conditions of their
employment change," Lerner said. "It can be
something like a hostile work environment.
It can be up to and including termination."
So far, in fiscal 2014, the agency has
received more than 1,700 complaints of
prohibited personnel practices, about half of
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which
involve
retaliation
whistleblowing, she said.

for

Lerner's agency wasn't the only one to be hit
with an increased workload following recent
changes in the law.
Whistleblower claims filed with MSPB have
more than doubled in recent years,
according to the board's chairwoman, Susan
Tsui Grundmann.
But there may be more than the new law at
work that explains the rise in cases, she said.
"The reason why I suspect we're seeing
more claims may have less to do with
changes in the law and more to do with a
greater awareness of a federal employee's
rights to file in this area," she told Federal
Drive hosts Tom Temin and Emily Kopp.
For one thing, whistleblower organizations
and good-government groups have helped
raise awareness of whistleblowing concerns,
she said.
Agencies are also attempting to do their part.
"At the same time, agencies are a lot sharper
in terms of getting the word out, training
people [on] what's protected, what's not
protected and your venue to redress your
claims," Grundmann said.
Do agencies' whistleblower practices pass
muster?
OSC runs training workshops to brief
managers on their responsibilities under the
whistleblower laws and to educate
employees about their rights, including the
fact that retaliation against whistleblowers is
a prohibited personnel practice.

The ultimate goal of OSC's outreach efforts
is to change the conversation — the climate
— around whistleblowing.
"No one likes to be criticized; no one likes
to feel like they are being called out for
doing something wrong," Lerner said. "But
the more we can create a climate where
disclosures are viewed as ultimately a good
thing, as an employee trying to do what's
right for the agency and for the government
and, frankly, for our country, the better
things will be. If we can help agencies create
that climate of openness where employees
feel like coming forward as valued, that will
help trust."
That will also have a very practical impact,
she suggested.
"I'm convinced that more education and
outreach
will
help
prevent
misunderstandings and mistakes and,
ultimately, result in fewer complaints
needing to be filed in the first place."
Shirine
Moazed,
chief
of
OSC's
Washington, D.C., field office, oversees a
team responsible for training federal
managers and ensuring an agency's
whistleblower practices pass muster.
Moazed said the trainings emphasize that
education is an essential step in preventing
whistleblower retaliation — and other
prohibited practices — and that such
education must start at the top.
"So, if the head of the agency and the head
of the components make it very significant
that their supervisors be trained and train
others on the prohibitions against
whistleblower retaliation, that's something
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that's going to generate interest and
understanding throughout the agency," she
told In Depth with Francis Rose.
'There are no real protections in place'
But despite the recent changes to law and
the outreach efforts across government, it
appears many would-be whistleblowers still
don't feel protected enough to disclose
potential wrongdoing. Just 14 percent of
respondents to an exclusive Federal News
Radio survey agreed that there are enough
protections in place for whistleblowers to
feel safe to report waste, fraud and abuse.
"In print and in theory, yes, there are enough
protections
in
place
for
federal
whistleblowers," one respondent said. "In
reality, there is not because of the real
possibility of retaliation from management
and/or the agency."
Another respondent presented an even
gloomier perspective.

"There are no real protections in place. It is
all lip service. All the employees who have
come forward in recent memory have their
careers destroyed ... or they were punished
with career-ending reassignments."
While fewer than 22 percent of respondents
said they had personally reported waste,
fraud or abuse at their agency, 44 percent of
those who did said they were retaliated
against in some form.
Those findings are similar to a 2011 MSPB
report on whistleblower retaliation. The
report indicated that while employees'
perceptions of agency wrongdoing had
actually declined between 1992 — when
MSPB first studied the issue — to 2011, the
overall perception that employees would be
retaliated against for speaking out had not.
About 36 percent of respondents said they
were retaliated against or threatened with
retaliation for reporting agency misconduct,
according
to
the
MSPB
study.
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“Fed. Circ. Ups Protection for Whistleblowers’ Disclosures”
Law 360
Bill Donahue
April 19, 2013
The Federal Circuit stressed Friday that
government whistleblowers are protected by
federal law unless their disclosures are
explicitly prohibited by another statute,
reviving the case of an air marshal who was
fired for leaking policy changes to a
reporter.
According to the opinion, Robert MacLean
was terminated after he told an MSNBC
reporter that the Department of Homeland
Security planned to remove all marshals
from flights in and out of Las Vegas for a
short period in 2003 – a change he thought
endangered public safety.
Though several congressmen publicly came
to his aid and the department eventually
reversed course, the Merit Systems
Protection Board later found that MacLean
didn’t qualify for reinstatement as a bona
fide whistleblower.
The Whistleblower Protection Act exempts
protection for employees who break other
laws when they come forward, and the
department persuaded the MSPB that
MacLean had violated the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act by disclosing
classified air marshal information to the
reporter.
The Federal Circuit overturned that decision
Friday, saying the WPA’s exemption was
reserved for the release of classified
information that a law specifically bans.
More vague laws like the ATSA—which

merely empowers an agency to create
nondisclosure regulations—don’t make that
cut, the court said.
“Notable, Congress changed the language
‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or
regulation’ in the [WPA]’s draft version to
simply ‘specifically prohibited by law,’” the
appeals court said.
“Congress did so because it was concerned
that the broader language would encourage
the adoption of internal procedural
regulations against disclosure, and thereby
enable an agency to discourage an employee
from coming forward with allegations of
wrongdoing,” the panel added.
In contrast, similar but more direct
provisions under laws like the Internal
Revenue Code—which bans employees
from disclosing a private tax return for any
reason—are specific enough to qualify
under the WPA’s exemption, the court
wrote.
“When Congress seeks to prohibit disclosure
of specific types of information, it has the
ability to draft the statute accordingly,” the
court said.
The opinion also rejected Department of
Homeland Security’s
argument that
MacLean’s tougher interpretation of the
WPA would effectively neuter Congress’
ability to empower government agencies to
implement and enforce nondisclosure laws.
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Under the court’s reading of the WPA,
agencies can still punish and fire employees
from disclosing information for personal
gain or out of negligence and can pass rules
to limit their exposure to Freedom of
Information Act requests, the court said.
What they can’t do, the court said, is punish
an employee for blowing the whistle by
releasing information that Congress hasn’t
specifically barred.
Though a win for MacLean, Friday’s ruling
does not a whistleblower make. With the
proper interpretation of the WPA
established, the appeals court remanded the
case back to the MSPB to determine other
prongs of the whistleblower test, like
whether MacLean made his disclosure
because he believed the department’s policy
posed a legitimate threat.

sacrifices, but no one should have to endure
seven or more years of aggravation,”
MacLean said.
A representative for the Department of
Homeland Security didn’t immediately
return a request for comment on the
decision.
Judges Sharon Prost, Kimberly Moore and
Wallach sat on the panel, with Moore
penning the majority opinion.
MacLean was represented by Lawrence
Berger of Mahon and Burger and by
Thomas M. Devine of Government
Accountability Project.
The case was Robert J. MacLean v.
Department of Homeland Security, case
number 11-3231, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal District.

Writing a one-paragraph concurring opinion,
U.S. Circuit Judge Evan Wallach agreed
with the ruling of the majority but used
stronger language to stress the high bar for
exempting disclosures from protection.
“I concur to emphasize that the facts alleged,
if proven, allege conduct at the core of the
Whistleblower Protection Act,” Wallach
wrote.
In a statement on Monday, MacLean said
the
ruling—alongside
last
year’s
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act—would mean that whistleblowers will
have “significantly more confidence to
expose wrongdoing without the fear of being
marginalized
or
suffering
financial
hardship.”
“An honest employee with the fortitude to
expose corruption should expect to make
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Comptroller v. Wynne
13-485
Ruling Below: Maryland State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Brian Wynne, 431 Md. 147
(2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2660 (2014).
Individual state-resident taxpayers sought judicial review of Tax Court decision that affirmed,
against a Commerce Clause challenge, assessment by state comptroller of county income tax
without a credit for payment of out-of-state income taxes. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court,
Howard County, Louis A. Becker, III, J., reversed decision of Tax Court and remanded case.
After an appeal was noted to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari.
Question Presented: Whether the United States Constitution prohibits a state from taxing all the
income of its residents -- wherever earned -- by mandating a credit for taxes paid on income
earned in other states.

MARYLAND STATE COMPTROLLER OF the TREASURY
v.
Brian WYNNE, et ux.
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Decided on January 28, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
McDONALD, Judge
Federal and Maryland law allow for the
attribution of corporate income to the
corporation's shareholders—without being
taxed at the corporate level—in defined
circumstances. In particular, the income of a
Subchapter S corporation is deemed to “pass
through” to the shareholders who are then
directly taxed on that income. Some or all of
that income may be generated outside the
state in which a shareholder resides.
The Maryland income tax law reaches all of
the income of a Maryland resident. The
State income tax law allows a credit against

an individual's State tax liability for income
taxes paid to other states based on the
income earned in those states. However, that
credit takes no account of, and cannot be
taken against, the portion of the Maryland
income tax known as the “county income
tax.”
This case poses the question whether the
failure to allow a credit violates the federal
Constitution when a portion of a Maryland
resident taxpayer's income consists of
significant “pass-through” income generated
by a Subchapter S corporation in other
states, apportioned to the taxpayer, and
taxed by the states in which it was
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generated. The taxpayer has appealed an
assessment by the State Comptroller that did
not allow a credit against the county income
tax portion of the Maryland income tax.
The Comptroller, as he should, defends the
tax law as written by the Legislature and
interpreted by this Court. The taxpayers
accept that interpretation, but assert that it is
wanting when measured against the federal
Constitution. They rely on a multitude of
cases—virtually all of which are subsequent
to the 1975 amendment of the Maryland tax
law that uncoupled the credit from the
county income tax—that assess state taxes
against what has come to be known as the
“dormant Commerce Clause.”
Although the Maryland Tax Court ruled in
favor of the Comptroller, the Circuit Court
for Howard County reversed that decision
and held that the statute's failure to allow
such a credit violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. For the reasons that
follow, we find merit in the taxpayers'
contentions and affirm the judgment of the
Circuit Court.
Background
State Income Taxes
A state may tax the income of its residents,
regardless of where that income is earned. A
state may also tax a nonresident on income
earned within the state. Both of these
propositions are consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, they raise the
possibility of what might be termed “double
taxation” when both the state of the
taxpayer's residence and the state where the
income was generated tax the same income.

As explained below, the Commerce Clause
of the federal Constitution sets certain
constraints on this possibility, which the
states recognize through the provision of
credits for payments of out-of-state taxes.
Maryland Individual Income Tax
State law imposes an income tax on
individuals. It is composed of three parts:
(1) a State income tax (the “State tax”)
at a rate set by the Legislature in statute;
(2) a county income tax that applies
only to residents of each county (the
“county tax”) at a rate set by the county
within the range allowed by statute; and
(3) a tax on those subject to State
income tax but not the county tax (the
“Special Non–Resident Tax” or
“SNRT”) at a rate equal to the lowest
county tax.
Thus, all individual taxpayers are subject to
the State tax and either the county tax or the
SNRT. These taxes are all collected by the
Comptroller; the proceeds of the county tax
are distributed to the relevant county.
Credit for Income Taxes Paid to Other
States
State law allows for an individual subject to
the Maryland income tax to take a credit
against the State tax for similar taxes paid to
other states. In particular:
a resident may claim a credit only
against the State income tax for a
taxable year in the amount determined
under [TG § 10–703(c) ] for State tax
on income paid to another state for the
year. There are various exceptions to
this credit, none of which are pertinent
to this case. In general, the credit is
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designed to ensure that Maryland
receives, at a minimum, the Maryland
income tax due on the taxpayer's
income that is attributable to Maryland,
regardless of the another state's method
or rate of taxation.
No credit is given against the county tax for
income taxes paid in other states. As this
Court outlined in Blanton, a credit had
previously applied with respect to the county
tax. However, in 1975, the Legislature
amended the tax code to eliminate that
credit.
S Corporations and Income Taxes
A Subchapter S corporation or “S
corporation” is a corporation—often a
relatively small business—that meets certain
requirements set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code and makes an election to pass
through its income and losses, for federal tax
purposes, to its shareholders. Each
shareholder reports his or her share of the S
corporation's income and losses on their
individual tax returns and is assessed federal
income tax at the shareholder's individual
rate. In that way, the income that the S
corporation generates for its owners is taxed
at one level—similar to the taxation of a
partnership—rather than at two levels
(corporate and shareholder) as is otherwise
typically the case. To accomplish this, the
character of any item of income or loss of an
S corporation “passes through” to its owners
“as if that item were realized directly from
the source from which realized by the
corporation, or incurred in the same manner
as incurred by the corporation.”
Some states accord similar pass-through
treatment to the income of an S corporation;

other states do not and require an S
corporation to pay income tax directly. The
Maryland income tax law incorporates, for
the most part, the definitions of income
under the Internal Revenue Code.
Accordingly, the income of an S corporation
“passes through” and is attributed to its
shareholders for purposes of the Maryland
income tax law.
The Wynnes
Services

and Maxim

Healthcare

The underlying facts are undisputed. The
taxpayers are Brian and Karen Wynne (“the
Wynnes”), a married couple with five
children residing in Howard County. During
the 2006 tax year, Brian Wynne was one of
seven owners of Maxim Healthcare
Services, Inc. (“Maxim”), a company that
does a national business providing health
care services, and owned 2.4% of its stock.
Maxim had made an election under the
Internal Revenue Code to be treated as an S
corporation. As a result of that election,
Maxim's income was “passed through” to its
owners for federal income tax purposes, and
the Wynnes reported a portion of the
corporation's income on their individual
federal income tax return.
Because Maryland accords similar passthrough treatment to the income of S
corporations, the Wynnes also reported passthrough income of Maxim on their 2006
Maryland tax return. A substantial portion of
the pass-through income had been generated
in other states and was taxed by those states
for the 2006 tax year.
In particular, for the 2006 tax year, Maxim
filed state income tax returns in 39 states.
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Maxim allocated to each shareholder a pro
rata share of taxes paid to the various states.
The returns did not indicate payments of
income taxes to any county or local entity in
other states. The Wynnes claimed their pro
rata share of such income taxes paid to other
states as a credit pursuant to TG § 10–
703(c) against
their
2006
Maryland
individual income tax, reflected on
Maryland Form 502.
Assessment and Appeal
The Comptroller made a change in the
computation of the local tax owed by the
Wynnes and revised the credit for taxes paid
to other states on the Wynnes' 2006
Maryland Form 502. The net result was a
deficiency in the Maryland taxes paid by the
Wynnes, and the Comptroller issued an
assessment, which the Wynnes appealed.
On October 6, 2008, the Hearings and
Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office
affirmed the assessment, although it revised
it slightly. The Wynnes then appealed to the
Maryland Tax Court where they argued, for
the first time, that the limitation of the credit
to the State tax for tax payments made to
other states discriminated against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Tax Court rejected that argument and
affirmed the assessment on December 29,
2009.
The Wynnes then sought judicial review in
the Circuit Court for Howard County.
Following a hearing on the appeal, the
Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court in a
decision issued on June 29, 2011. The
Circuit Court remanded the case to the Tax

Court for further factual development and
“an appropriate credit for out-of-state
income taxes paid” on Maxim's income. An
appeal was noted to the Court of Special
Appeals on July 22, 2011. Prior to hearing
and decision in the intermediate appellate
court, this Court granted certiorari.
Discussion
Standard of Review
The Tax Court is “an adjudicatory
administrative agency in the executive
branch of state government.” A decision of
the Tax Court is subject to the same
standards of judicial review as contested
cases of other administrative agencies under
the State Administrative Procedure Act. In
undertaking such review, this Court directly
evaluates the decision of the agency—in this
case, the Tax Court.
When the Tax Court interprets Maryland tax
law, we accord that agency a degree of
deference as the agency that administers and
interprets those statutes. In this case, the Tax
Court's decision required the application and
analysis of cases interpreting the United
States Constitution. Because our review of
its analysis turns on a question of
constitutional law, we do not defer to the
agency's determination.
The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Wynnes do not contest the State's
authority to tax their income, wherever
earned,
under
the
Due
Process
Clause. Rather, they base their challenge to
the Comptroller's assessment on what has
come to be known as the “dormant
Commerce Clause” of the United States
Constitution. The dormant Commerce
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Clause is a restriction on State power that is
not explicitly articulated in the Constitution
but that has been derived as a necessary
corollary of a power specifically conferred
on Congress by the Constitution.
The Commerce Clause provides Congress
with the power to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several
States,
and
with
the
Indian
Tribes.” “Though phrased as a grant of
regulatory power to Congress, the
[Commerce] Clause has long been
understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that
denies the States the power unjustifiably to
discriminate against or burden the interstate
flow of articles of commerce.” This
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is
an “implied limitation on the power of state
and local governments to enact laws
affecting foreign or interstate commerce.”
We assess first whether the dormant
Commerce Clause is implicated by the
county tax and, if so, whether the failure to
provide a credit for out-of-state taxes
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
Does the Application of the County Tax
without a Credit Implicate the Dormant
Commerce Clause?
Although each of the three components of
the State income tax has its own label and is
created by different code provisions, each is
for federal constitutional purposes a state
income tax. In any event, whether the tax is
nominally a state or county tax is irrelevant
for purposes of analysis under the dormant
Commerce Clause because a state may not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce

through its subdivisions any more than it
may at the state level.
Much recent case law concerning the
dormant Commerce Clause has been “driven
by concern about economic protectionism—
that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.” While
many cases construing the dormant
Commerce Clause concern state taxation,
“[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects
markets and participants in markets, not
taxpayers as such.” Therefore, the dormant
Commerce Clause will not affect the
application of a tax unless there is actual or
prospective competition between entities in
an identifiable market and state action that
either expressly discriminates against or
places an undue burden on interstate
commerce. This impact must be more than
incidental.
The Comptroller argues that the county
income tax is not directed at interstate
commerce and that the Wynnes have failed
to identify any interstate commercial activity
affected by a failure to allow a credit against
that tax for tax payments to other
states. However, application of the dormant
Commerce Clause is not limited to
circumstances where physical goods enter
the stream of commerce. For example, a
state tax exemption related to the movement
of people across state borders for economic
purposes has been held to implicate
interstate commerce and violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Moreover, even when a
state tax is imposed on an intrastate activity,
if that tax substantially affects interstate
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commerce, the tax is subject to scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause.
The Comptroller asserts that the Wynnes are
subject to Maryland income taxes because of
their status as Maryland residents and not
because of their activities in intrastate or
interstate commerce. But this is a false
dichotomy. In fact, they are subject to the
income tax because they are Maryland
residents and because they have income
derived from intrastate and interstate
activities; other states may also tax some of
that same income because it derives from
activities in those state. This case concerns
the constitutional constraint on the otherwise
overlapping power to tax such income.
In making his argument based on a state's
power to tax its own residents, the
Comptroller relies on several cases from
other states that fail to distinguish the
constraints on state taxation imposed by the
dormant Commerce Clause from those
imposed by the Due Process Clause or that
are otherwise distinguishable from the case.
Those cases are not persuasive.
The limitation of the credit for payments of
out-of-state income taxes to the State portion
of the Maryland income tax can result in
significantly different treatment for a
Maryland resident taxpayer who earns
substantial income from out-of-state
activities when compared with an otherwise
identical taxpayer who earns income entirely
from Maryland activities. In particular, the
first taxpayer may pay more in total state
and local income taxes than the second. This
creates a disincentive for the taxpayer—or
the S corporation of which the taxpayer is an
owner—to
conduct
income-generating

activities in other states with income taxes.
Thus, the operation of the credit with respect
to the county tax may affect the interstate
market for capital and business investment
and, accordingly, implicate the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Does Application of the County Tax
without a Credit Violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause?
The Supreme Court has held that a state may
tax interstate commerce without offending
the dormant Commerce Clause so long as
the tax satisfies a four-prong test. Under that
test, a state tax survives a challenge under
the dormant Commerce Clause if it:
(1) applies to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state;
(2) is fairly apportioned;
(3) is not discriminatory towards
interstate or foreign commerce; and
(4) is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.
The Wynnes apparently do not dispute that
the application of the county tax in this case
has a substantial nexus to Maryland or that it
is fairly related to services provided by the
State. Thus, for purposes of the present
controversy, we focus on the remaining two
prongs of the Complete Auto test: the
requirement of fair apportionment and the
prohibition against discrimination against
interstate commerce.
(1) Is the county tax without a credit fairly
apportioned?
The purpose of the apportionment
requirement is to ensure that each state taxes
only its fair share of an interstate
292

transaction. “It is a commonplace of
constitutional jurisprudence that multiple
taxation may well be offensive to the
Commerce Clause. In order to prevent
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, the
Court has required that taxes be apportioned
among taxing jurisdictions, so that no
instrumentality of commerce is subjected to
more than one tax on its full value.” “The
rule which permits taxation by two or more
states on an apportionment basis precludes
taxation of all of the property by the state of
the domicile.... Otherwise there would be
multiple taxation of interstate operations.”
The dormant Commerce Clause does not
mandate the adoption of a particular income
allocation formula for apportionment. In
order to assess the fairness of apportionment
courts look to whether a tax is “internally
consistent” as well as “externally
consistent.”
(a) Is the county tax without a credit
internally consistent?
“Internal consistency is preserved when the
imposition of a tax identical to the one in
question by every other State would add no
burden to interstate commerce that intrastate
commerce would not also bear. This test
asks nothing about the degree of economic
reality reflected by the tax, but simply looks
to the structure of the tax at issue to see
whether its identical application by every
state in the Union would place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage as compared
with commerce intrastate.”
Internal consistency is thus measured by the
answer to the following hypothetical
question: If each state imposed a county tax

without a credit in the context of a tax
scheme identical to that of Maryland, would
interstate commerce be disadvantaged
compared to intrastate commerce?
The answer is yes. In this scenario, TG §
10–703 (or its hypothetical equivalent in
other states) would grant a credit against a
taxpayer's home state income tax but not
against the home county income tax for
income taxes paid to other states. As a
result, taxpayers who earn income from
activities undertaken outside of their home
states would be systematically taxed at
higher rates relative to taxpayers who earn
income entirely within their home state.
Those higher rates would be the result of
multiple states taxing the same income.
This is illustrated by the following example.
• Tax rates. Assume each state imposes a
state tax of 4.75% on all the income of its
residents, a county tax of 3.2% on all the
income of residents, and a SNRT of 1.25%
on the income of non-residents earned
within the state.
• Credit. Assume that each state allows a
credit for income taxes paid to other states
that operates in the same fashion as TG §
10–703—i.e., the formula for the credit and
application of the credit take only the home
state “state tax” into account.
• Taxpayer with in-state income only. Mary
lives in Maryland and earns $100,000,
entirely from activities in Maryland.
Mary owes $4,750 in Maryland state
income tax (.0475 x $100,000), $3,200
in Maryland county income tax (.032 x
$100,000) for a total Maryland tax
of $7,950.
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• Taxpayer with multi-state income. John
lives in Maryland and earns $100,000, half
($50,000) from activities in Maryland and
half
($50,000)
from
activities
in
Pennsylvania.
Because John is a resident of Maryland,
all of his income is subject to both the
Maryland “state tax” and the “county
tax” applicable to his county. Before the
application of any credit, John owes
$4,750 in Maryland state income tax
(.0475 x $100,000), $3,200 in Maryland
county income tax (.032 x $100,000)
for a total Maryland tax of $7,950.
Because half of John's income was
generated in Pennsylvania, John also
owes $2,375 in Pennsylvania state
income tax (.0475 x $50,000) and $625
with respect to the Pennsylvania SNRT
(.0125 x $50,000) for a total
Pennsylvania tax of $3,000.
John receives a credit in the amount of
$2,375 with respect to his Maryland
state income tax pursuant to credit
formula set forth in TG § 10–703(c).
This reduces his Maryland income tax
to $5,575.
Thus, John owes a combined total
of $8,575 in state income taxes. As the
above example demonstrates, a taxpayer
with income sourced in more than one state
will consistently owe more in combined
state income taxes than a taxpayer with the
same income sourced in just the taxpayer's
home state. This may discourage Maryland
residents from engaging in income-earning
activity that touches other states. In the
context of S corporations, it may encourage
Maryland residents to invest in purely local
businesses, and discourage businesses from
seeking to operate both in Maryland and in

other states. In effect, it acts as an extra tax
on interstate income-earning activities. It
fails the internal consistency test.
While it is true that a failure to pass the
internal consistency test does not always
signal a constitutional defect in a state tax
scheme, the circumstances under which the
courts have tolerated a lack of internal
consistency do not pertain here. One such
case concerned a flat $100 annual fee
imposed by Michigan upon trucks engaged
in intrastate commercial hauling. The
petitioners in that case challenged the fee on
the ground that it discriminated against
interstate carriers and unconstitutionally
burdened interstate trade because the fee
was flat but trucks carrying both interstate
and intrastate loads engaged in less intrastate
business than trucks carrying only intrastate
loads. The Supreme Court held that the fee
did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. In analyzing the internal consistency
of the tax, the Court concluded that, if every
state imposed such a fee, an interstate
trucker doing local business in multiple
states would have to pay hundreds or
thousands of dollars in fees if it
supplemented its interstate business by
carrying local loads in many other states,
thus an internal inconsistency. The Court
nonetheless found no Commerce Clause
violation because a business would have to
incur such fees only because it engaged in
local business in all those states. “An
interstate firm with local outlets normally
expects to pay local fees that are uniformly
assessed upon all those who engage in local
business, interstate and domestic firms
alike.” Such a fee, in effect a toll on in-state
activity, is factually distinguishable from the
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present case involving business performed
and income earned outside of Maryland.
Moreover, we are not aware of an instance
in which a court has upheld an
unapportioned income tax on the authority
of American Trucking.

beyond that portion of value that is fairly
attributable to economic activity within the
taxing state.” “[T]he threat of real multiple
taxation (though not by literally identical
statutes) may indicate a state's impermissible
overreaching.”

The Comptroller advances an alternative
argument. Because an individual can only be
a resident of one county in the universe,
even if every taxing jurisdiction adopted
Maryland's tax structure, the individual
would only be required to pay a county tax
once. This, argues the Comptroller,
precludes the possibility of multiple taxation
by operation of the county tax. However,
this analysis appears to be inconsistent with
the logic underlying this Court's holding
in Frey that the Maryland SNRT is a state
tax for constitutional purposes. Moreover,
under dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
there are generally only two levels of
regulation, state and federal. The
Comptroller's analysis posits a third level,
the local level, such that a local tax need
only be considered in the light of local taxes
in other jurisdictions. But there appears to be
no authority in the case law for this position.

Thus, to test for external consistency one
asks: Does tax liability under the Maryland
income tax code reasonably reflect how
income is generated? Because no credit is
given with respect to the county tax for
income earned out-of-state, the Maryland
tax code does not apportion income subject
to that tax even when that income is derived
entirely from out-of-state sources. Thus,
when income sourced to out-of-state
activities is subject to the county tax, there is
a potential for multiple taxation of the same
income. In those circumstances, the
operation of the county tax appears to create
external inconsistency. This is further
indication that the application of the tax in
these circumstances without application of
an appropriate credit violates the dormant
Commerce Clause.

(b) Is the county tax without a credit
externally consistent?
The next question is whether the current
county
tax
scheme
is
externally
consistent. For this test, one must assess
“whether the State has taxed only that
portion of the revenues from the interstate
activity which reasonably reflects the instate component of the activity being taxed.”
This test looks to a state's “economic
justification” for its claim on the value taxed
“to discover whether a state's tax reaches

(2) Does the County Tax Discriminate
against Interstate Commerce?
Under the third prong of the Complete
Auto test, a tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce. Even if a tax is fairly
apportioned, it “may violate the Commerce
Clause if it is facially discriminatory, has a
discriminatory intent, or has the effect of
unduly burdening interstate commerce.” A
state tax may not discriminate against a
transaction because the transaction has an
interstate element or because the transaction
or incident crosses state lines. A taxing
scheme that encourages interstate businesses
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to conduct more of their business activities
within the taxing state may be found to be
discriminatory. Facially discriminatory state
taxes are subject to the strictest scrutiny, and
the “burden of justification is so heavy that
‘facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal
defect.’ ” There is no “de minimis ”
justification if a tax is found to actually
discriminate against interstate commerce.
Discriminatory effect may lie in the tax
itself, but it may also arise from interactions
with other states' taxes.
Particularly pertinent to the present case is
the Supreme Court's analysis of a North
Carolina tax in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,
supra. North Carolina imposed an
“intangibles tax” on the value of corporate
stock owned by North Carolina residents.
The tax was computed as a fraction of the
value of the stock, with the tax rate reduced
to the extent that the corporation's income
was subject to tax in North Carolina. This
resulted in a North Carolina stockholder
being taxed at a higher rate for holdings in
companies that did not do business in North
Carolina and at lower rates for holdings in
companies that did business in North
Carolina. The Supreme Court held that the
tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause
because it discriminated against interstate
commerce. In striking down the tax, the
Court stated: “[A] regime that taxes stock
only to the degree that its issuing
corporation participates in interstate
commerce favors domestic corporations
over their foreign competitors in raising
capital among North Carolina residents....”
This case presents a similar situation. The
application of the county tax to the out-of-

state
pass-through
income
without
application of a credit for out-of-state
income taxes on the same income means
that Maryland shareholders—the Wynnes in
this case—may be taxed at a higher rate on
income earned through Maxim's out-of-state
activities than on income earned though its
Maryland activities. This would appear to
favor businesses that do business primarily
in Maryland over their competitors who do
business primarily out-of-state—at least in
the context of ownership of a Subchapter S
corporation.
The
only
difference
between Fulton and the present case is one
of form. Whereas in Fulton it was North
Carolina's own tax rate that varied, in the
present case it is the imposition of an
additional tax, the tax set by the state where
the income was earned—and the failure to
provide a credit for it in Maryland—that
creates the discrimination. Nonetheless, the
effect is the same.
While the failure to allow a credit is at the
heart of the discrimination in this case, not
every denial of a deduction or credit for
taxes paid to another jurisdiction results in a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Amerada Hess v. New Jersey Dept. of the
Treasury, the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that
denied to oil-producing companies a
deduction for amounts paid under the federal
windfall profits tax. Holding that the tax did
not violate the Commerce Clause, the Court
noted, “a deduction denial does not unduly
burden interstate commerce just because the
deduction denied relates to an economic
activity performed outside the taxing State.”
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Amerada Hess is distinguishable from the
present case however. At issue in Amerada
Hess was a state deduction for a federal
income tax—a tax that a business would be
subject to no matter where it was located in
the United States, whether within New
Jersey or elsewhere. By denying a tax credit
in that case, New Jersey treated all similarlysituated taxpayers equally because a
business was subject to the same rate
regardless of whether the windfall profits
were earned within New Jersey or
elsewhere. By contrast, the failure to provide
a credit against the county tax in this case
penalizes investment in a Maryland entity
that earns income out-of-state: an
investment in such a venture incurs both
out-of-state taxes and the Maryland county
tax on the same income; a similar venture
that does all its business in Maryland incurs
only the county tax.
The tax at issue in this case is also similar to
the one in Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily.
There, a Louisiana statute had the
discriminatory effect of imposing a greater
tax on goods manufactured outside
Louisiana than on goods manufactured
within that state, thereby creating an
incentive to locate the manufacturing
process within Louisiana. Although the
mechanism is different, the application of
the credit in Maryland's income tax law has
a similar discriminatory effect. The more a
Maryland business can locate its valuecreating activities within Maryland the less
it will be taxed.
Thus, the application of the county tax to
pass-through S corporation income sourced
in other states that tax that income, without

application of an appropriate credit,
discriminates against interstate commerce.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the failure
of the Maryland income tax law to allow a
credit against the county tax for a Maryland
resident taxpayer with respect to passthrough income of an S corporation that
arises from activities in another state and
that is taxed in that state violates the
dormant Commerce Clause of the federal
Constitution.
As for relief, the Wynnes suggest in their
brief that the Maryland county income tax,
the credit, or some part of the Maryland tax
scheme be “struck down.” In fact, the
county income tax itself is not
unconstitutional. Nor is the credit, which
serves to ensure that the Maryland income
tax scheme operates within constitutional
constraints. Nor is the Maryland income tax
law generally. What is unconstitutional is
the application—or lack thereof—of the
credit to the county income tax. As this
Court explained in some detail in Blanton, a
credit previously applied to the county
income tax in these circumstances. The
county income tax was only eliminated from
the computation and application of the credit
by a 1975 amendment of the tax code.
Chapter 3, Laws of Maryland 1975. It is that
amendment, when applied to the particular
circumstances of taxpayers like the Wynnes,
that contravenes the Constitution. On
remand from the Circuit Court, the Tax
Court should recalculate the Wynnes' tax
liability in a manner consistent with this
opinion.

297

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY
AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTION TO
REMAND TO THE TAX COURT FOR
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE SHARED EQUALLY BY
THE PARTIES.
BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ., dissent.
GREENE,
J.,
dissenting,
which BATTAGLIA, J., joins.

in

I disagree with the Majority's conclusion
that the federal Constitution's dormant
Commerce Clause requires Maryland to
reduce the Wynnes' county taxes. Since the
early Nineteenth Century, the law has been:
[T]he power of taxation is one of vital
importance ... retained by the states....
[T]he power of taxing the people and
their property[ ] is essential to the very
existence of government, and may be
legitimately exercised on the objects to
which it is applicable, to the utmost
extent to which the government may
choose to carry it. The only security
against the abuse of this power, is found
in the structure of the government itself.
In imposing a tax, the legislature acts
upon its constituents. This is, in general,
a sufficient security against erroneous
and oppressive taxation.
The Wynnes may not agree that they should
pay the Howard County tax without a credit
pursuant to TG § 10–703. This, however, is
an issue for the elected officials of Howard
County and the State, not this Court. “It is
not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to
protect state residents from their own state
taxes.” The Maryland General Assembly's
decision to apply a credit for taxes paid in

other states to the Wynnes' state tax, and not
their county tax, does not run afoul of the
federal Constitution's dormant Commerce
Clause.
The Wynnes live in Howard County where
they benefit from the services provided by
that county. To pay for these services,
Howard County, like every county in
Maryland, including Baltimore City,
assesses a tax. As the Majority notes, TG §
10–703 does not permit the Wynnes to apply
a credit for taxes paid in other states to
reduce the Howard County tax. Rather, as
we said in Comptroller v. Blanton, residents
of a Maryland county are required to pay for
that county's services by paying the county
tax without the credit. Otherwise, “if the
taxpayers were allowed to pay a lesser
amount of county income tax, it ‘would have
the possible absurd result of the [taxpayers]
paying little or no local tax for services
provided by the county while a neighbor
with similar income, exemptions, and
deductions might be paying a substantial
local tax to support those services.’ ”
The Majority acknowledges that Maryland
law prohibits the Wynnes from applying a
credit for taxes paid to other states to reduce
their county taxes. The Majority, however,
concludes that imposing a county tax
without allowing for a credit pursuant to TG
§ 10–703 violates the dormant Commerce
Clause because Maryland's taxing scheme
fails two prongs of the Complete Auto fourpart test, namely that it is not fairly
apportioned, and it discriminates against
interstate commerce. As we have said
before, however:
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Declaring a statute enacted by the
General
Assembly
to
be
unconstitutional
and
therefore
unenforceable is an extraordinary act.
Statutes are generally presumed to be
Constitutional and are not to be held
otherwise unless the Constitutional
impediment is clear. We have said
many times
that
since
every
presumption favors the validity of a
statute, it cannot be stricken down as
void, unless it plainly contravenes a
provision of the Constitution.
Because of this presumption, a heavy burden
is on the Wynnes to prove that this Court
should not enforce Maryland law as it is
written.
The Majority states that before this Court
can decide whether the dormant Commerce
Clause has been violated, we must “assess
first whether the dormant Commerce Clause
is implicated by the county tax....” Contrary
to the Majority's conclusion, however, it
appears that the Wynnes have failed to meet
their burden of showing that the dormant
Commerce Clause is implicated.
States have the power to impose taxes that
may result in some overlap in taxation of
income. As the Majority notes, “[T]he
dormant Commerce Clause will not affect
the application of a tax unless there is actual
or perspective competition between entities
in an identifiable market and state action
that either expressly discriminates against or
places an undue burden on interstate
commerce. This impact must be more than
incidental.” In the present case, the Wynnes
have failed to prove that requiring them to
pay a county tax without a credit either
expressly discriminates against interstate
commerce or places more than an incidental

burden
upon
interstate
commerce.
Therefore, the Wynnes have failed to prove
that the dormant Commerce Clause is
implicated.
The Howard County tax, assessed without a
credit, does not expressly discriminate
against interstate commerce. As the
Comptroller argues, the Howard County tax
is directed at income earned by residents of
Howard
County,
not
interstate
commerce. And while, as the Majority
notes, the dormant Commerce Clause “is not
limited to circumstances where physical
goods enter the stream of commerce[,]” the
other cases the Majority relies on all involve
situations where, unlike the present case, the
law was facially discriminatory. The
Majority
looks
to Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,
Edwards v. California, Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, and Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner to conclude that the
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated. In
all four of those cases, the challenged tax
law facially discriminated against interstate
commerce by either first distinguishing
between organizations and businesses that
were involved in interstate business and
those organizations and businesses that were
only involved with intrastate business, and
then imposing a disadvantage upon those
involved in interstate transactions, or, in the
case of Edwards, placing a restriction upon
people moving in interstate commerce itself.
In Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, the
challenged Maine tax law granted a general
exemption from real estate and personal
property taxes for charities incorporated in
Maine, but limited that exemption for
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organizations that mostly served non-Maine
residents. The law, thereby, distinguished
between groups that served people traveling
in interstate commerce and those that only
served Maine residents and explicitly
benefitted the latter. In Edwards, the
challenged law directly implicated interstate
commerce and travel by prohibiting the
transportation of indigent persons across
state lines. In Boston Stock Exchange, the
challenged New York tax law distinguished
between sales of securities made within New
York and those made outside New York,
and then imposed a lower tax rate and a cap
on taxes for in-state sales and a higher tax
rate and no cap on taxes for out-of-state
sales. Finally, in Fulton Corp., North
Carolina imposed a tax on investments in
corporations but allowed stockholders to
reduce their tax liability based on the
business the corporation did in North
Carolina. In Fulton Corp., the United States
Supreme Court noted that the tax facially
discriminated against interstate commerce,
and North Carolina “practically concede[d]
as much.”
In the present case, nothing on the face of
the Maryland tax laws imposing a county
tax, TG § 10–103, or the Maryland tax law
limiting credits for taxes paid in other states
to state taxes, TG § 10–703, discriminates
against interstate commerce. TG § 10–
103 imposes a county tax on all residents
with no distinction drawn based upon the
source of the income. And, TG § 10–703, on
its face, provides a benefit to interstate
commerce by applying a credit to reduce the
amount of Maryland state taxes paid by
residents who earned income in interstate
commerce. The only distinction drawn

between income earned in intrastate
commerce and income earned in interstate
commerce pursuant to these two laws is that
a benefit is bestowed upon interstate
commerce through the credit that is applied
to state taxes. This can hardly be interpreted
as
discriminating
against
interstate
commerce on the face of the law.
The fact that Maryland's tax scheme is not
facially discriminatory is critical to the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. As the
Majority notes, “[f]acially discriminatory
state taxes are subject to the strictest
scrutiny, and the ‘burden of justification is
so heavy that “facial discrimination by itself
may be a fatal defect.” ’ ” In other words,
when a court is examining a law that, on its
face, draws a distinction between interstate
and intrastate commerce and imposes a
disadvantage to the former, the burden of
proving that the law expressly discriminates
against interstate commerce and that the
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated is
met. In this case, there is no facial
discrimination against interstate commerce,
and thus, the burden of proving that the
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated
requires a higher level of proof.
As noted above, the Wynnes have the
burden of proving that interstate commerce
is implicated. The Wynnes, however, fail to
meet this burden with the arguments they
present. In arguing that the dormant
Commerce Clause is implicated, the Wynnes
primarily rely on two lines of arguments,
both of which are inapplicable to the present
case.
First, the Wynnes rely on our decision
in Frey where we concluded that the
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“Special Nonresident Tax,” or SNRT,
implicated the dormant Commerce Clause.
The SNRT is applied to nonresidents doing
business in Maryland. On its face, the SNRT
singles out income from interstate
commerce and applies a tax on that income.
It is thus a “facially discriminatory state tax[
],” and subject to “the strictest scrutiny[.]”
The county tax, on the other hand, draws no
distinction between income earned in
interstate and intrastate commerce and is not
facially discriminatory. Therefore, unlike the
SNRT, the county tax does not expressly
discriminate against interstate commerce
and our conclusion in Frey that the SNRT
implicated the dormant Commerce Clause is
inapplicable to the present case.
Second, the Wynnes rely on Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Fulton Corp., and a
case from the Minnesota Supreme
Court, Chapman v. Comm'r of Revenue. As
noted
above, Camps
Newfound/Owatonna and Fulton
Corp.
address facially discriminatory laws.
Likewise, Chapman addresses a facially
discriminatory law. The law in question
allowed Minnesota taxpayers to take a tax
deduction for contributions to charities
“located in and carrying on substantially all
of its activities within [Minnesota],” but did
not allow a tax deduction for contributions
to non-Minnesota charities. The Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that “[o]n its face, the
statute treats contributions to in-state
charitable organizations differently from
contributions to out-of-state charitable
organizations,” and concluded that it was
“facially discriminatory.” As noted above, a
law that facially discriminates against
interstate commerce necessarily implicates

the dormant Commerce Clause. Maryland's
tax scheme, which is not facially
discriminatory,
however,
does
not
necessarily
implicate
the
dormant
Commerce Clause. Therefore, like Camps
Newfound/Owatonna and Fulton Corp., the
conclusion
that
the
law
in Chapman implicated
the
dormant
Commerce Clause is inapplicable to the
present case.
In the absence of facial or express
discrimination, an undue burden on
interstate commerce must be shown.
In Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of
Taxation, New Jersey, the Supreme Court, in
considering New Jersey's denial of a state
tax deduction for federal windfall profit tax
payments, observed that “in the absence of
discriminatory intent or a statute directed
specifically at economic activity that occurs
only in a particular location ... a deduction
denial does not unduly burden interstate
commerce just because the deduction denied
relates to an economic activity performed
outside the taxing State.” The Wynnes, in
failing to prove discriminatory intent or
unacceptable
statutory
geographical
specificity, have demonstrated neither an
undue burden on interstate commerce nor an
implication of the dormant Commerce
Clause.
The Blanton decision
conclusively
established that Maryland law applies TG §
10–703's tax credit only to state taxes, not
county taxes. The Wynnes asked this Court
to conclude that settled Maryland law is
unconstitutional
under
the
dormant
Commerce Clause. The presumption has
always been that Maryland law is
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constitutional, and the Wynnes, as
challengers of the Maryland tax law, have
failed to overcome that presumption by
proving that Maryland's tax scheme
expressly discriminates against or unduly
burdens interstate commerce such that the
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated.
The Wynnes may believe that it is bad
policy to require them to pay the Howard
County tax without a tax credit; however,
they have failed to prove that it is in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Judge BATTAGLIA joins in the views
expressed herein.
Opinion on Motion for Reconsideration
by McDONALD, J.
The Comptroller has filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and, Alternatively, a
Motion for Stay of Enforcement of the
Judgment. The Wynnes opposed that
motion. The parties filed memoranda of law
and other materials in support of their
respective positions.
It appears appropriate to clarify two points
raised in the papers submitted by the parties:
(1) The Comptroller raised the question of
whether he could deny application of a
credit to the Wynnes for income taxes paid
by an S corporation, such as Maxim, in
another state that does not accord pass-

through treatment to S corporation income,
but rather taxes the income of such a
corporation in the same way that it taxes the
income of a C corporation. The parties did
not brief, and we did not consider, the ways
in which other states may treat S corporation
income other than as pass-through personal
income of the corporation's shareholders.
Our opinion does not foreclose different
treatment in Maryland of income taxes paid
in other states that are not based on pass
through personal income.
(2) A state may avoid discrimination against
interstate commerce by providing a tax
credit, or some other method of
apportionment, to avoid discriminating
against interstate commerce in violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Comptroller interprets a footnote in our
earlier opinion to hold that a state must
provide a tax credit. While the footnote
might have been worded more elegantly, it
referred primarily to the method used by the
Legislature in the Maryland income tax; we
did not mean to preclude other methods that
might be utilized in other contexts.
The Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED; however, we shall STAY the
effective date of the mandate pending the
disposition of a timely petition for certiorari
filed by the Comptroller with the United
States Supreme Court.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Landmark Case on Whether States May Tax
Income Earned in Other States”
Forbes
Kelly Phillips Erb
May 28, 2014
The Supreme Court had a busy day on
Tuesday. When the dust settled, however, it
had only granted one new case – but it was a
big
one.
The
nation’s
highest
court granted certiorari to Comptroller v.
Wynne, setting the stage for a fight that
could rewrite tax laws in states across the
country.
As noted before, lawyers and judges like to
use Latin. Granting certiorari (or “granting
cert” for the really cool hipster lawyers)
means that the Supreme Court will hear the
matter.
Some cases have what’s called “original
jurisdiction” in the Supreme Court; those
cases, which are defined by statute (28
U.S.C. § 1251) go straight to the Supreme
Court. The typical case associated with
original jurisdiction would be a dispute
between the states. Most cases, however,
don’t go that route. To be heard at the
Supreme Court level without having original
jurisdiction requires the losing party at the
appellate level to file a petition seeking a
review of the case. If the Supreme Court
grants the petition and decides to hear the
matter, it’s called a writ of certiorari. And
that’s what happened here.
The question presented in the Petition for
Certiorari in Wynne is:
Does the United States Constitution
prohibit a state from taxing all the income

of its residents — wherever earned — by
mandating a credit for taxes paid on
income earned in other states?
Procedurally, the question found its way to
the Supreme Court after the Court of
Appeals of Maryland “reached the
unprecedented conclusion” that a state is in
violation of the Commerce Clause in the
U.S. Constitution if it collects income taxes
from its residents when the income was
earned from sources in another state and is
subject to tax by the other state.
In this case, a married couple, the Wynnes,
reported
taxable
net
income
of
approximately $2.7 million. More than half
of that amount represented a share of
earnings in an S corporation with operations
in several states. The Wynnes claimed a
credit on their Maryland tax returns for taxes
paid to 39 other states but not for any county
or local government taxes. The State of
Maryland denied the credits and issued a
notice of deficiency and the Wynnes
appealed. At a hearing, the assessment was
affirmed.
Eventually, the Wynnes amended their
petition to claim that the tax credit statute
was in violation of the Commerce Clause of
the United State Constitution. That claim
was rejected. At appeal, the Wynnes argued
that the state of Maryland was
constitutionally required to extend the credit
for taxes paid to other states to the county as
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well as the state, raising the question of
whether a state had the unconditional right
to tax all income based on residency. The
Circuit Court agreed with the Wynnes.
On appeal by the state, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the Circuit Court. The Court
wrote that, based on its belief that the
Constitution prohibits “double taxation” of
income earned in interstate commerce, a
state may not tax all the income of its
residents, wherever earned.
That decision, it was argued by the state,
conflicted with a number of “fundamental
precepts” involving the “well-established
principle” that “a jurisdiction… may tax all
the income of its residents, even income
earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.”
However, in Wynne, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Commerce Clause
imposes restrictions on a state’s power to tax
its own residents: in other words, Maryland
was not allowed to tax all of its residents’
income if the resident paid taxes on that
income to another State.
The state argued that this finding was
inconsistent with prior law and was, in a
word, wrong. The consequences, according
to the state’s petition, could be the
“significant loss of revenue that will amount
to tens of millions of dollars annually.”
And that’s why you should care. Not only
does this decision have consequences for
Maryland but it “has potential repercussions
beyond Maryland,” according to the
petitioner. The reply brief for the petitioner
specifically notes that “while most states
provide full credits for income taxes paid to
other states, many local jurisdictions do

not.” The result, if the Wynne decision
holds, according to the state is that “any
jurisdiction taxing its residents’ entire
income will face needless uncertainty about
the viability of its tax system and its
potential exposure to onerous refund
claims.”
In other words, an affirmation could cost
local and state governments millions of
dollars.
The loss shouldn’t matter, according to
Dominic Perella, a lawyer with Hogan
Lovells who is representing the Wynnes. He
said, about the case: “Maryland’s approach
is unfair to people who make money in more
than one state.”
The question is big enough for the feds to
weigh in. The Obama administration issued
an amicus curiae brief in April of this year,
supporting the petitioner’s position. Amicus
curiae is Latin (yes, more Latin) for “friend
of the court” and describes an argument
made by someone who is not a specific party
to the proceedings but believes that the
court’s decision may affect its interest.
Under the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
U.S., “An amicus curiae brief that brings to
the attention of the Court relevant matter not
already brought to its attention by the parties
may be of considerable help to the Court.
An amicus curiae brief that does not serve
this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing
is not favored.”
The feds argued in their brief that “though
States often choose to grant tax credits to
their residents for income taxes paid in other
States, nothing in the Commerce Clause
compels a State to offer such credits or
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otherwise defer to other States in the
taxation of its own residents’ income.”
Further, “[t]he decision… may lead to
challenges to similar tax schemes in other
jurisdictions; and is inconsistent with
statements made by the highest courts in
other States.”
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly agreed that
this was a matter that needed to be resolved.
Granting cert doesn’t mean that the court

believes that the petitioner is correct: the
regular court rules apply. There will be
arguments and more (!) briefs before the
Court reaches a decision.
These matters do not move quickly: you
shouldn’t expect oral arguments on this
matter until fall of this year. But expect
plenty of speculation – and interest – before
then.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Maryland Double Taxation Case”
Tax Foundation
Joseph Henchman
May 27, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court has announced that
it will hear the appeal in Comptroller v.
Wynne, on whether states must provide a
credit against its own taxes for taxes a
resident pays to another state. Maryland
allows such a credit against its state income
tax but not against its local county and city
income taxes.
The taxpayers in the case, Mr. and Mrs.
Wynne, owned 2.4 percent of a company
doing business in 39 states. Maryland
residents, they paid $123,434 in income tax
to Maryland, after applying a credit of
$84,550 for taxes paid to other states on
income earned outside Maryland's borders.
Maryland disallowed the credit to the extent
that it offset the county income tax. The Tax
Court upheld the assessment, a Maryland
circuit court reversed and sided with the
Wynnes, and Maryland's highest court (the
Court of Appeals) agreed, ruling the tax
unconstitutional without a credit. The state
has now appealed to the Supreme Court.
It's hard to think of a more blatant example
of impermissible state taxation of interstate
commerce than Maryland's tax here.
Maryland certainly has the authority to tax
the Wynnes -- they are Maryland residents -but gets into constitutional trouble when it
asserts the power to tax income earned
outside Maryland. Until this case, it has
generally been undisputed by scholars that
such a tax is only permissible if the state
credits the taxpayer for taxes paid to another

state. Otherwise, states would be able to
subject the same income to double-, triple-,
quadruple-, etc. levels of taxation. The net
result of this would be to strongly
discourage interstate investment and
commerce of the type the Wynnes
undertook, since only by investing within
Maryland would income not be subject to
gargantuan levels of taxation.
Analyzing whether Maryland's tax is
constitutional is a two-step process. First,
one must ask whether the state has the
authority to impose the tax on income. This
is fairly well-settled, with the statute
authorizing the tax and numerous court
precedents allowing states to tax their
residents however they wish, with any
credits or deductions a matter of legislative
grace. Second, though, one must ask
whether the tax discriminates against
interstate commerce. This has been
sometimes described as an "internal
consistency test" -- if every state had such a
tax, would the result be discrimination
against interstate commerce? The answer
here is unequivocally yes. The state (and the
U.S. Solicitor General, who was asked for
his views) performed step one of this
analysis but did not do step two. Their
arguments would get an F grade in any state
taxation class as incomplete.
17 states have local income taxes, and while
most provide a credit for taxes paid to
another state, they probably do so because
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they think they have to, constitutionally. An
adverse ruling here will quickly result in
taxpayers being taxed on the state income
over and over by any state with any tax
authority over them. Although this case
relates to local income taxes, there is no
logical reason why the rule should be
different for state income taxes.

agreed to hear it, the Court should take a
strong stand against states using their tax
systems to discriminate against interstate
commerce. We will make such an argument
in our amicus brief. (Both the Maryland
Attorney General and Wynne cited our 2011
local income tax study in their briefs to the
Court.)

It would have been best if the Court declined
to hear the case and let the Maryland Court
of Appeals ruling stand. As they have now

The case is No. 13-485, Comptroller of the
Treasury of Maryland v. Brian Wynne, et ux.
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“The Resident Income Tax Credit: Did Maryland Misapply the Commerce
Clause?”
TaxAnalysts
Robert J. Firestone
June 2, 2014
I. Introduction
If a resident individual of State A seeks
employment in State B, or owns incomeproducing property or opens a business in
State B, does that individual's status as
nonresident, standing alone, constitute
interstate commerce subjecting State B's
nonresident income tax to the strictest
scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution's
dormant commerce clause? Or does the
privileges and immunities clause of Article
IV apply, with its heightened "substantial
equality" level of scrutiny?
It is clear that both constitutional provisions
cannot apply in that instance. If the mere
status of an individual as a nonresident
constitutes interstate commerce and invokes
the stricter protections of the dormant
commerce clause, then the privileges and
immunities clause would be eclipsed and
effectively nullified in every instance. The
substantial equality standard of review
would never apply when the issue involves
discrimination
against
nonresident
individuals.
Under basic principles of legal construction,
express language generally controls over
language that is implied. The dormant
commerce clause is not an express
constitutional provision, but has been
implied as a means of delineating the federal
and state powers to regulate interstate

commerce. The dormant commerce clause,
therefore, shouldn't be construed so broadly
as to nullify the privileges and immunities
clause, an express constitutional provision
long construed to protect nonresident
individuals.
Also, do the two constitutional provisions
really cover the same subjects? Does the
scope of the dormant commerce clause,
which protects an interstate business in its
choice of where to locate its business
operations, also extend to the personal
choices of nonresident individuals who
choose to work, or otherwise earn their
income, in a state different from where they
live?
It is well established that the dormant
commerce
clause
protects
from
discrimination
interstate
business
transactions and business location decisions,
that is, "a State may not tax a transaction or
incident more heavily when it crosses state
lines than when it occurs entirely within the
State." By contrast, an individual's choice of
where to live is a personal decision. Federal
income tax rules, for instance, treat the cost
of commuting from home to work as a
personal and not a deductible business
expense.
Thus, while the decision to locate
manufacturing operations in one state
instead of another is protected by the
dormant commerce clause, the privileges
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and immunities clause of Article IV protects
nonresident individuals from discrimination,
that is, the personal choice to live in one
state and work in another.
In Maryland v. Wynne, the Maryland Court
of Appeals held that when an individual, a
resident of Maryland, earns income in other
states, the mere status of being a nonresident
in those other states, within the jurisdiction
of those other states' nonresident income tax
laws, constitutes interstate commerce,
implicating the dormant commerce clause.
Although Wynne concerned the taxpayer's
investment in an S corporation, its reasoning
extends to all income within the scope of a
nonresident income tax, including wages
and salaries earned in the course of
commuting from home to work.
On May 27 the U.S. Supreme Court granted
the state's petition for writ of certiorari. If
the Court upholds Wynne, it will essentially
nullify the privileges and immunities clause
of Article IV. Every discrimination claim
based on nonresidency will be easily
restated as a dormant commerce clause
claim. States will have far less latitude in
structuring their personal income tax laws,
which will no longer be subject to the
substantial equality standard, but to the
strictest scrutiny. The federal-state balance
will significantly change.
Although the issue in Wynne concerns tax
credits, it has far broader implications. Most
states grant their residents personal income
tax credits for other states' nonresident
income taxes. They do so for political
reasons, so their voting residents will not see
their incomes and personal wealth
diminished by two separate tax jurisdictions

with equally defensible claims to that
income.
A state's taxing jurisdiction over its
residents, based on the special privileges of
citizenship, is over the person, and extends
to all of the resident's income, regardless of
where it is earned. A state's taxing
jurisdiction over nonresidents is narrower -limited to the nonresidents' incomeproducing activities and property within the
state. A resident who earns income in
another state that imposes a nonresident
income tax will always be taxed twice, by
the state of residence and by the state in
which the income was earned. Neither state's
jurisdictional claim is superior to the other,
nor would favoring one state over the other
be fair. For example, requiring the state of
residence to credit taxes paid to other states
would forfeit the state of residence's just
claim to that revenue, and would treat the
state of residence unfairly.
The due process clause of the 14th
Amendment does not bar the double taxation
of income. In sum, the dormant commerce
clause does not apply here because (1) it
would be an unprecedented expansion of its
scope, from protecting interstate business
transactions and business location decisions,
to protecting the personal choices of
individuals who earn income in a state
different from where they live, and (2) it
would completely eclipse the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV, rendering it
a nullity, and change the federal-state
balance in favor of lessening the states'
power to tax nonresidents.
II. The Facts of Wynne
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The Wynnes were 2.4 percent shareholders
in a corporation, Maxim Healthcare Services
Inc., which was engaged in a multistate
healthcare business. Maxim made an
election under the Internal Revenue Code to
be taxed as an S corporation. As a result,
Maxim paid no federal income tax, and its
income was passed through to its
shareholders and subject to federal income
tax at the shareholder level.
For the 2006 tax year, Maxim filed state
corporate income tax returns in 39 states,
and it allocated to each shareholder a pro
rata share of the taxes paid to each of those
states. The Wynnes claimed their pro rata
share of Maxim's corporate income taxes
paid to other states as a credit against their
Maryland resident state and county income
taxes. The Maryland comptroller denied the
portion of the Wynnes' credit that applied to
the resident county income tax. The
resulting tax deficiency was affirmed by the
Hearings and Appeals Bureau of the
Comptroller's Office.
The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax
Court, where they argued that the failure to
grant a credit for income taxes paid to other
states against the county income tax
discriminated against interstate commerce,
in violation of the dormant commerce
clause. The tax court rejected that argument
and affirmed the assessment. The Wynnes
appealed to the circuit court, which reversed
the tax court. The case was eventually
appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
III. The
Decision

Maryland

Appeals

Court

The
Wynnes
conceded
Maryland's
jurisdiction, under the due process clause, to
tax all of their income, regardless of where it
was earned. The sole issue before the
Maryland Appeals Court was whether
Maryland's failure to grant a tax credit
against its county income tax for taxes paid
to other states violated the dormant
commerce clause.
As an initial matter, the court considered
whether the dormant commerce clause
applies to individuals who maintain their
personal residences in Maryland, but earn
income in other states that impose
nonresident income taxes. The comptroller
argued that the Wynnes were subject to the
Maryland income tax on individuals because
of their status as Maryland residents, and not
because of their activities in Maryland or in
other states.
The court rejected that argument, holding
that the Wynnes were subject to the
Maryland income tax both because they
were Maryland residents and "because they
have income derived from intrastate and
interstate activities." Because of their
interstate activities, "other states may also
tax some of that income because it derives
from activities in those states." However, it
is well established that a state's power to tax
persons residing within the state is based
solely on their status as citizens or residents
and is without regard to their activities or to
the source of their income.
The Maryland court thus mischaracterized
the Maryland resident income tax on
individuals as a tax on the individual's
activities. To the contrary, Maryland's taxing
power over persons residing within its
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jurisdiction is based only on their residency
status. When Maryland taxes its residents, it
is taxing them in their person, not their
activities, whether conducted out-of-state or
otherwise. If not for the Wynnes' status as
residents, Maryland would be powerless to
tax them on their out-of-state activities,
which would be outside of Maryland's
taxing jurisdiction. To the extent that the
Maryland court's reasoning depended on its
characterization of the resident income tax
as a tax on interstate activities, its
conclusion that the resident tax implicates
interstate commerce was erroneous.
If Maryland isn't taxing activities in other
states, but merely the persons within its
power, it is difficult to see how the resident
income tax implicates interstate commerce.
In concluding that it does, the Maryland
court compared a Maryland resident "who
earns substantial income from out-of-state
activities" with "an otherwise identical
taxpayer" who earns all of his income in
Maryland. The court explained that "the first
taxpayer may pay more state and local
income taxes than the second. That creates a
disincentive for the taxpayer -- or the S
Corporation of which the taxpayer is an
owner -- to conduct income-generating
activities in other states with income taxes."
The Maryland Court of Appeals makes
several assumptions here that are speculative
at best and that raise several concerns. In
comparing a Maryland resident individual
who earns substantial income from out of
state with an identical taxpayer who earns
income entirely from Maryland activities,
even the court realizes, by its use of the
word "may," that the first taxpayer will not

necessarily pay more in state and local taxes
than the second taxpayer. Not every state
imposes a personal income tax. Thus, if the
first taxpayer earns substantial income in a
state that does not impose a nonresident
income tax, then it will pay the same amount
of state and local taxes as the taxpayer who
earns income entirely from Maryland
activities.
While the factual basis for that comparison
is speculative, it raises a greater concern -the
comparison
between
the
two
hypothetical taxpayers residing in Maryland
depends entirely on another state's tax law,
which is beyond the control of the Maryland
General Assembly and in which Maryland
has no sovereign interest. The U.S. Supreme
Court has made it clear that the
constitutionality of one state's tax laws can
never depend on the tax laws in other
states. If Maryland has full jurisdiction to
tax its individual residents in their person on
all of their income, regardless of where it
was earned, does Maryland have to forfeit
that power to another state having an equally
founded jurisdiction over their activities, if
that state imposes a nonresident income tax?
Under the court's reasoning, the state of
residency and the source state would not be
treated as coequal sovereigns, elevating the
power of the source state to the detriment of
the state of residency. Moreover, the tax
laws of the state of residency would be
dependent on the tax laws of the source
state. The state of residency would forfeit its
taxing power if that other state's legislature
enacts a nonresident income tax.
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IV. The Maryland Resident Income Tax
Credit
Doesn't
Affect
Interstate
Commerce
In concluding that Maryland's resident
income tax creates a disincentive for the
taxpayer to conduct income-generating
activities in other states with income taxes,
the Maryland court relied on Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner. Fulton involved a credit under
North Carolina's intangibles property tax
that decreased as the stock issuer did a
greater proportion of its business outside the
state. The Fulton Court held that "the
intangibles tax facially discriminates against
interstate commerce" because a "regime that
taxes stock only to the degree that its issuing
corporation participates in interstate
commerce favors domestic corporations
over their foreign competitors in raising
capital among North Carolina residents and
tends, at least, to discourage domestic
corporations from plying their trades in
interstate commerce."
The tax credit in Fulton operated as a classic
tariff, benefiting corporate stock issuers that
do most of their business within North
Carolina by burdening issuers that do most
of their business outside of the state. The
Maryland court erred by comparing
Maryland's individual income tax on
residents to the intangibles tax in Fulton.
Unlike the intangibles tax credit, which
decreased as the issuer corporation
expanded its business in interstate
commerce, the resident income tax remains
the same, regardless of whether a Maryland
resident earns $100,000 of income in
Maryland or the same amount of income in
another state.

In order to conclude that a Maryland
resident pays a higher tax if it earns income
in another state, the Maryland court had to
look past the Maryland resident income tax
to the nonresident income tax imposed by
another
jurisdiction.
Again,
the
constitutionality of Maryland's tax laws can't
depend on the tax laws of other states.
Unlike the intangibles tax in Fulton, the
Maryland resident income tax doesn't create
a disincentive for the taxpayer to conduct
income-generating activities in other states.
The result in Fulton didn't depend on the tax
laws in effect in other states, but only on the
discriminatory effect of North Carolina's
intangibles tax standing alone. Standing
alone, Maryland's resident income tax
doesn't affect interstate commerce. The
court's contrary conclusion was based on a
reading of the dormant commerce clause
long rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
V. The Maryland Resident Income Tax
Doesn't Affect Interstate Travel
A Maryland resident who travels to another
state to earn income pays the same amount
of Maryland resident income tax as a
Maryland resident who earns all of his
income in Maryland. Notwithstanding the
Maryland court's contrary conclusion,
Maryland's resident income tax, standing
alone, doesn't implicate "the movement of
people across state borders for economic
purposes."
The court of appeals appears to have
read Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison
as a case that applies the dormant commerce
clause to individuals who travel or commute
across state lines to earn income in another
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state.Camps Newfound, however, wasn't a
right of travel case but concerned an export
tariff on services. In Camps Newfound,
Maine's real property tax exemption for
charitable organizations was limited to
charities that principally served Maine
residents. The taxpayer, a Christian Science
summer camp that aggressively marketed its
picturesque Maine facilities around the
country, generated 95 percent of its business
from campers residing in other states.
Because the camp mainly served
nonresidents, Maine denied the camp's
property tax exemption.
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Maine's
property tax exemption on the grounds that
"it functionally serves as an export tariff that
targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the
businesses that principally serve them." The
camp had aggressively reached out to
consumers in other states, from which it
received practically all of its campers; the
discriminatory exemption had the practical
effect of an export tariff on services, sharing
the same fate as an export tariff on goods.
In concluding that Camps Newfound is a
right of travel case, the Maryland Court of
Appeals apparently focused on a single
sentence responding to an argument made
by the town of Harrison that the property tax
exemption does not affect interstate
commerce. Referring to the nonresident
campers who attended the camp, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he
attendance of these campers necessarily
generates the transportation of persons
across state lines that has long been
recognized as a form of 'commerce.'"

Camps Newfound, however, does not hold
that Maine's property tax exemption
interfered with the campers' right to freely
enter and leave the state, burdening the
campers' right of travel. That wasn't the
issue before the Court. The Court concluded
that Maine's property tax exemption was
functionally equivalent to an "export tariff"
and that its practical effect was to
discriminate against the interstate sale of
camp services to nonresident consumers.
The Court's reference to the interstate travel
of the campers was one of several facts
identified by the Court to underscore the
interstate nature of the transactions burdened
by the exemption.
The Maryland court's reading of Camps
Newfound as a right of travel case conflicts
with U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding
that the right isn't protected by the dormant
commerce clause. In Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, the Court held that
the individual right of interstate travel "does
not derive from the negative commerce
clause, or else it could be eliminated by
Congress."
Saenz v. Roe divided the right of travel into
three components: (1) the right to enter and
leave the state; (2) the right of a citizen of
one state who travels to another state
intending to return home, to enjoy the same
"Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens
of the several States" that she visits; and (3)
when the traveler doesn't intend to return
home, the right to be treated like other
citizens of that state.
It is the second component of the right of
travel that is at issue in Wynne. Saenz stated
that right isn't subject to the strict scrutiny of
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the dormant commerce clause, but to the
lesser substantial equality standard under the
privileges and immunities clause.
The Maryland court, therefore, was incorrect
in holding that the fact that an individual
resident of one state earns income in another
state that imposes a nonresident income tax
implicates the dormant commerce clause.
Rather, the privileges and immunities clause
protects from discrimination nonresident
individuals who seek employment or
otherwise seek to earn income in another
state. The court's holding to the contrary is
an unwarranted expansion of the dormant
commerce clause beyond its present scope,
which changes the federal-state balance
under our system of federalism to the
detriment of the states, subjecting state
individual income tax laws to the strictest
scrutiny, while lessening the states' authority
to tax nonresident individuals.
VI. Distinguishing Commercial Domicile
From Individual Residency
Under the unitary business principle, a state
may not tax a corporation engaged in a
multistate business on 100 percent of the
corporation's income. The requirement that a
state must apportion the income of a
corporation
derived
from
business
conducted in other states is grounded in both
the due process and commerce clauses of the
U.S. Constitution.
Although the commerce clause plays a role
in apportionment, limiting multiple taxation
by requiring a state's apportionment formula
to be internally consistent, it is plain that the
constitutional
restrictions
on
apportionability
are
almost
entirely

described in due process terms. In formulary
apportionment cases, the commerce clause
generally plays a secondary role to due
process, in the sense that a formula that
taxes extraterritorial values and thus violates
due process, also results in multiple taxation
violating the commerce clause.
In limited circumstances, a corporation's
state of commercial domicile may tax the
corporation on 100 percent of its income,
but only if that income was earned in
activities
unrelated
to
its
unitary
business. Otherwise, the income of a
multistate corporation derived from a
unitary business must be apportioned "on
the basis of a formula taking into account
objective measures of the corporation's
activities
within
and
without
the
jurisdiction."
It might be tempting to extend the limitation
on a state's power to tax corporate income to
the personal income tax, thus prohibiting
states from taxing the income of individuals
who reside there but earn their living in
another state. Proponents of this approach
believe it is consistent with the dormant
commerce clause. This reading of the clause
requires that when two states have
jurisdiction to tax an individual, the state of
residence over the person and another state
over the individual's activities, the state
having jurisdiction over the activities should
take precedent.
The rationale for requiring the state where
an individual resides to yield its taxing
power to the state where the individual earns
his income appears to be based on three
assumptions: (1) that there is no reason to
treat the taxation of individuals based on
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personal residence differently from the
taxation of corporations based on
commercial domicile; (2) that individuals
who work or otherwise earn income in other
states acquire the equivalent of a business
situs there, which should prevail in any
conflict with the individual's domicile; and
(3) although the due process clause doesn't
prohibit the double taxation of income, the
requirement that a multistate corporation
apportion its income to other states is
dictated by the commerce clause. I will
consider each in turn.
The notion that a corporation is a person
capable of acquiring a domicile within a
particular state is a legal fiction that is given
relatively little weight under the corporate
income tax, generally yielding to the state in
which the income is earned under the
unitary business principle. Consistent with
that legal fiction is the reality that a
corporation is, in every respect, a business
and no aspect of its legal existence can be
deemed personal.
Individuals, on the other hand, are real
persons. When a state exercises its
jurisdiction to tax individuals who maintain
their homes within the state, send their
children to schools, and receive the benefits
of "police and fire protection . . . and the
advantages of living in a civilized
society," the state justifiably calls on those
individuals in their strictly personal aspect to
share the cost of providing those services. If
those individuals happen to commute to
work in other states, which also have a just
claim to tax a portion of their income, that
should not relieve those individuals of their
obligation to pay for all of the many services

they receive as citizens and residents of their
home state.
As explained above, extending the dormant
commerce clause to the individual income
tax would completely eclipse the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV and
render it a nullity. That issue does not arise
in the area of corporate income taxation
because the privileges and immunities
clause does not apply to corporations, which
are not citizens.
The legal fiction that a corporation is a
person capable of having a domicile within a
state derives from the property tax. Under
the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam,
intangible property is assigned a situs at the
place of the owner's domicile under the
assumption that the owner controls the
property from that location. Nevertheless,
once the intangible acquires a business situs
in another state, that other state also has
jurisdiction to tax the intangible. Invoking
the commerce clause, it is argued that the
state where the property acquired a business
situs has the superior claim.
That may be, but the reasoning doesn't
extend to the personal income taxation of
individual residents who commute to work,
or otherwise earn income, in other states. A
state's power to tax an individual citizen or
resident in his person isn't a legal fiction but
one of three jurisdictional bases for a state to
exert its taxing power -- over the persons,
property, or activities within its borders.
When an individual maintains a home in one
state and works in another, the home state
retains its power to demand that the
individual contribute to the cost of
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government, regardless of the source of his
income.
As explained above, the requirement that a
multistate corporation apportion its income
is dictated primarily by the due process
clause. That is evident by the "minimal
connection" and "rational relationship"
language, which is exclusively due process
language that appears in every unitary
business
case. The
only
additional
limitation, derived exclusively from the
commerce clause, is the requirement that an
apportionment formula be internally
consistent to avoid multiple taxation.
The commerce clause does not restrict state
apportionment formulas, except to require
that they must be internally consistent. The
main restriction on state apportionment
formulas derives from due process, which
requires that the income apportioned to a
state must be rationally related to in-state
activity. When two states have equal
jurisdiction, one over the individual, the
other over the individual's activity, the
commerce clause does not pose an
additional barrier to the home state's
jurisdiction over its individual residents.
Any other rule would deprive the home state
of its ability to call on resident individuals to

contribute their fair share to the cost of
schools, police and fire protection,
sanitation, and other services they benefit
from as citizens and residents of their home
state.
VII. Conclusion
Wynne represents
a
significant
and
unwarranted expansion of the dormant
commerce clause. Currently, it protects from
discrimination
interstate
business
transactions
and
business
location
decisions. Wynne extends this protection to
new territory previously the domain of the
privileges and immunities clause of Article
IV -- protecting the personal choices of
individuals who earn income in a state
different from where they reside. If the
dormant commerce clause is extended to the
personal income taxation of resident
individuals, it would completely eclipse the
privileges and immunities clause of Article
IV, render it a nullity, and change the
federal-state balance by reducing the states'
power to tax nonresidents. It would also
deprive the home state of its ability to call
on its residents to pay their fair share of the
cost of government and for the many
services they enjoy as state residents.
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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
13-1080
Ruling Below: Association of American Railroads v. United States Department of
Transportation, 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 285 (2014).
Railroad association sued the Department of Transportation and others, claiming that a section of
the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) requiring the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and a federally chartered corporation providing intercity
and commuter train services to “jointly” develop standards to evaluate the performance of the
corporation's intercity passenger trains was unconstitutional. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, James E. Boasberg, J., granted summary judgment for government.
Association appealed.
Question Presented: Whether Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement
Act of 2008, which requires the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Amtrak to “jointly .
. . develop” the metrics and standards for Amtrak’s performance that will be used in part to
determine whether the Surface Transportation Board (STB) will investigate a freight railroad for
failing to provide the preference for Amtrak’s passenger trains that is required by federal law,
and provides for the STB to appoint an arbitrator if the FRA and Amtrak cannot agree on the
metrics and standards within 180 days, effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to a private entity.

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on July 2, 2013
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted]
BROWN, Circuit Judge:
Imagine a scenario in which Congress has
given to General Motors the power to
coauthor, alongside the Department of
Transportation, regulations that will govern
all automobile manufacturers. And, if the
two should happen to disagree on what form
those regulations will take, then neither will
have the ultimate say. Instead, an
unspecified arbitrator will make the call.

Constitutional?
The
Department
Transportation seems to think so.

of

Next consider a parallel statutory scheme—
the one at issue in this case. This time,
instead of General Motors, it is Amtrak
(officially, the “National Railroad Passenger
Corporation”) wielding joint regulatory
power with a government agency. This new
stipulation further complicates the issue.
Unlike General Motors, Amtrak is a curious
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entity that occupies the twilight between the
public and private sectors. And the
regulations it codevelops govern not the
automotive industry, but the priority freight
railroads must give Amtrak's trains over
their own. Whether the Constitution permits
Congress to delegate such joint regulatory
authority to Amtrak is the question that
confronts us now.
Section 207 of the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008
empowers Amtrak and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to jointly develop
performance
measures
to
enhance
enforcement of the statutory priority
Amtrak's passenger rail service has over
other trains. The Appellant in this case, the
Association of American Railroads (AAR),
is a trade association whose members
include the largest freight railroads (known
in the industry as “Class I” freight railroads),
some smaller freight railroads, and—as it
happens—Amtrak. Challenging the statutory
scheme as unconstitutional, AAR brought
suit on behalf of its Class I members against
the four Appellees—the Department of
Transportation, its Secretary, the FRA, and
its
Administrator
(collectively,
the
“government”). We conclude § 207
constitutes an unlawful delegation of
regulatory power to a private entity.
I
A
To reinvigorate a national passenger rail
system that had, by mid-century, grown
moribund and unprofitable, Congress passed
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.
Most prominently, the legislation created the
passenger rail corporation now known as

Amtrak, which would “employ[ ] innovative
operating and marketing concepts so as to
fully develop the potential of modern rail
service in meeting the Nation's intercity
passenger transportation requirements.” The
act also made railroad companies
languishing under the prior regime an offer
they could not refuse: if these companies
consented to certain conditions, such as
permitting Amtrak to use their tracks and
other facilities, they could shed their
cumbersome common carrier obligation to
offer intercity passenger service. Pursuant to
statute,
Amtrak
negotiates
these
arrangements with individual railroads, the
terms of which are enshrined in Operating
Agreements. Today, freight railroads own
roughly 97% of the track over which
Amtrak runs its passenger service.
Naturally, sharing tracks can cause
coordination problems, which is why
Congress has prescribed that, absent an
emergency, Amtrak's passenger rail “has
preference over freight transportation in
using a rail line, junction, or crossing.” More
recently, this same concern prompted
enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment
and Improvement Act of 2008 (“PRIIA”).
At issue in this case is the PRIIA's § 207,
which directs the FRA and Amtrak to
“jointly ... develop new or improve existing
metrics and minimum standards for
measuring the performance and service
quality of intercity passenger train
operations, including cost recovery, on-time
performance and minutes of delay, ridership,
on-board services, stations, facilities,
equipment, and other services.” If Amtrak
and the FRA disagree about the composition
of these “metrics and standards,” either
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“may petition the Surface Transportation
Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the
parties in resolving their disputes through
binding arbitration.” “To the extent
practicable,” Amtrak and its host rail
carriers must incorporate the metrics and
standards into their Operating Agreements.
Though § 207 provides the means for
devising the metrics and standards, § 213 is
the enforcement mechanism. If the “on-time
performance” or “service quality” of any
intercity passenger train proves inadequate
under the metrics and standards for two
consecutive quarters, the STB may launch
an investigation “to determine whether and
to what extent delays or failure to achieve
minimum standards are due to causes that
could reasonably be addressed by a rail
carrier over whose tracks the intercity
passenger train operates or reasonably
addressed by Amtrak or other intercity
passenger rail operators.” Similarly, if
“Amtrak, an intercity passenger rail
operator, a host freight railroad over which
Amtrak operates, or an entity for which
Amtrak operates intercity passenger rail
service” files a complaint, the STB “shall ”
initiate such an investigation. Should the
STB determine the failure to satisfy the
metrics and standards is “attributable to a
rail carrier's failure to provide preference to
Amtrak over freight transportation as
required,” it may award damages or other
relief against the offending host rail carrier.
B
Following § 207's mandate, the FRA and
Amtrak jointly drafted proposed metrics and
standards, which they submitted to public
comment on March 13, 2009. The proposal

attracted criticism, with much vitriol
directed at three metrics formulated to
measure on-time performance: “effective
speed” (the ratio of route's distance to the
average time required to travel it), “endpoint
on-time performance” (the portion of a
route's trains that arrive on schedule), and
“all-stations on-time performance” (the
degree to which trains arrive on time at each
station along the route). AAR, among
others, derided these metrics as “unrealistic”
and worried that certain aspects would
create “an excessive administrative and
financial burden.” The FRA responded to
the comments, and a final version of the
metrics and standards took effect in May
2010.
AAR filed suit on behalf of its Class I
freight railroad members, asking the district
court to declare § 207 of the PRIIA
unconstitutional and to vacate the
promulgated metrics and standards. The
complaint asserted two challenges: that §
207 unconstitutionally delegates to Amtrak
the authority to regulate other private
entities; and that empowering Amtrak to
regulate its competitors violates the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
district court rejected these arguments,
granting summary judgment to the
government and denying it to AAR. AAR
renews these constitutional claims on
appeal.
II
AAR's argument takes the following form:
Delegating regulatory authority to a private
entity is unconstitutional. Amtrak is a
private
entity.
Ergo,
§
207
is
unconstitutional. This proposed syllogism is
319

susceptible, however, to attacks on both its
validity and soundness. In other words, does
the conclusion actually follow from the
premises? And, if it does, are both premises
true? Our discussion follows the same path.
A
We open our discussion with a principle
upon which both sides agree: Federal
lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory
authority to a private entity. To do so would
be “legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form.” This constitutional
prohibition is the lesser-known cousin of the
doctrine that Congress cannot delegate its
legislative function to an agency of the
Executive Branch. This latter proposition
finds scarce practical application, however,
because “no statute can be entirely precise,”
meaning “some judgments, even some
judgments involving policy considerations,
must be left to the officers executing the law
and to the judges applying it.” All that is
required then to legitimate a delegation to a
government agency is for Congress to
prescribe an intelligible principle governing
the statute's enforcement.
Not so, however, in the case of private
entities to whom the Constitution commits
no executive power. Although objections to
delegations are “typically presented in the
context of a transfer of legislative authority
from the Congress to agencies,” we have
reaffirmed that “the difficulties sparked by
such allocations are even more prevalent in
the context of agency delegations to private
individuals.” Even an intelligible principle
cannot rescue a statute empowering private
parties to wield regulatory authority. Such
entities may, however, help a government

agency make its regulatory decisions, for
“[t]he Constitution has never been regarded
as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality” that
such schemes facilitate. Yet precisely how
much involvement may a private entity have
in the administrative process before its
advisory
role
trespasses
into
an
unconstitutional delegation? Discerning that
line is the task at hand.
Preliminarily, we note the Supreme Court
has never approved a regulatory scheme that
so drastically empowers a private entity in
the way § 207 empowers Amtrak. True, §
207 has a passing resemblance to the
humbler statutory frameworks in Currin v.
Wallace and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins. In Currin Congress circumscribed
its delegations of administrative authority—
in that case, by requiring two thirds of
regulated industry members to approve an
agency's new regulations before they took
effect. Adkins, meanwhile, affirmed a
modest principle: Congress may formalize
the role of private parties in proposing
regulations so long as that role is merely “as
an aid” to a government agency that retains
the discretion to “approve [ ], disapprove[ ],
or modif[y]” them. Like the private parties
in Currin, Amtrak has an effective veto over
regulations developed by the FRA. And like
those in Adkins, Amtrak has a role in filling
the content of regulations. But the
similarities end there. The industries
in Currin did not craft the regulations, while
Adkins involved no private check on an
agency's regulatory authority. Even more
damningly, the agency in Adkins could
unilaterally change regulations proposed to
it by private parties, whereas Amtrak enjoys
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authority equal to the FRA. Should the FRA
prefer an alternative to Amtrak's proposed
metrics and standards, § 207 leaves it
impotent to choose its version without
Amtrak's permission. No case prefigures the
unprecedented regulatory powers delegated
to Amtrak.

body of the standards.” Not only that, § 207
directs “Amtrak and its host carriers” to
include the metrics and standards in their
Operating Agreements “[t]o the extent
practicable.” The STB's involvement is no
safe harbor from AAR's constitutional
challenge to § 207.

The government also points out that the
metrics and standards themselves impose no
liability.
Rather,
they
define
the
circumstances in which the STB will
investigate
whether
infractions
are
attributable to a freight railroad's failure to
meet its preexisting statutory obligation to
accord preference to Amtrak's trains. We are
not entirely certain what to make of this
argument. Taken to its logical extreme, it
would preclude all preenforcement review
of agency rulemaking, so it is probably
unlikely the government is pressing so
immodest a claim. If the point is merely that
the STB adds another layer of government
“oversight” to Amtrak's exercise of
regulatory power, this precaution does not
alter the analysis. Government enforcement
power did not save the rulemaking authority
of the private coal companies in Carter
Coal, nor the power of private landowners
in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co.
v. Roberge to impose a zoning restriction on
a neighbor's tract of land. As is often the
case in administrative law, the metrics and
standards lend definite regulatory force to an
otherwise broad statutory mandate. The
preference for Amtrak's traffic may predate
the PRIIA, but the metrics and standards are
what channel its enforcement. Certainly the
FRA and Amtrak saw things that way,
responding to one public comment by noting
the STB “is the primary enforcement

As far as we know, no court has invalidated
a scheme like § 207's, but perhaps that is
because no parallel exists. Unprecedented
constitutional questions, after all, lack clear
and controlling precedent. We nevertheless
believe Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting
Oversight
Board
offers
guidance. There the Supreme Court deemed
it a violation of separation of powers to
endow inferior officers with two layers of
good-cause tenure insulating them from
removal by the President. Two principles
from that case are particularly resonant. To
begin with, just because two structural
features raise no constitutional concerns
independently does not mean Congress may
combine them in a single statute. Free
Enterprise Fund deemed invalid a regime
blending two limitations on the President's
removal power that, taken separately, were
unproblematic: the establishment of
independent agencies headed by principal
officers shielded from dismissal without
cause, and the protection of certain inferior
officers from removal by principal officers
directly accountable to the President. So
even if the government is right that § 207
merely synthesizes elements approved
by Currin and Adkins, that would be no
proof of constitutionality.
As for the second principle, Free Enterprise
Fund also clarifies that novelty may, in
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certain
circumstances,
signal
unconstitutionality. That double good-cause
tenure, for example, lacked an antecedent in
the history of the administrative state was
one reason to suspect its legality:
“Perhaps the most telling indication of
the severe constitutional problem with
the PCAOB is the lack of historical
precedent for this entity. Neither the
majority opinion nor the PCAOB nor
the United States as intervenor has
located any historical analogues for this
novel structure. They have not
identified any independent agency other
than the PCAOB that is appointed by
and removable only for cause by
another independent agency.”
In defending § 207, the government
revealingly cites no case—nor have we
found any—embracing the position that a
private entity may jointly exercise
regulatory power on equal footing with an
administrative agency. This fact is not
trivial. Section 207 is as close to the
blatantly unconstitutional scheme in Carter
Coal as we have seen. The government
would essentially limit Carter Coal to its
facts, arguing that “[n]o more is
constitutionally
required”
than
the
government's
“active
oversight,
participation, and assent” in its private
partner's rulemaking decisions. This
proposition—one we find nowhere in the
case law—vitiates the principle that private
parties must be limited to an advisory or
subordinate role in the regulatory process.
To make matters worse, § 207 fails to meet
even the government's ad hoc standard.
Consider what would have happened if
Amtrak and the FRA could not have reached
an agreement on the content of the metrics

and standards within 180 days of the
PRIIA's enactment. Amtrak could have
“petition[ed] the Surface Transportation
Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the
parties in resolving their disputes through
binding arbitration.” And nothing in the
statute precludes the appointment of a
private party as arbitrator. That means it
would have been entirely possible for
metrics and standards to go into effect that
had not been assented to by a single
representative of the government. Though
that did not in fact occur here, § 207's
arbitration provision still polluted the
rulemaking process over and above the other
defects besetting the statute. As a formal
matter, that the recipients of illicitly
delegated authority opted not to make use of
it is no antidote. It is Congress's decision to
delegate that is unconstitutional. As a
practical matter, the FRA's failure to reach
an agreement with Amtrak would have
meant forfeiting regulatory power to an
arbitrator the agency would have had no
hand in picking. Rather than ensuring
Amtrak would “function subordinately” to
the FRA, this backdrop stacked the deck in
favor of compromise. Even for government
agencies, half an apple is better than none at
all.
We remain mindful that the Constitution
“contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable
government.” But a flexible Constitution
must not be so yielding as to become
twisted. Unless it can be established that
Amtrak is an organ of the government,
therefore, § 207 is an unconstitutional
delegation of regulatory power to a private
party.
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B
Now the crucial question: is Amtrak indeed
a private corporation? If not—if it is just one
more government agency—then the
regulatory power it wields under § 207 is of
no constitutional moment.
Many of the details of Amtrak's makeup
support the government's position that it is
not a private entity of the sort described
in Carter Coal. Amtrak's Board of Directors
includes the Secretary of Transportation (or
his designee), seven other presidential
appointees, and the President of Amtrak.
The President of Amtrak—the one Board
member not appointed by the President of
the United States—is in turn selected by the
eight other members of the Board. Amtrak is
also subject to the Freedom of Information
Act. Amtrak's equity structure is similarly
suggestive. As of September 30, 2011, four
common stockholders owned 9,385,694
outstanding shares, which they acquired
from the four railroads whose intercity
passenger service Amtrak assumed in 1971.
At the same time, however, the federal
government owned all 109,396,994 shares
of Amtrak's preferred stock, each share of
which is convertible into 10 shares of
common stock. And, all that stands between
Amtrak and financial ruin is congressional
largesse.
That being said, Amtrak's legislative origins
are not determinative of its constitutional
status. Congress's power to charter private
corporations was recognized early in our
nation's history. And, as far as Congress was
concerned, that is exactly what it was doing
when it created Amtrak. As Congress
explained it, Amtrak “shall be operated and

managed as a for-profit corporation” and “is
not a department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States Government.” We have
previously taken Congress at its word and
relied on this declaration in deciding
whether the False Claims Act applies to
Amtrak. Amtrak agrees: “The National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, also known
as Amtrak, is not a government agency or
establishment [but] a private corporation
operated for profit.” And, somewhat
tellingly, Amtrak's website is www.amtrak.
com—not www.amtrak.gov.
How to decide? Since, in support of its
claim that Amtrak is a public entity, the
government looks past labels to how the
corporation functions, it is worth examining
what functional purposes the public-private
distinction serves when it comes to
delegating regulatory power. We identify
two of particular importance. First,
delegating the government's powers to
private parties saps our political system of
democratic accountability. This threat is
particularly dangerous where both Congress
and the Executive can deflect blame for
unpopular policies by attributing them to the
choices of a private entity. This worry is
certainly present in the case of § 207, since
Congress has expressly forsworn Amtrak's
status as a “department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States
Government.” Dislike the metrics and
standards Amtrak has concocted? It's not the
federal government's fault—Amtrak is a
“for-profit corporation.”
Second, fundamental to the public-private
distinction in the delegation of regulatory
authority is the belief that disinterested
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government agencies ostensibly look to the
public good, not private gain. For this
reason, delegations to private entities are
particularly
perilous. Carter
Coal specifically condemned delegations
made not “to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private
persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the
same
business.” Partly
echoing
the
Constitution's guarantee of due process, this
principle ensures that regulations are not
dictated by those who “are not bound by any
official duty,” but may instead act “for
selfish reasons or arbitrarily.” More recent
decisions are also consistent with this view.
Amtrak may not compete with the freight
railroads for customers, but it does compete
with them for use of their scarce track. Like
the “power conferred upon the majority ... to
regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority”
in Carter Coal, § 207 grants Amtrak a
distinct competitive advantage: a hand in
limiting the freight railroads' exercise of
their property rights over an essential
resource.
Because Amtrak must “be operated and
managed as a for-profit corporation,” the
fact that the President has appointed the bulk
of its Board does nothing to exonerate its
management from its fiduciary duty to
maximize company profits. Also consistent
with this purpose, “Amtrak is encouraged to
make agreements with the private sector and
undertake initiatives that are consistent with
good business judgment and designed to
maximize its revenues and minimize
Government subsidies.” Yet § 207 directs
Amtrak and its host carriers to incorporate
the metrics and standards in their Operating

Agreements. So to summarize: Amtrak must
negotiate contracts that will maximize its
profits; those contracts generally must, by
law, include certain terms; and Amtrak has
the power to define those terms. Perverse
incentives abound. Nothing about the
government's involvement in Amtrak's
operations restrains the corporation from
devising metrics and standards that inure to
its own financial benefit rather than the
common good. And that is the very essence
of the public-private distinction when a
claim of unconstitutional delegation arises.
No discussion of Amtrak's status as a private
or public institution would be complete,
however, without an examination of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. There
the Court held that Amtrak “is part of the
Government for purposes of the First
Amendment.” Otherwise, the majority
cautioned, the government could “evade the
most solemn obligations imposed in the
Constitution by simply resorting to the
corporate form.” What the Court did not do
in Lebron was conclude that Amtrak
counted as part of the government for all
purposes. On some questions—Does the
Administrative Procedure Act apply to
Amtrak? Does Amtrak enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit?—Congress's disclaimer
of Amtrak's governmental status is
dispositive. This makes sense: Congress has
the power to waive certain governmental
privileges, like sovereign immunity, that are
within its legislative control; but it cannot
circumvent the Bill of Rights by simply
dubbing something private.
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Whether § 207 effects an unconstitutional
delegation is a constitutional question, not a
statutory
one.
But
just
because Lebron treated Amtrak as a
government agency for purposes of the First
Amendment does not dictate the same result
with respect to all other constitutional
provisions. To view Lebron in this way
entirely misses the point. In Lebron, viewing
Amtrak as a strictly private entity would
have permitted the government to avoid a
constitutional prohibition; in this case,
deeming Amtrak to be just another
governmental entity would allow the
government to ignore a constitutional
obligation. Just as it is impermissible for
Congress to employ the corporate form to
sidestep the First Amendment, neither may
it reap the benefits of delegating regulatory
authority while absolving the federal
government of all responsibility for its
exercise. The federal government cannot
have its cake and eat it too. In any
event, Lebron 's holding was comparatively
narrow, deciding only that Amtrak is an
agency of the United States for the purpose
of the First Amendment. It did not opine on
Amtrak's status with respect to the federal
government's structural powers under the
Constitution—the issue here.
This distinction is more than academic.
When Lebron contrasted “the constitutional
obligations of Government” from “the
‘privileges of the government,’ ” it was not
drawing a distinction between questions that
are constitutional from those that are not.
Any “privilege” of the federal government
must
also
be
anchored
in
the
Constitution. As our federal government is
one
of
enumerated
powers,
the

Constitution's structural provisions are the
source of Congress's power to act in the first
place. And, generally speaking, these
provisions
authorize
action
without
mandating it. Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce, for example, does not
dictate the enactment of this or that bill
within its proper scope. By contrast,
individual
rights
are
“affirmative
prohibitions” on government action that
become relevant “only where the
Government possesses authority to act in the
first place.” While often phrased in terms of
an affirmative prohibition, Congress's
inability to delegate government power to
private entities is really just a function of its
constitutional authority not extending that
far in the first place. In other words, rather
than proscribing what Congress cannot do,
the doctrine defines the limits of what
Congress can do. And, by designing Amtrak
to operate as a private corporation—to seek
profit on behalf of private interests—
Congress has elected to deny itself the
power to delegate it regulatory authority
under § 207.
We therefore hold that Amtrak is a private
corporation with respect to Congress's
power to delegate regulatory authority.
Though
the
federal
government's
involvement in Amtrak is considerable,
Congress has both designated it a private
corporation and instructed that it be
managed so as to maximize profit. In
deciding Amtrak's status for purposes of
congressional delegations, these declarations
are dispositive. Skewed incentives are
precisely the danger forestalled by
restricting delegations to government
instrumentalities. And as a private entity,
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Amtrak cannot be granted the regulatory
power prescribed in § 207.
III
We conclude § 207 of the PRIIA
impermissibly delegates regulatory authority
to Amtrak. We need not reach AAR's

separate
argument
that
Amtrak's
involvement in developing the metrics and
standards deprived its members of due
process. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is
Reversed.
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“Supreme Court to Review Amtrak Role in Setting Rail Regulations: High
Court to Hear Challenge by Freight Railroads”
The Wall Street Journal
Brent Kendall
June 23, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday said it
would decide whether Amtrak should be
allowed to participate in the development of
rail performance measures with a
government agency.
Congress set up the arrangement in a 2008
law that allowed Amtrak to work with the
Federal Railroad Administration to set
metrics and minimum standards for
assessing the performance of the passenger
rail service. Those standards are supposed to
be incorporated into Amtrak's operating
agreements with the freight railroad
companies, which host Amtrak trains on
their tracks.
Freight railroads potentially can be
penalized if Amtrak fails to meet
performance standards because the freights
didn't give Amtrak trains priority use of the
rail lines.
The
railroads
found
the
adopted
performance metrics to be unrealistic and
said the law's grant of authority to Amtrak
was unprecedented and untenable. They

argued that Congress violated the
Constitution by delegating authority to a
private entity.
A federal appeals court in Washington,
D.C., agreed.
The appeals court acknowledged that
Amtrak "is a curious entity" that straddles
the public and private sectors, but it noted
that Amtrak was a for-profit corporation. It
struck
down
the
arrangement
as
unconstitutional, suggesting the unusual
setup wasn't much different than giving
General Motors authority to help write
government regulations that would govern
all auto makers.
The Justice Department asked the Supreme
Court to review the case, saying the
government retained sufficient control over
the Amtrak performance standards to avoid
any constitutional concerns.
The Supreme Court will consider the case,
Department of Transportation v. Association
of American Railroads, during its next term,
which begins in October.
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“Supreme Court to Consider USDOT vs. AAR re: Amtrak”
RailwayAge
William C. Vantuono
June 24, 2014
In 2008, Congress passed PRIIA (Passenger
Rail Improvement and Investment Act).
Among its many provisions, it allows
Amtrak to work with the Federal Railroad
Administration to set metrics and minimum
standards for assessing passenger rail
service performance. Those standards are
meant to be incorporated into Amtrak's
operating agreements with its host freight
railroads.
Freight railroads can be penalized if Amtrak
fails to meet its own performance standards,
particularly if Amtrak trains have not been
given priority on the freight rights-of-way it
uses. The Association of American
Railroads strongly objected, calling the law
unrealistic and saying that giving authority
to Amtrak to participate in the development
of rail performance measures with a
government agency was unprecedented and
untenable. They argued that Congress
violated the Constitution by delegating
authority to a private entity.
A federal DC Circuit appeals court in
Washington D.C. agreed, calling Amtrak “a
curious entity” that straddles the public and
private sectors, but still a for-profit
corporation. It struck down the PRIIA
provision as unconstitutional, suggesting the
unusual setup was equivalent to giving
General Motors authority to help write
government regulations that would govern
all auto makers.

At the request of the U.S. Department of
Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court will
consider
the
case, Department
of
Transportation vs. Association of American
Railroads, during its next term, which
begins in October. DOJ said the government
should retain sufficient control over Amtrak
performance standards to avoid any
constitutional concerns.
“The issue in the case is whether PRIIA
Section 207, which required the FRA and
Amtrak to jointly develop metrics, is an
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’
legislative power to a private entity,” says
Kevin Sheys, a railroad attorney with
Nossaman LLP of Washington, D.C. “The
metrics have many purposes, but the
important one for this case is that they could
be used to measure whether the freights
were meeting their statutory obligation to
give preference to Amtrak’s passenger
trains.”
“The Supreme Court will need to grapple
with whether Amtrak is a private entity for
purposes of PRIIA Section 207 and, if so,
whether Amtrak had too much influence
over the development of the metrics,” Sheys
observes. “The USDOT will argue that
Amtrak is not a private entity for 207
purposes and in any case it did not have too
much influence over the development of the
metrics. The freights, represented by the
AAR, believe the DC Circuit properly
decided the case and probably will make a
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second argument (not reached by the DC
Circuit) that the metrics violate their Fifth

Amendment due process rights.”
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“Amtrak Barred From Regulating Freight Railroads on Delays”
Bloomberg
Angela Greiling Keane & Tom Schoenberg
July 3, 2013
Amtrak, the U.S. long-distance passenger
railroad, lost its power to assess blame when
its trains are delayed and to have a say in
whether freight railroads causing those
holdups are penalized.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington
yesterday ruled the taxpayer-supported
service is a private company to which
Congress improperly gave regulatory power
over freight railroads such as Union Pacific
Corp.
(UNP) and Warren
Buffett’s
Burlington Northern Santa Fe.
The court threw out a law passed to enforce
a requirement, dating to Amtrak’s creation
in 1970, that freight trains give priority to
passenger trains on tracks they share, which
they do in most of the U.S.
“If freight railroads perceive they no longer
face penalties for giving freight trains
priority over passenger trains, and the
passenger-train delays are extensive, the
result could be a de-facto imploding of
Amtrak,” said Frank Wilner, a transportation
economist and author of “Amtrak: Past,
Present and Future,” published last year.
The case involves on-time performance
standards and enforcement mechanisms
established under the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.
Amtrak, based in Washington, tracks and
publishes, in monthly reports on its website,
how many minutes its trains are delayed
each month and assigns causes. It cited

freight-train interference as the most
common type of delay over the past 12
months.
During April, it said, such interference was
responsible for about 55,000 minutes of
delays, or 14.9 percent of the total.
Canadian National Railway Co. (CNI) was
held responsible for the most delays in the
12 months ending in April.
General Motors
If Amtrak trains don’t meet the on-time
performance standards set by the company
and its regulators, the U.S. Surface
Transportation Board can investigate the
railroads whose tracks they use and assess
damages.
The court ruled the law unconstitutional for
giving Amtrak a say in setting the metrics
that could lead to penalties. U.S. Circuit
Judge Janice Rogers Brown said that was
akin to the government giving General
Motors Co. (GM) the power to regulate
automobile manufacturers.
“It appears that the current metrics and
standards are invalid until Congress rewrites
the law,” said Ross Capon, president of the
National
Association
of
Railroad
Passengers, a Washington-based advocacy
group, in an interview.
Steve Kulm, a spokesman for Amtrak,
declined to comment.
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Delays Reduced
The U.S. Federal Railroad Administration,
which wrote the standards, said they’ve been
a useful tool to reduce Amtrak delays.
“Since the establishment of the metrics and
standards in 2010, delays have been reduced
each successive year, culminating in a
historic best for Amtrak in 2012,” said
Kevin Thompson, a spokesman for the
agency. “But there is still need for additional
improvement.”
The Transportation Department inspector
general in 2008 found Amtrak’s on-time
performance of 30 percent on long-distance
routes in 2006 reduced the railroad’s
revenue and increased the demand for
taxpayer subsidies.
The Association of American Railroads,
whose members include freight railroads
and Amtrak, sued the U.S. Transportation
Department in 2011 arguing that the
standards, which Amtrak drafted with
Federal Railroad Administration, forced
freight railroads to substantially alter their

business operations, at times by delaying
their own freight traffic.
Bilateral Contracts
The rail association, based in Washington,
hailed the ruling.
“Freight railroads recognize Amtrak wants
to run trains on time, and they work closely
with Amtrak to help make this happen,” Ed
Hamberger, the group’s chief executive
officer, said in an e-mailed statement.
“However, freight railroads believe setting
and measuring schedules and on-time
performance metrics should not be done
through a one-size-fits all approach at the
federal level, but addressed jointly through
private bilateral contracts that take into
account the facts and circumstances of
particular routes.”
The case is Association of American
Railroads
v.
U.S.
Department
of
Transportation, 12-5204, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
(Washington).
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“A New Private Delegation Doctrine?”
Reason Foundation
Alexander Volokh
August 1, 2013
On July 2, 2013, in Ass’n of American
Railroads v. DOT, the D.C. Circuit struck
down a delegation of authority to Amtrak in
§ 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and
Improvement Act of 2008, holding that the
statute
unconstitutionally
delegated
regulatory power to a private party. This is a
significant case for several reasons.
First, it’s potentially significant in terms of
constitutional doctrine. In holding that
private delegations of regulatory authority
are illegitimate, the case seems to go against
the conventional wisdom, which is that there
is no special doctrine for private delegations
by Congress: the Nondelegation Doctrine
applies equally to public and private
recipients of delegated congressional
authority by Congress. Moreover, this
conventional wisdom is probably right. The
D.C. Circuit’s decision may yet be correct
under the Due Process Clause, but the D.C.
Circuit deliberately refused to choose
whether this delegation implicated the
Nondelegation Doctrine or the Due Process
Clause.
Second, it's potentially significant in terms
of its real-world effect on delegations to
private parties—though, again, much
depends on precisely why the delegation is
unconstitutional. If the decision rests on the
Nondelegation Doctrine, it only affects
federal delegations; but if it rests on the Due
Process Clause, it also affects the much
broader set of state delegations.

Third, in holding, based on a multi-factor
analysis, that Amtrak is a private actor, it
provides yet another example of how the
public-private distinction is fuzzy, and an
entity that is public for one reason might be
private for another.
Amtrak, formally called the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, was created
by statute in 1970. Faced with competition
from other modes of transport, railroads that
offered passenger service had been incurring
heavy losses; many of these railroads had
petitioned
the
Interstate
Commerce
Commission, which at the time regulated
railroads, for permission to stop providing
passenger service. With the passage of the
statute, a railroad could transfer its
passenger service responsibilities to Amtrak
if it agreed to a number of conditions, one of
which was to grant Amtrak the use of its
tracks and other facilities. The statute
provides that, except in an emergency, an
Amtrak passenger car has precedence over
another railroad's freight car when they both
need to use the same facilities. Most
railroads agreed to these conditions, which
were enshrined in a series of bilateral
operating agreements.
Fast forward a few decades, to when
Congress passed the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.
One section of the new statute, § 207,
required
the
Federal
Railroad
Administration (FRA) and Amtrak to
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“jointly . . . develop new or improve existing
metrics and minimum standards for
measuring the performance and service
quality of intercity passenger train
operations, including cost recovery, on-time
performance and minutes of delay, ridership,
on-board services, stations, facilities,
equipment, and other services.” These
performance measures aren’t of merely
academic interest. Amtrak and its
contractual partners are required to
incorporate the measures into their operating
agreements “[t]o the extent practical.”
Perhaps more seriously, if “on-time
performance” or “service quality” is
substandard for two consecutive quarters,
the Surface Transportation Board (STB), an
independent agency housed in the
Department of Transportation, is allowed to
start an investigation (and is required to do
so, if a complaint is filed) to check whose
fault it is, and can assess damages against
the host railroad if the problems are due to
the railroad’s failure to grant preference to
Amtrak trains.
These metrics and standards are supposed to
be developed “jointly” by Amtrak and the
FRA. If they can’t agree, they can petition
the STB to appoint an arbitrator, whose
decision will be binding. Amtrak thus has
equal authority with the FRA on this issue;
the FRA has to get Amtrak’s consent in
developing the metrics and standards (or it
has to abide by the decision of an arbitrator,
who might also end up being private). The
Association of American Railroads sued,
charging that this sort of private delegation
is invalid; and the D.C. Circuit agreed.

First, the D.C. Circuit noted, “[f]ederal
lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory
authority to a private entity.” The
Nondelegation Doctrine states that when
Congress delegates power to a government
agency, all that’s required is that Congress
provide an “intelligible principle” to limit
the agency’s discretion. But, said the D.C.
Circuit, “[e]ven an intelligible principle
cannot rescue a statute empowering private
parties to wield regulatory authority.” To
illustrate this point, the D.C. Circuit cited
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936). The New
Deal-era Congress had established a
National Bituminous Coal Commission and
required the organization of 23 “coal
districts.” Within each coal district, all coal
producers would be bound by any collective
bargaining agreements agreed to by a
majority of producers (representing twothirds of total tonnage) and representatives
of a majority of workers. In other words, 2/3
of the coal industry could, by its collective
bargaining activity, legally bind the
remaining 1/3 of the industry. (This reliance
on massive binding industry self-regulation
was classic New Deal procedure.) The
Supreme Court struck this down: “The
power conferred upon the majority is, in
effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an
unwilling minority. This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it
is not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested,
but to private persons whose interests may
be and often are adverse to the interests of
others in the same business. The delegation
is clearly arbitrary, and clearly a denial of
rights safeguarded by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.”
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To the D.C. Circuit, the question thus
became: “precisely how much involvement
may a private entity have in the
administrative process before its advisory
role trespasses into an unconstitutional
delegation?” The court distinguished two
relatively old cases where the Supreme
Court
had
upheld
private
delegations: Currin
v.
Wallace (1939)
and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins (1940). In Currin, an agency wrote
regulations for tobacco auction markets, but
they wouldn’t take effect unless two-thirds
of the industry approved. The Supreme
Court held that this was unobjectionable,
because (unlike in Carter Coal) private
parties did no more than hold the on-off
switch for regulations that were written by
the government. In Adkins, the fact pattern
was reminiscent of Carter Coal: in fact,
Congress had reenacted the same statute that
the Supreme Court had struck down
in Carter Coal, with the exception that now
the government agency wrote the
regulations for the industry based on the
industry’s recommendation. The Supreme
Court upheld this scheme, since now the
industry was merely subordinate to the
government agency. (The possible reality
that the agency might just rubber-stamp the
industry’s recommendations was irrelevant
to the analysis: what was important was that
the agency had the legal authority to modify
the recommendations if it wanted to.)

private actor could control the regulations
that governed the rest of the railroad
industry, choosing a set of performance
measures that would tend to make it look
good relative to its competitors—and if the
FRA refused to accede to Amtrak’s
demands, the regulations would be written
by an arbitrator chosen by the STB who
could, for all we know, also be a private
party.

The Amtrak case, though, went far
beyond Currin or Adkins and was more
similar to Carter Coal: Amtrak had an
“effective veto” over FRA regulations and,
in fact, enjoyed “authority equal to the
FRA.” This really was a case where a

Notably, still on the public side, there’s a
Supreme Court case, Lebron v. National
Railroad
Passenger
Corp.
(1995).
In Lebron, Amtrak was sued, mostly on First
Amendment grounds, for refusing to display
a political advertisement in New York’s

Not so fast, though; one might legitimately
argue that Amtrak isn’t private. The hazard
with all such doctrines that draw a bright
line between public and private is that, in
reality, the line is somewhat fuzzy,
especially in an age where contracting out of
government
services
and
pervasive
regulation of the private sector are
widespread.
So let’s tally up the indicia of privateness
and publicness. On the public side, Amtrak’s
Board of Directors has nine members, one of
whom is the Secretary of Transportation and
seven of whom are presidential appointees;
the ninth, the President of Amtrak, is elected
by the other eight. Amtrak has some private
shareholders, but almost all its stock is
preferred stock held by the federal
government. The D.C. Circuit noted that
Amtrak gets substantial subsidies from the
federal government—though the amount of
government money one gets generally isn’t
relevant to whether one is public or private.
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Penn Station. First Amendment rights, like
many other constitutional rights, only apply
against “state actors,” so the question was
whether Amtrak was a state actor. The
Supreme Court held that “where, as here, the
Government creates a corporation by special
law, for the furtherance of governmental
objectives, and retains for itself permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the
directors of that corporation, the corporation
is part of the Government for purposes of
the First Amendment.”
On the private side, the 1970 statute
specifies that Amtrak “is not a department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United
States Government.” The statute also
commands that Amtrak “shall be operated
and managed as a for-profit corporation.”
Relatedly, by statute, “Amtrak is encouraged
to make agreements with the private sector
and undertake initiatives that are consistent
with good business judgment and designed
to maximize its revenues and minimize
Government subsidies.” Amtrak itself
announces that it’s “not a government
agency or establishment [but] a private
corporation operated for profit.” The D.C.
Circuit
attaches
some
significance
(“somewhat tellingly”) to the fact that
Amtrak’s
URL is
amtrak.com—not
amtrak.gov—but this doesn’t really seem all
that telling, as one could make a similar
claim about the U.S. Postal Service at
usps.com.
To decide the issue, the D.C. Circuit looked
to “what functional purposes the publicprivate distinction serves when it comes to
delegating regulatory power.” One purpose
is accountability: a private delegation dilutes

democratic accountability, because when
power is delegated to a private organization,
the government is no longer blamed for that
organization’s decisions. (Perhaps; but if
something goes wrong, why can’t the voters
blame the government for the initial decision
to delegate?) Another purpose is the
distinction between the public good and
private gain: public recipients of delegated
power are “presumptively disinterested” and
are bound by “official duty,” whereas
private recipients may act “for selfish
reasons or arbitrarily.” (Perhaps; but doesn’t
this display an overly optimistic view of the
motivations of public employees?) In the
D.C. Circuit’s view, these considerations cut
in favor of treating Amtrak as private: the
statutory command that it be “managed as a
for-profit corporation” requires that it seek
its private good, not the public good, and
Congress’s and Amtrak’s consistent labeling
of Amtrak as private tends to distance
Amtrak’s decisions from democratic
accountability. (The court distinguished
Lebron on the grounds that being a state
actor for First Amendment purposes doesn’t
mean one is a state actor for all purposes.)
Section 207 thus delegates regulatory power
to a private party, and is thus invalid.
One interesting aspect of Ass’n of American
Railroads v. DOT is the idea that Amtrak
can be private for the purposes of structural
provisions like the Nondelegation Doctrine,
even though it is public for the purposes of
individual-rights provisions like the First
Amendment. This is possible, though the
D.C. Circuit’s multi-factor analysis isn’t
exactly overwhelming.
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A more interesting aspect of the case is what
the court relegates to a footnote and refuses
to decide. Recall the Carter Coal precedent
from 1936, where giving businesses the
power to regulate their competitors was
characterized as “legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form.” Carter Coal is,
unfortunately, less than crystal-clear on the
precise source of the unconstitutionality.
Since it mentions “legislative delegation,”
one could think of it (as the D.C. Circuit
did) as a Nondelegation Doctrine decision.
Nondelegation challenges rest on the
Vesting Clause of Article I of the federal
constitution, which vests all legislative
power in Congress (“All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States.”). Congress must
exercise its own legislative power, but it’s
allowed to delegate limited authority as long
as the delegation is accompanied by some
“intelligible principle” to limit the agency’s
discretion.
But Carter Coal also says that the
delegation is “clearly a denial of rights
safeguarded by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment” (“[N]or shall any person
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”).
So is this a Nondelegation Doctrine decision
or a Due Process Clause decision? The D.C.
Circuit wasn’t that interested in precisely
what part of the Constitution was being
violated. It wrote, in a footnote, that “the
distinction evokes scholarly interest,” but
the parties in this case didn’t press the point,
and “neither court nor scholar has suggested
a change in the label would effect a change
in the inquiry.”

But reading Carter Coal as a Due Process
opinion, and likewise grounding the Amtrak
challenge in the Due Process Clause, makes
more sense. The focus of a nondelegation
challenge should be on how much power
Congress has given up—has it actually
given up legislative power, or has it merely
allowed someone to fill gaps and
ambiguities?—not on the identity of the
recipient of the delegation. The Due Process
Clause, on the other hand, is concerned with
fair treatment, and the idea that financially
biased decisionmakers (whether public or
private) are illegitimate has been a staple of
Due Process doctrine for a long time. Claims
of bias, whether it’s a public official who
has prejudged an issue or a private
organization that can lose money depending
on how it wields its power, thus fit more
naturally into a Due Process framework than
into a nondelegation framework.
Moreover, the distinction matters for future
cases. A nondelegation holding based on
Article I’s Vesting Clause would enforce
the federal separation
of
powers
by
preventing Congress from getting rid of
some of its legislative authority, and so it
would only govern federal delegations.
These separation of powers constraints are
irrelevant for the states. The federal
constitution doesn’t require that states have
the same separation of powers as the federal
government:
states
could
adopt
parliamentary democracy or engage in any
number of structural experiments forbidden
to the federal government, provided they
comply with certain minimal guarantees like
“one-person, one-vote” or having a
“republican form of government.”
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A Due Process challenge would be quite
different: like the First Amendment and
most other Bill of Rights provisions, the Due
Process Clause now applies against the
states, so a Due Process holding would also
constrain state delegations and would
therefore have a much wider sweep. Under
the Due Process Clause, the court wouldn’t
do the public/private inquiry that was on
display here; rather, it would look to
whether Amtrak was a state actor using the
substantial body of state action doctrine. But
this question was already resolved in 1995
by the Lebron case: yes, Amtrak is a state
actor. (Lebron arose in a First Amendment
context, but it turns out that the Due Process
Clause, as well as various other individualrights provisions, turns on the same state
action question, so any finding of state
action for First Amendment purposes carries
over directly to the Due Process Clause.)
Finding that Amtrak is a state actor doesn’t
mean there’s a Due Proces violation; it’s
only a threshold step that means that Due
Process protections apply. To find out
whether the Due Process Clause was

violated, the relevant inquiry would be the
extent of Amtrak’s financial bias. And given
the statutory command that Amtrak act to
maximize its profits, one could legitimately
conclude that it couldn’t, without an
unconstitutional conflict of interest, regulate
the rest of the railroad industry—thus
arriving at the same bottom line as the D.C.
Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit thus seems incorrect when
it says that public delegations of regulatory
authority are merely evaluated by the
“intelligible framework” test while private
delegations are per se illegitimate. Rather,
all federal delegations (public or private) are
evaluated by the “intelligible principle” test,
while all delegations of any kind (state or
federal, public or private) are scrutinized for
conflicts of interest under the Due Process
Clause, and perhaps private delegations
might be more vulnerable because conflicts
of interest are more likely to arise there.
This, then, is the open issue at the heart of
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. The true reach of
this decision is yet to be determined.
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Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl
13-1032
Ruling Below: Direct Marketing Association v. Barbara Brohl, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2901 (2014).
Association of mail and online retailers brought action against Executive Director of Colorado
Department of Revenue, challenging the constitutionality of notice and reporting requirements
that state imposed on retailers that did not collect taxes on sales to Colorado purchasers. The
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Robert Blackburn, J., granted summary
judgment to association and permanently enjoined enforcement of requirements on ground that
they violated Commerce Clause. Defendant appealed.
Question Presented: Whether the Tax Injunction Act, which provides that “[t]he district courts
shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” bars federal
court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and
reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a
tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration.

DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Barbara BROHL, in her capacity as Executive Director, Colorado Department of Revenue,
Defendant-Appellant, and Multistate Tax Commission, Amicus-Curiae.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Decided on August 20, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from Colorado's efforts to
collect sales and use taxes during the
expansion of e-commerce.
Appellant Barbara Brohl, Executive Director
of the Colorado Department of Revenue (the
"Department"), appeals from an order
enjoining the enforcement of state notice
and reporting requirements imposed on
retailers who do not collect taxes on sales to

Colorado
purchasers
("non-collecting
retailers"), Most, if not all, of these noncollecting retailers sell products to Colorado
purchasers by mail or online.
Appellee Direct Marketing Association
("DMA") — a group of businesses and
organizations that market products via
catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media,
and the Internet — urges us to uphold the
district court's determination that Colorado's
notice and reporting obligations are
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unconstitutional.
The
district
court
concluded that Colorado's requirements for
non-collecting
retailers
discriminated
against and placed undue burdens on
interstate commerce, in violation of the
Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. It therefore entered a
permanent
injunction
prohibiting
enforcement of the state requirements.
The issue in this appeal is whether
Colorado's notice and reporting obligations
for non-collecting retailers violate the
Commerce Clause. However, we do not
reach that merits question. Because the Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, deprived
the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin
Colorado's tax collection effort, we remand
to the district court to dismiss DMA's
Commerce Clause claims.
I BACKGROUND
A. Colorado's Sales and Use Taxes
Colorado imposes a 2.9 percent tax on the
sale of tangible goods within the state.
Retailers with a physical presence in the
state are required by law to collect sales tax
from purchasers
and remit it to the
Department. The sales tax statute imposes
additional duties on Colorado retailers such
as recordkeeping, and penalties for deficient
remittance of sales tax.
If Colorado purchasers have not paid sales
tax on tangible goods — as occurs in some
online and mail-order purchases from
retailers with no in-state physical presence
— they must pay a 2.9 percent use tax "for
the privilege of storing, using, or
consuming" the goods in Colorado. The use
tax complements the sales tax and is

"prevent[] consumers of retail products from
purchasing out of state in order to avoid
paying a Colorado sales tax."
Although Colorado's sales and use taxes
have equivalent rates, they are collected
differently. Whereas retailers with a physical
presence in the state must collect and remit
sales tax to the Department, the onus is on
the purchaser to report and pay use tax. This
difference results from the Supreme Court's
bright-line rule in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota. In Quill, the Court reaffirmed that it
is unconstitutional under the "negative" or
"dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause
for a state to require a retailer with no instate physical presence to collect the state's
sales or use taxes. Because Quill prohibits
Colorado from forcing retailers with no instate physical presence to collect and remit
taxes on sales to Colorado consumers, the
state requires its residents to report and pay
use taxes to the Department with their
income tax returns. The failure to report and
pay use tax is a criminal offense.
Nonetheless, use tax collection is elusive.
Most Colorado residents do not report or
remit use tax despite the legal obligation to
do so. A 2010 report submitted as part of
this litigation estimated that Colorado state
and local governments would lose $172.7
million in 2012 because of residents' failure
to pay use tax on e-commerce purchases
from out-of-state, non-collecting retailers.
B. Notice and Reporting Requirements
To increase use tax collection, in 2010 the
Colorado legislature enacted statutory
requirements for non-collecting retailers.
The statute and its implementing regulations
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impose three principal obligations on noncollecting retailers whose gross sales in
Colorado exceed $100,000; they must (1)
provide transactional notices to Colorado
purchasers, (2) send annual purchase
summaries to Colorado customers, and (3)
annually
report
Colorado
purchaser
information to the Department.
Under the first requirement, non-collecting
retailers must "notify Colorado purchasers
that sales or use tax is due on certain
purchases . . . and that the state of Colorado
requires the purchaser to file a sales or use
tax return." The notice must be included in
every transaction with a Colorado purchaser,
and shall inform the purchaser that (1) the
retailer has not, collected sales or use tax,
(2) the purchase is not exempt from
Colorado sales or use tax, and (3) Colorado
law requires the purchaser to file a sales or
use tax return and to pay tax owed.
According to the Department, the
transactional notice "serves to educate
consumers about their state use tax liability
with the aim of increasing voluntary
compliance."
Under the second requirement, noncollecting retailers must mail annual notices
to Colorado customers who purchased more
than $500 in goods from them in the
preceding calendar year. The summary must
be sent by January 31 of each year and the
envelope containing it must be "prominently
marked with the words 'Important tax
document enclosed.'" The summary must
inform Colorado consumers of purchase
dates, items bought, and the amount of each
purchase made in the preceding calendar
year. The annual summary tells purchasers

they have a duty to "file a sales or use tax
return at the end of every year" in Colorado
and must inform customers that the retailer
is required to report to the Department the
customers' total purchase amounts from the
preceding calendar year. According to the
Department, the annual summary "arms the
consumer with accurate information to
facilitate reporting and paying the use tax."
Third, non-collecting retailers must annually
report information on Colorado purchasers
to the Department. The annual report shall
include purchasers' names, billing addresses,
shipping addresses, and total purchase
amounts for the previous calendar year.
According to the Department, this customer
information report "allows [it] to pursue
audit and collection actions against
taxpayers who fail to pay the tax" and "is
designed to increase voluntary consumer
compliance with state tax laws because
consumers know that a third party has
reported their taxable activity to the taxing
authority."
Non-collecting retailers who do not comply
with any one of Colorado's notice and
reporting obligations are subject to penalties.
Alternatively, retailers may choose to collect
and remit sales tax from Colorado
purchasers to forgo the notice and reporting
obligations.
C. Procedural History
In June 2010, DMA sued the Department's
executive
director,
challenging
the
constitutionality of Colorado's notice and
reporting requirements. Claims I and II of
DMA's complaint alleged that Colorado's
statutory and regulatory obligations are
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unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause because they (1) discriminate against
interstate
commerce
("Discrimination
Claim"), and (2) impose undue burdens on
interstate commerce ("Undue Burden
Claim").
The district court granted DMA a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the
enforcement of the notice and reporting
requirements. The parties then agreed to an
expedited process for resolving the two
Commerce Clause claims and filed crossmotions for summary judgment on those
claims.
On March 30, 2012, the district court
granted DMA's motion for summary
judgment and denied the Department's
motion for summary judgment. On the
Discrimination Claim, the court concluded
that the notice and reporting requirements
facially discriminate against interstate
commerce. It held these requirements are
unconstitutional because "[t]he record
contains essentially no evidence to show that
the legitimate interests advanced by the
[Department] cannot be served adequately
by
reasonable
nondiscriminatory
alternatives."
On the Undue Burden Claim, the district
court relied on Quill's bright-line rule that
state governments cannot constitutionally
require businesses without an in-state
physical presence to collect and remit sales
or use taxes. The district court
acknowledged that Colorado's notice and
reporting requirements do not obligate outof-state retailers to collect and remit taxes.
But it reasoned that the notice and reporting
requirements place burdens on out-of-state

retailers that "are inextricably related in kind
and purpose to the burdens condemned in
Quill" These burdens, the district court
concluded,
would
unconstitutionally
interfere with interstate commerce.
In the same order, the court entered a
permanent
injunction
prohibiting
enforcement of the notice and reporting
requirements. In granting injunctive relief,
the district court said DMA had achieved
actual success on the merits because the
court had granted summary judgment on the
Discrimination and Undue Burden Claims.
Because DMA's non-Commerce Clause
claims remained unresolved, the district
court said it would "address in a separate
order the parties' request that [it] certify this
order as a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b)," from which the Department could
appeal. However, the Department filed its
notice of appeal before the district court
certified the order as final under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We nevertheless may
consider the Department's appeal from the
district court's entry of a permanent
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(providing jurisdiction over interlocutory
orders granting injunctions).
II. DISCUSSION
The issue on appeal is whether Colorado's
notice and reporting requirements for noncollecting retailers violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Before addressing that
issue, however, we must determine whether
the Tax Injunction Act ("TLA") precludes
federal jurisdiction over DMA's claims. We
conclude that it does and do not reach the
merits of this appeal.
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A. Tax Injunction Act
The TIA provides that "district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State." " The statute has its roots in
equity practice, in principles of federalism,
and in recognition of the imperative need of
a State to administer its own fiscal
operations." It therefore serves as a "broad
jurisdictional
barrier"
that
"limit[s]
drastically federal district court jurisdiction
to interfere with so important a local
concern as the collection of taxes." Because
the TIA is a jurisdictional limitation, we
must determine whether it prohibits our
consideration of this appeal regardless of
whether it was raised in the district court.
The TIA prohibits our jurisdiction if (1)
DMA's action seeks to "enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law," and (2) "a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
the courts of such State," id. We address
these issues in turn.
1. Does DMA seek to enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of a state tax?
The TIA divests federal district courts of
jurisdiction over actions that seek to "enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law." This
broad language prohibits federal courts from
interfering with state tax administration
through injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
or damages awards. The TIA "does not limit
any substantive rights to enjoin a state tax

but requires only that they be enforced in a
state court rather than a federal court."
In its brief, DMA argues the TIA does not
preclude federal jurisdiction here because
DMA (1) is not a taxpayer seeking to avoid
a tax, and (2) challenges notice and
reporting requirements, not a tax
assessment.
a. Non-taxpayer lawsuits
DMA argues it is not a taxpayer seeking to
avoid state taxes and thus the TIA does not
apply. Its argument rests on Hibbs v. Winn,
where the Supreme Court stated that the TIA
is triggered when "state taxpayers seek
federal-court orders enabling them to avoid
paying state taxes." Relying on our
precedent interpreting Hibbs, we disagree
that the TIA applies only when taxpayers
seek to avoid a state tax in federal court
The plaintiffs in Hibbs were Arizona
taxpayers who brought an Establishment
Clause challenge in federal court to a state
tax credit for contributions to "school tuition
organizations." The plaintiffs did not
challenge a tax imposed on them, but a tax
benefit to others. The Supreme Court
determined the TIA did not bar such a
lawsuit.
The Court observed that Congress enacted
the TIA to "direct[] taxpayers to pursue
refund suits instead of attempting to restrain
[state tax] collections" through federal
lawsuits. "In short," the Court said,
"Congress trained its attention on taxpayers
who sought to avoid paying their tax bill by
pursuing a challenge route other than the
one specified by the taxing authority."
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Beyond this discussion of taxpayer lawsuits,
the Hibbs Court explained that the TIA
applies to federal court relief that "would . . .
operate[] to reduce the flow of state tax
revenue" — i.e., federal lawsuits that would
inhibit state tax assessment, levy, or
collection. According to the statute's
legislative history, Congress enacted the
TIA
with
"state-revenue-protective
objectives,"
including
prohibiting
"taxpayers, with the aid of a federal
injunction, from withholding large sums,
thereby disrupting state government
finances." The Court noted that the Hibbs
plaintiffs did not challenge a state-revenueproducing measure — they sought to
invalidate a tax credit the state gave to
taxpayers — and that nothing in the TIA
prohibited a third party from challenging a
state tax benefit in federal court..
Although Hibbs states that the TIA applies
to "cases in which state taxpayers seek
federal-court orders enabling them to avoid
paying state taxes," we have not interpreted
it as holding that the TIA applies only to
taxpayer suits. For instance, in Hill v. Kemp,
we applied the TIA outside the context of a
taxpayer seeking to avoid taxes. In Hill,
Oklahoma motorists and abortion-rights
supporters sought to enjoin Oklahoma's
statutory scheme for specialty vehicle
license plates. The plaintiffs argued that
Oklahoma unconstitutionally discriminated
against their viewpoint by giving more
favorable terms and conditions to drivers
who wanted specialty plates with antiabortion messages.
We agreed with the district court that the
TIA barred the plaintiffs' challenge because

Oklahoma's specialty license plate scheme
imposed revenue-generating charges, which
we viewed as taxes. To enjoin the "entire
specialty plate regime . . . or even to enjoin a
portion of it," we said, "would deny
Oklahoma the use of significant funds" used
for a variety of state initiatives. Such a result
"would implicate exactly the sort of
federalism problems the TIA was designed
to ameliorate."
The plaintiffs in Hill argued that, under
Hibbs, the TIA did not apply because they
did not "challenge an assessment imposed
on them, but rather assessments imposed on
and paid by other persons or entities" — i.e.,
they were not taxpayers trying to avoid a
tax. We disagreed with this reading of
Hibbs. We saw "[n]othing in the language of
the TIA indicat[ing] that our jurisdiction to
hear challenges to state taxes can be turned
like a spigot, off when brought by taxpayers
challenging their own liabilities and on
when brought by third parties challenging
the liabilities of others."
We acknowledged that in Hibbs the Court
"did point out that TIA cases typically
involve challenges brought by state
taxpayers seeking to avoid their own state
tax liabilities." But we noted that some
lower-court cases applied the TIA to suits by
third parties who sought to disrupt state tax
collection and that the Hibbs Court did not
criticize these decisions. We interpreted
Hibbs as holding that the "essential problem
with the defendant's assertion that the TIA
barred the suit . . . lay in the fact that the
plaintiff[s] . . . simply did not seek to enjoin
the levy or collection of any tax . . . but
instead sought to challenge the provision of
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a tax credit." The upshot of Hibbs, we said,
is that "giving away a tax credit is a very
different thing than assessing, levying or
collecting a tax." The nature of the plaintiff
was not the "essential and dispositive
distinction under the Supreme Court's
teaching in Hibbs."
Accordingly, we have not interpreted Hibbs
as holding that the TIA applies only when
taxpayers seek to avoid a state tax. Rather,
the key question is whether the plaintiff's
lawsuit seeks to prevent "the State from
exercising its sovereign power to collect . . .
revenues." This interpretation adheres to
Hibbs's instruction that the primary purpose
of the TIA is to "shield[] state tax
collections from federal-court restraints."
Contrary to DMA's position, it cannot avoid
the TIA merely because it is not a taxpayer
challenging tax payment.
b. Notice and reporting obligations
DMA next argues that it seeks to avoid
notice and reporting obligations, not a tax. It
insists that "[t]he fact that such obligations
relate to use tax owed by Colorado
consumers does not bring the DMA's suit . .
. under the umbrella of the TIA as a suit
seeking to enjoin the collection of a state
tax."
But the TIA bars more than suits that would
enjoin tax collection. It also prohibits federal
lawsuits that would "restrain the . . .
collection" of a state tax. The issue is
whether DMA's attack on Colorado's notice
and reporting obligations would "restrain"
Colorado's tax collection.
i. Suits that restrain tax collection

In enacting the TIA, Congress chose to
prohibit three forms of interference with
state
tax
collection:
"enjoin[ing],
suspend[ing], or restrain[ing.]" Its use of the
disjunctive "or" suggests each term has a
distinct meaning. The terms "enjoin" and
"suspend" suggest entirely arresting tax
collection, but "restrain" has a broader
ordinary meaning.
Under most definitions, "restrain" means to
limit, restrict, or hold back. We accept this
ordinary meaning of "restrain," cognizant of
the Supreme Court's instruction that the TIA
is a broad jurisdictional prohibition.
A lawsuit seeking to enjoin state laws
enacted to ensure compliance with and
increase use tax collection, like DMA's
challenge here, would "restrain" state tax
collection. Such a lawsuit, if successful,
would limit, restrict, or hold back the state's
chosen method of enforcing its tax laws and
generating revenue. Federalism concerns,
which the TIA seeks to avoid, arise not only
when a state tax is challenged in federal
court, but also when the means for collecting
a state tax are targeted there. The TIA's use
of the term "restrain" allows federal courts
to weed out lawsuits, such as DMA's, that
attempt to undermine state tax collection.
Although DMA does not directly challenge
a tax, it contests the way Colorado wishes to
collect use tax. This court has said that the
TIA "cannot be avoided by an attack on the
administration of a tax as opposed to the
validity of the tax itself." In making this
statement, we agreed with Czajkowski v.
Illinois, which applied the TIA to a
challenge to state cigarette tax enforcement,
even though it was "arguable that plaintiffs
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[were] only seeking to enjoin the state from
using
unconstitutional
methods
and
procedures to collect the taxes, rather than
the collection of taxes itself."
We acknowledge that DMA's suit is unlike
TIA cases in which a plaintiff asks a federal
court to invalidate and enjoin a state tax.
Even if DMA's constitutional attack on the
notice and reporting obligations were
successful, Colorado consumers would still
owe use taxes by law. But the state-chosen
method to secure those taxes would be
compromised, curbing Colorado's ability to
collect revenue. The inquiry under the TIA
is whether DMA's lawsuit would restrain
state tax collection. Although DMA's
lawsuit differs from the prototypical TIA
case, its potential to restrain tax collection
triggers the jurisdictional bar.
DMA suggests that the obligations imposed
on non-collecting retailers merely "relate to
use tax owed by Colorado consumers." We
disagree with DMA's characterization and
attempt to distance the notice and reporting
obligations from the collection of a state tax.
Colorado enacted the notice and reporting
obligations
to
increase
taxpayers'
compliance with use tax laws and thereby
increase use tax collection. Even the title of
the bill that later became law reflects its tax
collection purpose: "An Act Concerning the
Collection of Sales and Use Taxes on Sales
Made by Out-of-State Retailers." One of the
challenged requirements, the annual
customer information reports sent to the
Department, would aid the Department's
auditing of taxpayers, a significant tax
collection mechanism. Indeed, the tax
collection goal of the notice and reporting

requirements is apparent because out-ofstate retailers who voluntarily collect tax on
Colorado purchases are exempt.
The purposes of the TIA apply both to a
lawsuit that would directly enjoin a tax and
one that would enjoin a procedure required
by the state's tax statutes and regulations that
aims to enforce and increase tax collection.
Either action interferes with state revenue
collection and falls within the "traditional
heartland of TIA cases" that dismiss federal
lawsuits to protect state coffers.
Other courts have applied the TIA to attacks
on tax collection methods, rather than taxes
themselves. In Gass v. County of Allegheny,
the Third Circuit held that the TIA barred a
lawsuit challenging a state tax appeals
procedure. Although the appellant argued
that its lawsuit did not affect the state's
ability to collect tax, the appellate court
concluded that the "appeal process is
directed to the . . . ultimate goal and
responsibility of determining the proper
amount of tax to assess" and thus fell within
the TIA.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has applied the
TIA to bar a suit that would have prohibited
disclosure of tax information to state taxing
authorities. The lawsuit sought to withhold
"earnings records and other tax related
information to the Idaho and Montana taxing
authorities." As here, the taxpayer would
have continued to owe tax, but the states
would have been deprived of the means to
calculate and collect it. The Ninth Circuit
said, "[t]he fact that the injunction would
restrain assessment indirectly rather than
directly does not make the [TIA]
inapplicable." The Ninth Circuit has since
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explained that whether the TIA applies
depends on "the effect of federal litigation
on the state's ability to collect revenues, and
will only bar the adjudication of a federal
constitutional claim in federal court if a
judgment for the plaintiffs will hamper a
state's ability to raise revenue." We have
little problem concluding that DMA's
lawsuit would hamper Colorado's ability to
raise revenue.
ii. DMA's additional arguments
DMA responds that the Supreme Court has
cautioned that the TIA is not a "sweeping
congressional direction to prevent federalcourt interference with all aspects of state
tax administration." We have acknowledged
this point, and continue to do so here. But in
making this pronouncement, the Supreme
Court was distinguishing between federal
lawsuits that would not curb state revenue
collection, and therefore would not fall
within the TIA, and "[f]ederal-court relief
[that] . . . [would] reduce the flow of state
tax revenue," and thus trigger the TIA.
DMA's Commerce Clause claims fall within
the latter category.
DMA also cites two federal circuit court
cases to argue that our interpretation of the
TIA is overly broad: United Parcel Service
Inc. v. Flores-Galarza ("UPS"), and Wells v.
Malloy.
In UPS, the First Circuit addressed whether
the Butler Act, a close relative of the TIA,
deprived it of jurisdiction over a challenge
to Puerto Rico's interstate package delivery
scheme. The Butler Act provides that "[n]o
suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax imposed

by the laws of Puerto Rico shall be
maintained in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico." UPS
challenged Puerto Rico's statutory scheme
prohibiting an interstate carrier from
delivering a package unless the recipient
presented a certificate of excise tax
payment. Alternatively, interstate carriers
could prepay excise tax and seek
reimbursement from package recipients, but
this option imposed expensive and
burdensome statutory and regulatory
obligations.
The First Circuit determined the Butler Act
did not bar UPS's action. It reasoned that
"UPS sought to enjoin only those provisions
. . . that prohibit or interfere with the
delivery of packages. UPS did not challenge
the amount or validity of the excise tax, nor
the authority of the Secretary to assess or
collect it." The court also said that Puerto
Rico's package "delivery ban targets third
parties instead of those who owe the tax." It
found that Puerto Rico's laws produced
excise tax revenue "indirectly through a
more general use of coercive power" and did
not create "a system of tax collection within
the meaning of the Butler Act."
Even if UPS counsels against applying the
TIA here, we decline to follow it. Much of
UPS's reasoning conflicts with our own
binding case law. For instance, UPS found it
important that the plaintiff did "not
challenge the amount or validity of the
excise tax," but we have said the TIA
"cannot be avoided by an attack on the
administration of a tax as opposed to the
validity of the tax itself." The UPS court
also declined to apply the Butler Act
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because Puerto Rico's laws targeted third
parties, not taxpayers. But, as discussed
above, we recognized in Hill that the TIA
can apply to third-party lawsuits that enjoin,
suspend, or restrain tax collection. Indeed,
much of the reasoning in UPS would have
counseled against applying the TIA to the
license plate lawsuit in Hill.
DMA also cites Wells v. Malloy. In Wells,
the plaintiff sought to enjoin a Vermont
provision that required suspension of his
driver's license for failure to pay motor
vehicle taxes. The plaintiff did not dispute
owing taxes. The district court determined
the TIA barred the action, but the Second
Circuit disagreed.
The court concluded the plaintiff was not
seeking to restrain the collection of a tax. It
said, '"Collection,' of course, could be read
broadly to include anything that a state has
determined to be a likely method of securing
payment." But the court interpreted
"collection" to mean "methods similar to
assessment and levy . . . that would produce
money or other property directly, rather than
indirectly through a more general use of
coercive power."
Like Wells, we do not interpret the TIA as
applying to any action challenging a state
law that could possibly secure tax payment.
But here DMA challenges laws enacted to
notify consumers of their duty to pay use tax
and to garner information on consumer
purchases to ensure tax compliance through
audits. Its lawsuit targets measures that
attempt to ensure tax compliance in the first
instance, not sanctions imposed after a
taxpayer has admittedly refused to pay
taxes. Colorado's laws are not a reactive and

punitive "general use of coercive power" to
entice tax payment from individuals who
admittedly refuse to pay, and we therefore
do not think Wells applies here.
Finally,
we
mention
one
recent
development. After oral argument in this
case, this court considered the application of
the Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA"), in Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius. Using
somewhat similar language to the TIA, the
AIA states that "no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by
any person, whether or not such person is
the person against whom such tax was
assessed." Whereas the TIA protects state
tax measures, the AIA "protects the [federal]
Government's ability to collect a consistent
stream of revenue, by barring litigation to
enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of
taxes."
In Hobby Lobby, two corporations
challenged a federal requirement that they
provide employees with health insurance
coverage for certain contraceptive methods.
Failure to comply with the federal
requirement exposed the corporations to a
"tax" under 26 U.S.C. § 4980. We
considered whether the AIA barred the
corporations' action because their suit might
enjoin a tax on them for non-compliance
with the health care coverage requirement.
We explained that the corporations were
"not seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes
or the execution of any IRS regulation; they
[were] seeking to enjoin the enforcement, by
whatever method, of one HHS regulation"
regarding contraceptive coverage. The "tax
[was] just one of many collateral
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consequences" of noncompliance with the
federal contraceptive-coverage requirement.
Moreover, "[t]he statutory scheme ma[de]
clear that the tax at issue [was] no more than
a penalty for violating regulations . . . and
the AIA does not apply to the exaction of a
purely regulatory tax."

foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision
in Quill. Having determined that DMA's
action falls within the TIA's prohibition on
federal lawsuits that would "enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law," we proceed to
the statute's second element.

Our position in this appeal is consistent with
the analysis in Hobby Lobby. The
corporations in Hobby Lobby challenged a
health insurance regulation and a possible
penalty for failing to comply with that
regulation. To the extent that the penalty
constituted a "tax" under the AIA, an issue
that this court seemed to doubt in Hobby
Lobby, it was a "more general use of
coercive power," and fell outside the bounds
of the AIA.

2. Does DMA have a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy in Colorado?

Here, DMA challenges notice and reporting
requirements in Colorado's sales and use tax
statutory scheme. These requirements are
not a coercive use of power or punitive in
nature — they are the state's chosen means
of enforcing use tax collection in the first
instance. And the state's use tax is
indisputably a "tax" under the TIA. The
revenue-generating, non-punitive purpose of
the notice and reporting obligations places
them squarely within the TIA's protection.
DMA's action seeks to restrain the collection
of sales and use taxes in Colorado. The
state's notice and reporting obligations,
while not taxes themselves, were enacted
with the sole purpose of increasing use tax
collection. Indeed, the obligations for noncollecting retailers are a substitute for
requiring these same retailers to collect sales
and use taxes at the point of sale, an
approach the Colorado legislature deemed

For the TIA to apply, DMA must also have a
"plain, speedy and efficient remedy . . . in
the courts of [Colorado]." This part of the
TIA requires that Colorado law offer a "full
hearing and judicial determination" on its
claims. We must be convinced that Colorado
law provides DMA with sufficient process
to challenge the notice and reporting
requirements.
As previously discussed, Congress intended
for the TIA to impose a "broad jurisdictional
barrier" that "limit[s] drastically federal
district court jurisdiction to interfere with so
important a local concern as the collection
of taxes." The TIA's "plain, speedy and
efficient remedy" provision is therefore
interpreted "narrowly" to "be faithful to
[this] congressional intent." Our narrow
inquiry asks only whether the "state-court
remedy . . . meets certain minimal
procedural criteria." The TIA does not
require that the state provide the best or
speediest remedy. And "the likelihood of [a]
plaintiff's success in the state court is not a
factor . . . when determining whether the
jurisdictional prohibition of [the TIA]
applies."
DMA does not challenge the process
available to it in Colorado. Colorado state
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courts can and do grant relief in cases
challenging the constitutionality of tax
measures. Further, Colorado courts have
considered Commerce Clause challenges
involving taxes. Circuit courts have
routinely said that such available process in
state court satisfies the TIA's "plain, speedy
and efficient remedy" element.
We are hesitant, however, to stop our
analysis there. The Supreme Court in Hibbs
suggested that the TIA does not refer to
general process available in state court. The
Court said that a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy" under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 is "not one
designed for the universe of plaintiffs who
sue the State. Rather, it [is] a remedy
tailormade for taxpayers." It then cited to
decisions in which taxpayers were allowed
to protest taxes in state court after first
seeking a refund under state administrative
law. Although the Hibbs Court was not
deciding any issue specifically dealing with
the "plain, speedy and efficient remedy"
language of the TIA, its brief discussion
suggests that the statutory language may
contemplate something more than the
general availability of a remedy to "the
universe of plaintiffs who sue the State."
As discussed earlier, in Hill v. Kemp, this
court determined that the TIA may bar thirdparty non-taxpayer lawsuits, despite the
Hibbs Court's discussion of taxpayer
lawsuits. In Hill, the plaintiffs had a "plain,
speedy and efficient" remedy in state court
because Oklahoma tax statutes provided "a
general right to protest taxes before the Tax
Commission," as well as a right of action to
remedy grievances for any state tax law that
is contrary to federal law or the Constitution.

Thus, in Hill, the plaintiffs could seek a
remedy under specific state tax laws. This
was consistent with Hibbs in that these
remedies were not available to the universe
of plaintiffs suing the state. Accordingly, we
address whether Colorado's tax laws
similarly provide a more specific remedy to
DMA: How can DMA or the remote
retailers it represents challenge Colorado's
statutory scheme outside of filing an action
in state court for injunctive or declaratory
relief?
DMA complains that Colorado's laws force
remote retailers to choose between obeying
the notice and reporting requirements and
remitting sales tax to the Department. Much
like a taxpayer who seeks to challenge a
state tax but must first pay the tax and seek a
refund under state law, a remote retailer
could choose to remit sales tax and then seek
a refund. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 39-26-703(2.5)(a)
allows retailers to "file any claim for refund
with the executive director of the department
of revenue." In pursuing the refund, the
retailer could argue that Colorado laws
unconstitutionally coerce it to choose
between collecting a sales tax and
complying with the notice and reporting
requirements, the same Commerce Clause
argument it brings here. The director then
would "promptly examine such claim and . .
. make a refund or allow a credit to any
[retailer] who establishes that such [retailer]
overpaid the tax due." If the retailer is
"aggrieved at the final decision," it may seek
review in the state district courts.
Another remedy for a remote retailer is to
challenge any penalties it incurs for failing
to comply with the notice and reporting
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obligations. Under Colo. Rev. Stat § 39-21103, a taxpayer may dispute a tax owed to
the Department after receiving a notice of
deficiency and may request a hearing.
Although this provision discusses tax
deficiencies, it also contemplates disputes
involving penalties owed to the Department.
This provision also contemplates the
taxpayer and the executive director agreeing
that "a question of law arising under the
United States or Colorado constitutions" is
implicated in the dispute, bypassing a
hearing, and going "directly to the district
court."
We are satisfied that Colorado provides
avenues for remote retailers to Challenge the
scheme allegedly forcing them to choose
between collecting sales tax and complying
with the notice and reporting requirements.
Colorado's administrative remedies provide

for hearings and appeals to state court, as
well as ultimate review in the United States
Supreme Court. Whether DMA or a remote
retailer it represents files a similar lawsuit in
state court seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief, or whether it follows
Colorado's administrative tax procedures, a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is
available in Colorado.
III. CONCLUSION
The TIA divested the district court of
jurisdiction over DMA's Commerce Clause
claims, and we therefore have no
jurisdiction to reach the merits of this
appeal. We remand for the district court to
dismiss DMA's Commerce Clause claims
for lack of jurisdiction, dissolve the
permanent injunction entered against the
Department, and take further appropriate
action consistent with this opinion
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“High Court to Hear Appeal Over Colorado 'Amazon Tax' Law”
Law360
Drew Singer
July 1, 2014
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed to
hear a case challenging Colorado’s so-called
Amazon tax law, taking up the issue of
whether federal judges have the power to
decide whether states may impose reporting
requirements on out-of-state retailers as part
of their tax laws. The closely watched case
gives Supreme Court justices the chance to
clarify the scope of the Tax Injunction Act’s
jurisdiction. The TIA, in general, prevents
federal courts from interfering with state tax
collection regimes. The Direct Marketing
Association, a trade association of directmarketing retailers, asked the high court in
February to review the Tenth Circuit’s use
of the law.
“Jurisdictional cases are always important
because it's essential for the appellate court
system, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
to indicate when you can go to federal
court,” association attorney George S.
Isaacson of Brann & Isaacson said in March.
“And when you have [a court] expanding
the scope of the TIA without any clear
guidance, it's unsettling to businesses who
want to be able to have certainty in pursuing
claims in federal court.”
The dispute stems from a 2010 Colorado
law requiring remote retailers selling to instate customers to comply with a number of
notice and reporting obligations intended to
beef up the state's use-tax collections.

The DMA filed a complaint challenging the
constitutionality of Colorado’s law shortly
after it was adopted, arguing that the new
regulations, which don't apply to retailers
located in Colorado, discriminate against
out-of-state retailers. U.S. District Judge
Robert E. Blackburn agreed, ruling that
Colorado's reporting requirements strained
interstate commerce in violation of the U.S.
Constitution's Commerce Clause.
But, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned
the decision on procedural grounds. The
appeals court said Judge Blackburn was
precluded from considering the merits of
DMA's complaint because the district court
lacked jurisdiction under the TIA.
“The TIA divested the district court of
jurisdiction over DMA’s Commerce Clause
claims, and we therefore have no
jurisdiction to reach the merits of this
appeal,” the Tenth Circuit said. The appeals
court, citing a lack of jurisdiction, directed
Judge Blackburn to throw out DMA's
Commerce Clause claims.
Now before the Supreme Court, the DMA
says in its petition that the constitutional
question presented in its complaint does not
fall under the purview of the TIA because it
is not challenging Colorado's tax per se.
Instead, DMA argues, its challenge avoids
the tax question and targets only the state
law's reporting requirements.
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“It is the nontax, notice and reporting
obligations imposed on noncollecting
retailers under the act that place the DMA's
challenge outside the scope of the TIA,”
DMA says in its petition.
Isaacson said jurisdictional questions over
the TIA were not originally raised in the
state's appeal. He said the appeals court
decision conflicts with prior rulings in the
First and Second circuits.
Colorado's regulations require three things:
First, out-of-state retailers must send
“transactional notices” to their Colorado
buyers notifying them that they must file
state sales- or use-tax returns declaring items
purchased from those retailers.
Second, an out-of-state retailer must send an
annual report to each Colorado buyer
itemizing the total amount of purchases the
buyer made from that particular retailer. The
report, known as an annual purchase
summary, must also remind the buyer that
he or she is responsible for filing a Colorado
sales
or
use
tax
return.

Third, the law requires out-of-state retailers
to file an annual report with the Colorado
Department of Revenue that shows the total
amount of purchases Colorado buyers made
during the preceding calendar year, known
as customer information reports.
Retailers are fined if they fail to comply
with the requirements — $5 per
transactional notice violation, capped at
$50,000 per retailer; $10 per violation of the
annual purchase summary requirement,
capped at $100,000 per retailer; and $10 per
violation of the customer information report
requirement, also capped at $100,000 per
retailer.
DMA is represented by George S.Isaacson
and Matthew P. Schaefer of Brann &
Isaacson LLP.
The case is Direct Marketing Association v.
Brohl et al., case number 13-1032, in the
Supreme Court of the United States.

.
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“Supreme Court to Hear DMA Privacy Suit, Review Colorado Web Tax Sales
Statute”
Bloomberg
Alexander Ripps
July 7, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court July 1 agreed to
hear a case challenging a Colorado law
requiring out-of-state retailers to report to
the state the names, addresses and total
annual purchases of their Colorado
customers.
The court July 1 said it will review a case
brought by the Direct Marketing Association
(DMA), which seeks to overturn a ruling by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit that held that the Tax Injunction Act
(TIA) barred federal court jurisdiction to
enjoin the enforcement of the Colorado law.
“We are pleased that the Supreme Court has
agree to hear this important case,” Peggy
Hudson, the DMA's senior vice president of
government affairs, said in a July 1 DMA
statement. “DMA began this fight four years
ago with the goal of protecting consumer
privacy by safeguarding businesses from
being forced to divulge their customers'
purchase history to the state of Colorado.
Along the way, the fight has broadened to
encompass not only issues of privacy, but
also fundamental constitutional questions
about access to federal courts.”
The DMA's lead attorney, George S.
Isaacson of Brann & Isaacson in Lewiston,
Maine, told Bloomberg BNA July 1 that
“the DMA is pleased the Supreme Court has
decided to address the scope of the TIA.” He

said the case involves constitutional
questions that are important to retailers who
offer their products in multiple states.
Disputes over the release of customer
purchase information from online retailers,
such as Amazon.com, haven't been limited
to Colorado. North Carolina's Department of
Tax Revenue was one of the first state tax
agencies to face legal challenges over
demands for Web customer data.
Court Challenges
The DMA initially brought its lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado,
challenging
a
reporting
requirement imposed on out-of-state vendors
that don't collect and remit state sales and
use taxes. The law requires those vendors to
provide their customers' purchase history
information to the state, the DMA explained
in its statement.
“In the lawsuit, DMA contends that the
Colorado law constitutes an unprecedented
invasion of consumer privacy and unfairly
discriminates against interstate commerce by
targeting solely out-of-state merchants,” the
DMA said.
In 2012, that court ruled in favor of the
DMA, calling the “Amazon law”
unconstitutional for violating the dormant
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Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The court imposed a permanent injunction
preventing the state from executing the law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the decision and dismissed
the case, citing the lack of federal
jurisdiction due to the TIA, 28 U.S.C. §
1341. An attempt by the DMA to have the
case reconsidered en banc was denied.
After failing to get a full review from the
Tenth Circuit, the case was removed to
Colorado state court where the DMA won a
preliminary injunction. Briefs for summary
judgment in that case are due the week of
July 7, Isaacson and Christopher Oswald,
the DMA's vice president of state affairs,
told Bloomberg BNA July 1.
Notice, Reporting Requirements
Oswald said the main issues in the case are
the notice and reporting aspects of the
Colorado law. “Those requirements are
separate and apart from the taxation
element,” he said.

Oswald noted that the Supreme Court's
decision could have implications beyond
Colorado, particularly in states considering
similar schemes such as Michigan and
Colorado.
Should the Supreme Court rule in the
DMA's favor, Oswald said he feels
confident about the DMA's chances of
succeeding on the merits of the case.
“The underlying question of whether the
notice and reporting requirements are
constitutional or not is something we won
on in federal district court. We also won a
preliminary injunction in state court. So we
feel pretty confident,” he said.
George S. Isaacson and Matthew P. Schaefer
of Brann & Isaacson, in Lewiston, Maine,
represented the DMA. John Suthers, Daniel
D. Domenico, Melanie J. Snyder and Grant
to Sullivan of the Colorado State Attorney
General's Office, in Denver, represented the
director of the Colorado Department of
Revenue.
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“Tenth Circuit: Tax Injunction Act Precluded Federal Jurisdiction in
Colorado’s E-Commerce Use Tax Reporting Requirements Case”
CBA Legal Connection
Ellen Buckley
August 29, 2013
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
published its opinion in Direct Marketing
Ass’n v. Brohl on Tuesday, August 20 2013.
Colorado imposes a 2.9% use tax on
tangible goods stored, used, or consumed in
the state when no sales tax has been paid.
Because the dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits Colorado from forcing retailers
with no in-state physical presence to collect
and remit taxes on sales to Colorado
consumers, the state requires its residents to
report and pay use taxes to the Department
with their income tax returns. In 2010 the
Colorado legislature enacted statutory
requirements for non-collecting retailers.
The statute and its implementing regulations
impose three principal obligations on noncollecting retailers whose gross sales in
Colorado exceed $100,000: they must (1)
provide transactional notices to Colorado
purchasers, (2) send annual purchase
summaries to Colorado customers, and (3)
annually
report
Colorado
purchaser
information to the Department.
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA)
sued the Department of Revenue’s executive
director, challenging the constitutionality of
the state’s new notice and reporting
requirements. The district court concluded
that Colorado’s requirements for noncollecting retailers discriminated against and

placed undue burdens on interstate
commerce, in violation of the Commerce
Clause and entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the state
requirements. The Department appealed.
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the
Commerce Clause issue on appeal because it
held that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA)
precluded federal jurisdiction over DMA’s
claims. The TIA provides that “district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.”
The DMA argued that it sought to avoid
notice and reporting obligations, not a tax,
so the TIA did not apply. The court
disagreed. “The purposes of the TIA apply
both to a lawsuit that would directly enjoin a
tax and one that would enjoin a procedure
required by the state’s tax statutes and
regulations that aims to enforce and increase
tax collection.” The court also found that a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy is
available to retailers subject to the Colorado
law.
The court remanded to the district court to
dismiss DMA’s Commerce Clause claims
for lack of jurisdiction and to dissolve the
permanent injunction.
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Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter
12-1497
Ruling Below: United States ex rel. Benjamin Carter c. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir.
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2899 (2014).
Relator brought qui tam action against government contractor under the False Claims Act (FCA),
alleging the contractor falsely billed the United States for services performed in Iraq.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge, dismissed the complaint. Relator appealed.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act – a criminal code
provision that tolls the statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud against the
government “[w]hen the United States is at war,” and which this Court has instructed must be
“narrowly construed” in favor of repose – applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private
relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite
tolling; and (2) whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act’s
so-called “first-to-file” bar – which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who
promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims –
functions as a “one case- at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long
as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.

UNITED STATES ex rel. Benjamin CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HALLIBURTON CO.; Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.; Service Employees
International, Inc.; KBR, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on March 18, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
FLOYD, Circuit Judge.
Reversed and remanded by published
opinion. Judge FLOYD wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge WYNN joined.
Judge WYNN wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Judge AGEE wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

Appellant Benjamin Carter appeals the
district court's dismissal of his complaint
with prejudice. The matter was initiated
upon Carter's filing of a qui tarn lawsuit
under the False Claims Act (FCA). The
subject matter underlying this case involves
Appellees' — Halli-burton Company; KBR,
Inc.; Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.;
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and Service Employees International, Inc.
(collectively KBR) — alleged fraudulent
billing of the United States for services
provided to the military forces serving in
Iraq. The district court concluded that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Carter's claims because of the False Claims
Act's first-to-file bar. The district court also
held that Carter's complaint had been filed
beyond the six-year statute of limitations in
the FCA and was not tolled by the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA),
which the court ruled does not apply to nonintervened qui tam cases. Accordingly, the
district court dismissed Carter's complaint
with prejudice. Because we conclude that
the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction and find that the WSLA applies
to this action, we reverse. Further, because it
may be appropriate for the district court to
make factual findings to consider the public
disclosure claim urged by KBR, we remand
so the district court can consider this issue.
I.
In his complaint, Carter brings a qui tam
action under the False Claims Act. The FCA
allows the United States to bring suit to
recover funds and also allows, through the
Act's qui tam provisions, for a private
plaintiff (relator) to sue in place of the
government and keep a share of the
proceeds. Carter alleges that KBR falsely
billed the United States for services
performed in Iraq. Specifically, Carter
alleges that KBR "knowingly presented to
an officer or employee of the United States
Government false or fraudulent claims for
payment or approval in violation of 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)." Carter goes on to

allege that KBR "knowingly made, used, or
caused to be made or used, false records or
statements to get false or fraudulent claims
paid or approved by the Government" in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
KBR provided logistical services to the
United States military in Iraq under a
government contract. Carter worked for
KBR as a reverse osmosis water purification
unit (ROWPU) operator at two camps in
Iraq from mid-January 2005 until April
2005. Carter was hired to test and purify
water for the troops in Iraq. Carter claims
that KBR was in fact not purifying water
during the time period but was repeatedly
misrepresenting to the United States that it
was. Carter submits that water purification
did not actually begin until May 2005.
Further, Carter maintains that he and his
fellow employees were instructed to submit
time sheets for twelve-hour days for work
that they performed on ROWPU functions.
During this time, Carter states that he was
actually not working any hours on ROWPU
functions. Carter also contends as part of an
overall scheme by KBR to overbill the
government for labor charges, that all trade
employees were required to submit time
sheets totaling exactly twelve hours per day
and eighty-four hours per week and that it
was "routine practice" of the employees to
do so regardless of actual hours worked. As
a result, according to Carter, the United
States paid KBR for work not actually
performed.
Carter filed his original complaint under seal
on February 1, 2006, in the United States
District Court for the Central District of
California. After over two years of
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investigation into the matter, the action was
unsealed in May 2008. Shortly thereafter,
the case was transferred to the Eastern
District of Virginia in October 2008, at
which point Carter amended his complaint.
The district court dismissed Carter's first
amended complaint without prejudice in
January 2009 for failure to plead fraud with
particularity. Carter then amended his
complaint for a second time and refiled his
complaint in January 2009 (Carter 2009).
KBR then moved to dismiss Carter's second
amended complaint under Rules 9(b) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which the district court granted
in part. The district court, however, refused
to dismiss counts 1 and 4. Count 1 alleged a
scheme by KBR to submit fraudulent claims
for payment to the government, and count 4
alleged fraudulent statements knowingly
made to the government to receive claims
for payment. At this point, KBR answered
the remaining allegations and the case
proceeded through discovery, which closed
in March 2010.
In March 2010, one month before the
scheduled trial date, the parties were
contacted by the United States Department
of Justice, who informed them of the
existence of a False Claims Act case
containing similar allegations filed under
seal in December 2005, in the United States
District Court for the Central District of
California. Thorpe also alleges that KBR's
standard operating procedure was billing
twelve hours per day, without regard to the
actual hours worked to perpetuate a scheme
to overbill the government. In April 2010,
KBR filed a motion to dismiss Carter 2009,
arguing that Thorpe constituted a "related"

action under FCA § 3730(b)(5). In response,
Carter argued that Thorpe was materially
different from his case because he focused
on
KBR's
alleged
fraudulent
misrepresentation to the government that
KBR was actually performing water services
for which it was submitting bills.
The district court rejected Carter's
characterization, reasoning that he must
show that KBR employees were reporting
hours that they did not work and the fact that
KBR was not performing water services is
merely evidence that the time sheets were
false. The district court dismissed Carter
2009 without prejudice on May 10, 2010.
Carter appealed the dismissal on July 13,
2010.
Thereafter, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
dismissed the Thorpe action on July 30,
2010. In response, Carter refiled his
complaint (Carter 2010) in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia while his appeal was still pending.
When Carter refiled his complaint, he also
sought to dismiss his appeal in the 2009
action. This Court granted Carter's motion to
dismiss his appeal on February 14, 2011.
Meanwhile, Carter 2010 proceeded in the
district court and, on May 24, 2011, the
district court dismissed Carter's complaint
without prejudice, on the grounds that Carter
had filed Carter 2010 while Carter 2009 was
still pending on appeal, thereby creating his
own jurisdictional bar under the FCA's firstto-file provision. Carter chose not to appeal
this ruling.
However, Carter refiled his complaint
(Carter 2011) on June 2, 2011. The district
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court unsealed the complaint on August 24,
2011. The complaint in this case is identical
to the earlier 2010 complaint as well the
second amended complaint filed in 2009.
After the complaint was unsealed, KBR
moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the
complaint was barred by two related actions,
that the case was time barred, and that the
case was barred by the public disclosure
provision of the FCA.
At the time Carter 2011 was filed, two
allegedly related cases were pending: United
States ex rel. Duprey, and another action —
that is under seal — filed in Texas in 2007.
Duprey and the Texas action allege that
KBR "knowingly presented, or caused to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government, false or
fraudulent claims for payment or approval in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)." Since
at least March 2003, KBR provided shipping
and transportation support in Iraq for the
United States military. The Duprey relator
was employed by KBR as a truck driver in
Iraq from March 27, 2005, to January 15,
2006. The Texas relators were also truck
drivers in Iraq, and at least one relator was
present in Iraq during the period of
September 2003 to March 15, 2004. Both
complaints allege substantially similar
claims, namely that KBR had a policy that
its drivers enter time sheets reflecting a
twelve hour workday and an eighty-four
hour work week, without regard to actual
hours worked. The relators alleged that this
practice was widespread throughout KBR's
operations in Iraq and elsewhere. Duprey
was subsequently voluntarily dismissed in
October 2011, and the Texas action was
voluntarily dismissed in March 2012.

The district court granted KBR's motion and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice on
November 29, 2011, ruling that the case was
related to Duprey and the Texas action. The
court also found that Duprey was "pending"
for purposes of the first-to-file bar, because
it had not been dismissed at the time Carter
2011 was filed. The court considered
whether the Texas action was also "pending"
as to bar Carter 2011, but ultimately
concluded that it need not decide the issue
because at least one case — Duprey — was
pending. The district court also held that
Carter 2011 had been filed beyond the
FCA's six-year statute of limitations and
would be time barred should it be refiled.
Because of this reason, the court dismissed
the case with prejudice. The district court
further held that Carter's action was not
tolled by the WSLA. The district court held
that the WSLA does not apply to claims
under the FCA brought by private relators.
Finding ample grounds to dismiss the action,
the district court did not consider whether
the complaint was barred by the public
disclosure provision of the FCA. Carter
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review de novo the district court's legal
rulings, such as its granting of KBR's
motion to dismiss. To the extent that the
decisions below involved legal conclusions
based upon factual determinations, we
review the factual findings for clear error,
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Carter.
III.
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When the United States is at war the
running of any statute of limitations
applicable to any offense (1)
involving fraud or attempted fraud
against the United States . . . shall be
suspended until three years after the
termination
of
hostilities
as
proclaimed by the President or by a
concurrent resolution of Congress.

We first address Carter's contention that the
WSLA tolls his action and there-fore, that
his claims are not time barred under the
FCA.
A.
First, as a general matter, qui tarn actions
must be brought within six years after the
date on which the alleged violation
occurred. The WSLA was enacted in 1942
to extend the time for prosecution to bring
charges relating to criminal fraud offenses
against the United States during times of
war. When enacted, the law applied to
"offenses involving the defrauding or
attempts to defraud the United States . . . and
now indictable under any existing statutes."
When amended in 1944, the phrase "now
indictable" was deleted. The WSLA was
later codified, and is now to be used
whenever the country is at war.
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the
WSLA has three components: "(1) a
triggering clause ("When the United States
is at war the running of [the applicable
statute of limitations] shall be suspended . .
.') (2) a suspension period ('three years'), and
(3) a termination clause ('suspended until . . .
after the termination of hostilities as
proclaimed by the President or by a
concurrent resolution of Congress.')." The
Supreme Court has held that the WSLA
applies only to offenses committed after the
triggering clause and before the termination
of hostilities. The running of the limitations
period then begins when hostilities are
terminated.
Prior to October 4, 2008, the WSLA
provided:

In 2008, the Wartime Enforcement of Fraud
Act (WEFA) amended the WSLA to expand
its times of operation to "[w]hen the United
States is at war or Congress has enacted
specific authorization for the use of the
Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1544(b))." Additionally, the suspension
period was extended until "5 years after the
termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a
Presidential proclamation, with notice to
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of
Congress."
Courts are in disagreement as to which
version of the WSLA applies to offenses
that occurred before the amendments of
2008. Additionally, courts are in conflict as
to whether the pre-amendment WSLA
requires a formal declaration of war or
whether the authorized use of military force
shall suffice.
B.
Carter contends that the conflict in Iraq in
2005 is sufficient to trigger WSLA's "at
war" status under either version of the
WSLA. KBR however, urges us not to apply
the post-amendment WSLA because it
believes that the post-amendment WSLA
implicates its constitutional due process
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rights in that the Act may allow a statute of
limitations to run indefinitely.
The question presented is the meaning of "at
war" as it appears in the WSLA. As with all
questions of statutory construction, we begin
by examining the statute's language.
"[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity to an
issue[,] judicial inquiry into the statute's
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary
circumstance, is finished." In interpreting a
statute we "must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there."
Although the meaning of "at war" may
appear unambiguous at first glance, its
meaning in the context of the WSLA is not
so clear. As the Supreme Court has noted,
"Congress in drafting laws may decide that
the Nation may be`at war' for one purpose,
and`at peace' for another." Therefore, we
must determine what Congress meant by "at
war" in the context of the WSLA.

where the United States engages in massive
military campaigns resulting in enormous
expense and widespread bloodshed without
declaring a formal war. In fact, the United
States has not declared war since World War
II. However, there have been extensive
military engagements in Vietnam, Korea,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and twice in Iraq.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that
the laws of war apply to non-declared wars,
for example the war in Afghanistan. Surely
these circumstances result in situations in
which fraud can easily be perpetuated
against the United States just as much as a
formally declared war. The purpose of the
WSLA — to combat fraud at times when the
United States may not be able to act as
quickly because it is engaged in "war" —
would be thwarted were we to find that the
United States must be involved in a declared
war for the Act to apply.

As an initial matter, we find it un-necessary
to decide which version of the WSLA
applies because we find that the Act does
not require a formal declaration of war.
Therefore, under either version of the Act,
the United States was at war when the acts
at issue occurred. We find that the Act does
not require a formal declaration of war for
several reasons. First, had Congress
intended the phrase "at war" to encompass
only declared wars, it could have written the
limitation of "declared war" into the Act as
it has in numerous statutes.

With these principles in mind, we now
address the specific conflict in Iraq. On
October 11, 2002, Congress authorized the
President to use military force to "defend the
national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq" and
"enforce all relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."
Although not a formal recognition of war,
the AUMF signaled Congress's recognition
of the President's power to enter into armed
hostilities. Based on the foregoing analysis,
we find that the United States was "at war"
in Iraq from the date of the AUMF issued by
Congress on October 11, 2002.

Next, we believe that requiring a declared
war would be an unduly formalistic
approach that ignores the realities of today,

We now turn to when — and if — the
hostilities in Iraq terminated. The Fifth
Circuit recently considered this issue in
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Pfluger. There the court determined that
termination clause of the WSLA required
compliance with the formal requirements set
out in the clause because the language of the
clause was plain and unambiguous. We
agree. The pre-amendment and postamendment WSLA both specify that
termination shall not occur until the Act's
formalities have been met. In the preamendment WSLA, termination occurs
when "proclaimed by the President or by a
concurrent resolution by Congress." In the
post-amendment
WSLA,
termination
happens when "proclaimed by a Presidential
proclamation, with notice to Congress, or by
a concurrent resolution of Congress."
Neither Congress nor the President had met
the formal requirements of the Act for
terminating the period of suspension when
the claims at issue were presented for
payment. We therefore conclude that the
United States was at war during the relevant
time period for purposes of the WSLA.

However, when amended in 1944, the
phrase "now indictable" was deleted. The
WSLA was then applicable to all actions
involving fraud against the United States.
Further, all but one court, United States v.
Weaver, to have considered the issue of
whether the WSLA applies to civil claims
have found that it applies.

C.

The district court found that even if the
WSLA was applicable to civil cases, it
remains inapplicable to actions where the
United States is not a party. The district
court relied on this Court's decision in
United States ex rel Sanders v. North
American Bus Industries Inc., for support
that the WSLA includes actions brought
only by the United States. This Court held in
Sanders that 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2), a
special statutory extension of the FCA's
statute of limitations, was available only to
the government. Sanders's reasoning is
further supported by the fact that the FCA
has a statute of limitations that applies
specifically to relators. The limitations
period in § 3731(b)(2) starts when the

KBR next argues that the WSLA does not
apply to Carter's claims because the WSLA
by its plain terms applies only to criminal
cases. KBR bases its argument on the
language in the statute that states it applies
to "offense[s] involving fraud" and reasons
that "offense" ordinarily means only crimes.
Resolution of this issue requires us to
interpret the meaning of "offense" as used in
the WSLA.
In Dugan & McNamara, the court examined
both the legislative history of the Act and
the meaning of "offense." The court
reasoned that the term "offense" in the 1942
version referred only to criminal penalties.

Had Congress intended for "offense" to
apply only to criminal offenses, it could
have done so by not deleting the words
"now indictable" or it could have replaced
that phrase with similar wording. However,
Congress did not include any limiting
language and it is our opinion that in failing
to do so it chose for the Act to apply to all
offenses involving fraud against the United
States. Therefore, because we find the text
of the WSLA, the 1944 amendments, and
the legislative history persuasive, we find
that the WSLA applies to civil claims.
D.
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government knows or should know of "facts
material to the right of action." The court
reasoned:
This language makes perfect sense
when referring to an action brought
by the government: the limitations
period is based on the government's
knowledge of facts material to the
right of action' because that
particular knowledge notifies the
government that it has an actionable
FCA claim. But applying the
statute's language to a relator's action
makes no sense whatsoever.
Unlike in Sanders, whether the suit is
brought by the United States or a relator is
irrelevant to this case because the
suspension of limitations in the WSLA
depends upon whether the country is at war
and not who brings the case. As such the
district court's reliance on Sanders was
misguided.
Courts are "authorized to deviate from the
literal language of a statute only if the plain
language would lead to absurd results, or if
such an interpretation would defeat the
intent of Congress." Sanders follows this
logic, but this principle does not exclude
relator-initiated actions from the ambit of
the WSLA. Including such actions does not
lead to "absurd results" nor "defeat the intent
of Congress." In fact, including civil claims
furthers the WSLA's purpose: to root out
fraud against the United States during times
of war. The district court's reasoning for
relying on Sanders was that if the WSLA
applied to a relator's claims this would
"allow fraud [claims] to extend perhaps
indefinitely." This is incorrect. The WSLA
tolls the applicable period for a specified

and bounded time while the country is at
war. By offering this rationale, it appears the
court was critiquing the purpose of the
WSLA itself and not providing a valid basis
for excluding relator-initiated claims from
the
WSLA.
Accordingly,
we
are
unpersuaded that relator-initiated claims are
excluded from the ambit of the WSLA.
Thus, Carter's action is not time barred.
IV.
We next consider KBR's argument that the
FCA's first-to-file bar prohibits Carter's case
from proceeding.
A.
The FCA prescribes penalties for claims
submitted to the government that are known
to be false. While encouraging citizens to act
as whistleblowers, the Act also seeks to
prevent parasitic lawsuits based on
previously disclosed fraud. To reconcile
these conflicting goals, the FCA has placed
jurisdictional limits on its qui tarn
provisions, including § 3730(b)(5)'s first-tofile bar and § 3730(e)(4)'s public disclosure
provision.
Under the first-to-file bar, if Carter's claims
had been previously filed by another relator,
then the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. By the same token, the public
disclosure bar prevents a relator from
bringing an action if the matters therein have
already been made public knowledge, except
if the person is an original source of the
information. Although the provisions
promote the same goals, they have different
requirements. Here the district court ruled
on the firstto-file bar and did not consider
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the public disclosure bar. Because of this,
we begin with the first-to-file bar.
B.
KBR argues that Duprey and the Texas
action are related actions that deprive this
Court of jurisdiction under the first-to-file
bar. This Court has described the first-to-file
bar as an absolute, unambiguous exceptionfree rule. Therefore, whoever wins the race
to the courthouse prevails and the other case
must be dismissed. The text of the relevant
section provides that "[w]hen a person
brings an action under [the FCA], no person
other than the Government may intervene or
bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action." Section
3730(b)(5) is jurisdictional and if an action
is later filed that is based on the facts
underlying the pending case, the court must
dismiss the later case for lack of jurisdiction.
In determining whether a complaint is
similar enough as to be caught by the firstto-file bar, courts have applied variations of
a common approach. Although the
approaches vary, courts have almost
uniformly rejected an "identical facts" test
on the ground that the provision refers to a
"related" action rather than an "identical"
action. The courts also agree that differences
in specifics — such as geographic location
or added facts — will not save a subsequent
case. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and D.C. circuits have all adopted a "same
material elements test."
Under this test, a later suit is barred if it is
based upon the "same material elements of
fraud" as the earlier suit, even though the
subsequent suit may "incorporate somewhat

different details." "[T]he test prevents the
less vigilant whistle-blower from using
insignificant factual variations to allege
what is essentially the same fraudulent
scheme already made known to the
government." We find our sister circuits'
reasoning persuasive, and we join these
circuits in adopting the "material elements
test."
C.
We shall now apply the material elements
test to determine whether Carter's action is
barred by either Duprey or the Texas action.
The allegations in Duprey, the Texas action,
and herein are substantially similar. All
allege that KBR had a systematic practice of
overbilling the government for hours
worked by their employees. The employees
were instructed to complete their time sheets
without regard to the number of hours that
were actually worked. These allegations of
fraud provide the government with enough
knowledge of essential facts of the scheme
to discover related fraud. The government
would likely investigate billing practices
across the company, because Duprey notes
that the official national policy was to bill
correctly but that the employees were
consistently instructed not to do so.
Carter seeks to distinguish his action by
pointing out that the other relators worked in
different divisions and were truck drivers,
whereas he was a ROWPU employee. We
are unpersuaded that these distinctions are
material. Duprey and the Texas action both
allege a broad scheme that encompasses the
time and location of Carter's action. Even
though the fraud did occur via different
types of employees and in different
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divisions, this is insufficient to demonstrate
that the scheme Carter alleges is different
from the one Duprey and the Texas relators
allege. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "a relator
cannot avoid § 3730(b)(5)'s first-to-file bar
by simply adding factual details or
geographic location to the essential or
material elements of a fraud claim. . . ."
Here the fraud alleged — submission of
false time sheets in support of claims for
false payment — is the same in all of the
complaints. Thus, Section 3730(b)(5)'s goal
of preventing parasitic qui tam lawsuits
would not be furthered if all three actions
were allowed to proceed on the same
essential claims.
D.
Carter argues that regardless of the
relatedness of his complaint to the other
cases, the other cases cannot continue to
have a preclusive effect on his action. Carter
argues that because the Duprey and Texas
action have been dismissed neither can be
deemed a "pending action" under §
3730(b)(5).
Following the plain language of the first-tofile bar, Carter's action will be barred by
Duprey or the Texas action if either case
was pending when Carter filed suit. The
Duprey action was filed in 2007, and
voluntarily dismissed in October 2011, after
the relator failed to serve the complaint on
the defendants. The Texas action was filed
in 2007 and voluntarily dismissed in March
2012, when the government declined to
intervene. Therefore, both actions were
pending when Carter filed his complaint on
June 2, 2011. Because we look at the facts
as they existed when the claim was brought

to determine whether an action is barred by
the first-to-file bar, we conclude that Carter's
claims are barred by the Duprey and Texas
actions. However, this does not end our
inquiry.
Carter alleges that the district court erred
when it dismissed his complaint with
prejudice on the ground that his action was
forever barred by the Duprey action. In
United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria
Healthcare Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a complaint that was dismissed
with prejudice because of a pending case.
The court reasoned that once the initial
complaint was no longer pending, the bar of
§ 3730(b)(5) was inapplicable and Chovanec
was "entitled to file a new qui tarn
complaint." However, if a case is brought
while the original case is pending it must be
dismissed "rather than left on ice." Although
the doctrine of claim preclusion may prevent
the filing of subsequent cases, § 3730(b)(5)
does not. This is especially true when the
original case is dismissed on reasons other
than the merits or dismissed without
prejudice. Because Chovanec was entitled to
file a new complaint, the proceeding should
have been dismissed without prejudice.
Similarly the Tenth Circuit has explained
why an action that is no longer pending
cannot have a preclusive effect for all future
claims. The court reasoned, "if that prior
claim is no longer pending, the first-to-file
bar no longer applies." "The`pending'
requirement
much
more
effectively
vindicates the goal of encouraging relators
to file; it protects the potential award of a
relator while his claim remains viable, but,
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when he drops his action another relator . . .
may pursue his own."
We agree that once a case is no longer
pending the first-to-file bar does not stop a
relator from filing a related case. In this
case, both of the original actions have been
dismissed. Because of this, the first-to-file
bar does not preclude Carter from filing an
action. The first-to-file bar allows a plaintiff
to bring a claim later; this is precisely what a
dismissal without prejudice allows a
plaintiff to do as well. Therefore, Carter's
only impediment at the moment is the
district court's dismissal with prejudice.
And, as we have already concluded the
district court erred in dismissing Carter's
complaint with prejudice.
V.
KBR argues that this Court should affirm
the dismissal of Carter's complaint on the
alternative ground of the FCA's public
disclosure provision. As noted previously,
the public disclosure bar removes subject
matter jurisdiction for FCA claims that are
based upon matters that have been disclosed
publicly, unless the relator was the original
source of the allegations. KBR alleges that
Carter was not the original source of the
information, and that he gathered the
information from another KBR employee.
The district did not reach this argument,
having found grounds for dismissal
elsewhere. We decline to address this issue
for the first time on appeal. Because the
district court should have the opportunity in
the first instance to address the facts relevant
to public disclosure, we remand this issue to
the district court.

VI.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the
district court's dismissal of Carter's
complaint. Rather than address the
alternative ground of the public disclosure
bar for the first time on appeal, we remand
this issue to the district court for further
consideration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I fully concur in the fine majority opinion. I
write separately to address what appears to
be the heart of the dissent's objections: that
applying the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act, to the False Claims Act,
actions in which the United States is not
plaintiff or intervenor is unwise because
doing so is contrary to the policy of strictly
construing statutes of limitations and the
goals of the False Claims Act. In particular,
the dissent expresses concern that our
decision will allow the False Claims Act
limitations period to "extend indefinitely"
and, consequently, will incentivize private
plaintiffs to delay filing their claims to
maximize their potential recovery. Because
it is not our place to second-guess
Congress's
clearly expressed
policy
decisions, I respectfully disagree with the
dis-sent.
When interpreting a federal statute, the
"cardinal rule . . . is that the intent of
[Congress] is to be given effect." Typically,
we ascertain Congressional intent from the
plain language of the statute. If the plain
language of the statute unambiguously
expresses Congress's intent, our inquiry
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comes to an end, even if we disagree with
the policy embraced by the statutory
language. For, as the Supreme Court has
explained,
Our individual appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular
course consciously selected is to be
put aside in the process of
interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is
discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process
comes to an end. We do not sit as a
committee of review, nor are we
vested with the power of veto.
Here, as the majority correctly concludes
and the dissent tacitly acknowledges, the
plain language of the Wartime Suspension
of Limitations Act extends the limitation
period for "any offense" of fraud against the
United States during a time of war. No
doubt recognizing that it is not our role to
question Congress's clearly expressed policy
determinations, the dissent relies on strained
readings of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act and our precedent in an
attempt to argue that, under the plain
language of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act, the term "any offense" does
not encompass False Claims Act actions in
which the government is not a party.
First, the dissent appeals to our decision in
United States ex rel. Sanders v. North
American Bus Industries, Inc., in which we
held that the False Claims Act limitations
period tolling provision, does not apply to
False Claims Act actions in which the
government is not a party. Section
3731(b)(2) provides that the standard sixyear False Claims Act limitations may be

tolled until "no more than 3 years after the
date when facts material to the right of
action are known or reasonably should have
been known by the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in
the circumstances." In Sanders, we reasoned
that Section 3731(b)(2) does not toll the
limitations period for private False Claims
Act actions because it would make little
sense to have a suit's limitations period turn
on the knowledge of an entity that is not
party to the action.
The majority opinion correctly notes that
Sanders is inapposite because it involved an
entirely different statute, which includes
express
language
that
supports
distinguishing between False Claims Act
actions where the government is and is not a
party. Nevertheless, the dissent tries to
analogize the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act to Section 3731(b)(2),
which was at issue in Sanders, by asserting
that federal government conduct controls the
limitations periods set out in both statutes. In
particular, the dissent notes that
[b]y the terms of the [Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act], the
government is solely entitled to
invoke and terminate the tolling
provisions of the statute. . . . The
private qui tarn plaintiff has no
connection with these decisions and
it seems odd to conclude that such a
private plaintiff should be entitled to
the same limitations period as the
necessary actor, the government.
There is no such clear statutory
direction.
But Congress does not "invoke" the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act.
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Rather, the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act becomes effective when
Congress declares war or authorizes the use
of military force. The invocation of the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is at
most a tertiary consideration in Congress's
decision to declare war or authorize the use
of military force, and thus there is only a de
minimus
relationship
between
the
government conduct discussed in the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act and
any particular False Claims Act claim. By
contrast, with Section 3132(b)(2) the
connection between the relevant government
conduct and a particular False Claims Act
claim is quite close, because whether
Section 3132(b)(2) tolls the limitations
period turns on the government's knowledge
of the alleged fraudulent conduct at issue in
the particular False Claims Act claim.
The dissent also places great weight on the
fact that both the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act and its legislative history
are silent regarding qui tarn relators in False
Claims Act actions, arguing that this silence
"strongly suggests that Congress did not
intend the tolling provisions of the statute to
reach indiscriminately to any private
plaintiff pursuing a claim for fraud against
the government." Yet the Supreme Court has
admonished courts to tread carefully in
attempting to find meaning in statutory
silence because such silence is frequently
amenable to multiple interpretations:
Not every silence is pregnant. In
some cases, Congress intends silence
to rule out a particular statutory
application,
while
in
others
Congress' silence signifies merely an
expectation that nothing more need

be said in order to effectuate the
relevant legislative objective. An
inference from congressional silence
certainly cannot be credited when it
is contrary to all other textual and
contextual evidence of congressional
intent.
Here, finding meaning in the War-time
Suspension of Limitations Act's silence is
improper because the silence just as
reasonably can be interpreted as indicating
that Congress did not intend to distinguish
between False Claims Act actions by private
plaintiffs and those in which the government
is a party as it can be interpreted as
excluding actions by private relators from
the ambit of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act, as the dissent does.
Moreover, Congress's decision not to clarify
the scope of "any offense" when amending
the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
in 2008 in the face of numerous decisions
broadly interpreting "offense" in the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
casts further doubt on the dissent's appeal to
statutory silence. A canon of statutory
construction is that "[w]e presume that when
Congress amends a statute, it is
knowledgeable about judicial decisions
interpreting the prior legislation."
Congress amended the Wartime Suspension
of Limitations Act in 2008 to broaden its
scope by lengthening the tolling period and
clarifying that the statute applies to
Congressional authorizations of the use of
military force as well as declared wars.
Notably, the amendment did not in any way
alter, narrow, or circumscribe the scope of
the term "any offense." By the time of the
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2008 amendment, numerous courts had held
that the term "offense" in the earlier version
of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act encompassed civil fraud claims,
including False Claims Act cases, and the
only court to address whether the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act applies to
non-intervened False Claims Act actions had
determined that it did, albeit in dicta. We
must presume that Congress was aware of
these interpretations when it amended the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act in
2008, and its decision not to amend the
statute to exclude, or even discuss, False
Claims Act actions, let alone non-intervened
False Claims Act actions, in the face of this
precedent suggests that it agreed with, or at
least acquiesced in, these judicial decisions.
In such circumstances, Congress's silence
favors the majority's reading, rather than
undermining it.
Thus, neither of the dissent's rationales for
reading ambiguity into the plain language of
the statute is persuasive. Therefore, we are
left to conclude that when Congress said
"any offense," it meant any offense,
including offenses raised by private False
Claims Act relators. Because the plain
language of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act indicates that Congress
intended the statute to apply to nonintervened False Claims Act actions, it is not
our place to question the wisdom of this
policy decision.
Even if the plain language of the War-time
Suspension of Limitations Act would allow
us to consider the policy concerns
highlighted by the dissent — that our
decision will "extend indefinitely" the

limitations period for False Claims Act
claims and will encourage would — be
relators to delay filing their claims — I am
not convinced that either concern is
justified. First, the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act tolls the limitations period
for fraud actions for a bounded period of
time: the time during which the country is at
war or otherwise engaged in a military
conflict. Moreover, even if the informal
nature of modern military conflicts renders
the limitations period established by the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
somewhat less definite, it is within
Congress's purview to determine that certain
conduct is sufficiently egregious — such as
defrauding the government during a time of
war — that an extended or indefinite
limitations period is warranted. Indeed,
Congress has elected to entirely do away
with limitations periods for many federal
crimes.
Second, any concern that our holding will
encourage relators to sit on their claims in
order to maximize recovery is alleviated by
the False Claims Act's public disclosure and
first-to-file bars, which preclude a would-be
relator from bringing a claim that is based
on information that has already been
publicly disclosed or that is "related" to a
pending action. Regardless of the
applicability of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act, False Claims Act relators
have an incentive to bring actions as early as
possible to avoid having their claims
dismissed under either of these two
provisions.
In sum, the majority correctly concludes that
the plain language of the Wartime
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Suspension
of
Limitations
Act
unambiguously encompasses False Claims
Act actions in which the government is not a
party. It is not this Court's — or any court's
— place to revisit Congress's clearly
articulated policy determinations, even when
we feel they are unwise. If, after reviewing
our decision, Congress agrees with the
dissent that limiting the Wartime Suspension
of Limitations Act to False Claims Act
actions in which the government is a party is
the best policy, it is free to amend the
statute, as it did in 2008. Until that point,
however, we are required to give effect to
Congress' intent, as expressed through the
plain and unambiguous language of the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, that
the tolling applies to "any offense."
AGEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority opinion that the
"first-to-file" rule does not act as a barrier to
Benjamin Carter's qui tarn action against
Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root, and
Service
Employees
International
(collectively "KBR"). However, I do not
agree with the holding in the majority
opinion, principally section III D, that the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
("WSLA"), tolls the six-year limitations
period set forth in the False Claims Act
("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), when the
United States is not the plaintiff or an
intervenor. For that reason, I respectfully
dissent from the majority opinion insofar as
it would allow Carter to proceed on those of
his claims that fall outside the six-year FCA
limitations period.
I.

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), a civil
action under the FCA may not be brought
more than six years after the date on which
the alleged violation was committed. In this
case, the vast majority of Carter's claims
against KBR stem from violations that
allegedly took place before May 1, 2005.
Pursuant to § 3731(b)(1), therefore, Carter
had until May 1, 2011, to file his qui tarn
complaint against KBR for it to be deemed
timely. The latest iteration of Carter's
complaint, however, was not filed until June
2, 2011. Thus, absent tolling, in some form,
the bulk of Carter's claims are barred by the
FCA's limitations period because they did
not take place within six years of the filing
of the complaint.
In 1942, Congress unanimously approved
the first version of the WSLA, which
temporarily suspended the statute of
limitations in criminal contracting fraud
cases arising out of the Second World War.
Congress amended the WSLA in 1948, and
the majority concludes that the effect of
those amendments was to extend the reach
of the WSLA to civil limitations periods, not
merely those arising in the criminal fraud
context. The majority may be correct, but
the issue is not without doubt.
In 2011, at the time Carter filed his
complaint, the WSLA provided:
When the United States is at war or
Congress has enacted a specific
authorization for the use of the
Armed Forces . . . the running of any
statute of limitations applicable to
any offense (1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United
States or any agency thereof in any
manner, whether by conspiracy or
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not, or (2) committed in connection
with the acquisition, care, handling,
custody, control or disposition of any
real or personal property of the
United States, or (3) committed in
connection with the negotiation,
procurement, award, performance,
payment for, interim financing,
cancelation, or other termination or
settlement,
of
any
contract,
subcontract, or purchase order which
is connected with or related to the
prosecution of the war or directly
connected with or related to the
authorized use of the Armed Forces,
or with any disposition of
termination inventory by any war
contractor or Government agency,
shall be sus pended until 5 years
after the termination of hostilities as
proclaimed by a Presidential
proclamation, with
notice to
Congress, or by a concurrent
resolution of Congress. For purposes
of applying such definitions in this
section, the term "war" includes a
specific authorization for the use of
the Armed Forces.
Carter argues that, by operation of the
WSLA, the FCA limitations period was
suspended in 2005, at the time KBR
submitted allegedly false claims to the
United States for payment. Accordingly,
Carter posits (and the majority opinion
agrees) that the WSLA precludes KBR from
asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense in this case. For reasons explained
below, I do not agree with that construction
of the WSLA.
II.
A.

This appeal presents a quintessential
question of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo.
"As in all cases of statutory interpretation,
our inquiry begins with the text of the
statute." "In that regard, we must first
determine whether the language at issue has
a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute . . . and our
inquiry must cease if the statutory language
is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent." "We determine
the`plainness or ambiguity of the statutory
language . . . by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.'"
B.
I note at the outset that no case has ever held
(other than in dicta) that the WSLA applies
to civil cases where the United States is not
a plaintiff or intervener in the qui tarn
action. In the only case in which a court
suggested the WSLA did so apply, the
court's conclusion was not the ratio decendi
of the decision and was clearly dicta. In
McCans, the relator brought a qui tam
complaint against Armour & Co., a
government contractor, alleging that Armour
sold certain pork products to war
procurement agencies at prices in excess of
limitations set by Congress during World
War II. Although the allegedly illegal sales
were conducted between 1942 and 1943, the
relator did not file her complaint until 1954.
While the district court discussed the
application of the WSLA tolling provisions
to the relator's complaint, it concluded that
the complaint was not timely filed, even if
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WSLA tolling were applicable. Any
discussion of WSLA tolling in McCans was
thus clearly unnecessary to the district
court's holding that the suit was untimely.
Accordingly, the court's references to the
WSLA's applicability to private plaintiffs is
mere dicta.
C.
As there is no direct authority for
application of the WSLA here, I find the
reasoning in United States ex rel. Sanders v.
North American Bus Industries, Inc. a
persuasive guide to our disposition of this
issue. Sanders concerned the construction of
31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), the FCA's limitations
provisions; the same statute providing the
statute of limitations in this case. That
statute provides that
[a] civil action under [the FCA] may
not be brought —
(1) more than 6 years after the date
on which the violation of [the FCA]
is committed, or
(2) more than 3 years after the date
when facts material to the right of
action are known or reasonably
should have been known by the
official of the United States charged
with responsibility to act in the
circumstances, but in no event more
than 10 years after the date on which
the
violation
is
committed,
whichever occurs last.
The Sanders relator, whose complaint was
filed beyond the six-year limitations period
described in § 3731(b)(1), sought to avail
himself of § 3731(b)(2), which runs the
limitations period from the time the United
States receives (or reasonably should

receive) notice of the violation. We rejected
that attempt.
Although we observed that § 3731(b)
applied to "civil action[s]" under the FCA,
we held that the language of § 3731(b)(2)
could only be logically applied when
referring to an action brought by the United
States, not by a private relator. In support of
this holding we reasoned that "applying the
statute's language to a relator's action makes
no sense whatsoever. The government's
knowledge of`facts material to the right of
action' does not notify the relator of
anything, so that knowledge cannot
reasonably begin the limitations period for a
relator's claims."
The Sanders court also made important
observations about the practical effect of
allowing a private relator to claim the
benefit of a statutory limitations period
intended for the benefit of the government.
It noted that extending the limitations period
for up to 10 years (the outer limit provided
by § 3731(b)(2)) in the case of a private
relator would create incentives contrary to
the purposes of the FCA. "[R]elators would
have a strong financial incentive to allow
false claims to build up over time before
they filed, there-by increasing their own
potential recovery." Critically, the court
went on to note that the relator's proposed
construction would undermine the very
purpose of the qui tarn provisions of the
FCA: "to combat fraud quickly and
efficiently by encouraging relators to bring
actions that the government cannot or will
not."
Following the reasoning of Sanders in the
instant case, I agree with the holding of the
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district court that application of the WSLA
to a suit brought by a private relator is
inconsistent with the WSLA and its
legislative history and would be contrary to
the articulated goals of the FCA. Let me
explain why that is so.
At first blush, Carter is correct that the
WSLA applies to "any offense," involving
fraud against the United States (obviously,
when certain conditions are met). But to
read "any offense" as encompassing actions
by private relators is a superficial reading of
the WSLA and fails to construe the statute in
context. By the terms of the WSLA, the
government is solely entitled to invoke and
terminate the tolling provisions of the that
statute, however, the text of the WSLA is
entirely silent as to private relators. The
triggering and terminating provisions of the
WSLA are both related to and solely
controlled actions of the United States
government: declaration of war or
congressional authorization for use of
military force (to trigger) and congressional
resolution or Presidential proclamation (to
terminate). In either circumstance, Congress
and the President possess the unique power
to invoke the WSLA to toll the limitations
period for fraud offenses: a period when the
same government is thus released from a
looming time bar to bring an FCA claim.
The private qui tarn plaintiff has no
connection with these decisions and it seems
odd to conclude that such a private plaintiff,
absent a clear statutory direction, should be
entitled to the same limitations period as the
necessary actor, the government. There is no
such clear statutory direction.

In Sanders, we declined to find that the
private party relator could latch onto the §
3731(b)(2) exception since the relator was
neither mentioned in the statute or
legislative history as authorized to do so.
Similarly, here with the WSLA, we find no
mention of the private party relator in the
statute or its legislative history: again, an
odd basis upon which to extend the tolling
of a statute of limitations which is to be
strictly construed.
Simply reading "any offense" to encompass
all offenses regardless of whether the United
States is the plaintiff, is inconsistent with the
nuanced approach that courts have
employed when reading the "civil action"
language in § 3731(b). We reasoned in
Sanders that "a civil action" should not be
read to encompass all FCA actions, but
rather, should be read in context to include
only those actions brought by the United
States. Here, the WSLA (like § 3731(b)(2))
mentions the United States, not private
relators. Thus the text of the WSLA, on its
own, supports the proposition that only the
United States may take advantage of its
tolling provisions. Nevertheless, I also find
that this interpretation is consistent with the
purposes and legislative history of the
WSLA.
D.
The Supreme Court has described the
rationale underlying the passage of the
WSLA during World War II as follows:
The fear was that the lawenforcement officers would be so
preoccupied with prosecution of the
war effort that the crimes of fraud
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perpetrated against the United States
would be forgotten until it was too
late. The implicit premise of the
legislation is that the frenzied
activities, existing at the time the Act
became law, would continue until
hostilities terminated and that until
then the public interest should not be
disadvantaged.

inability of the Department of Justice and
other federal law-enforcement entities to
effectively prevent and prosecute fraud in
light of other duties antecedent to waging
war. The legislative history makes no
mention of private plaintiffs bringing relator
actions against those allegedly engaged in
fraud.

In other words, the Court recognized that the
primary concern motivating Congress in
passing the WSLA was the ability of law
enforcement to effectively police fraud
against the government during the fog of
war. This concern is evident in the WSLA's
legislative history.

The legislative history of the Wartime
Enforcement of Fraud Act of 2008
("WEFA"), which contained the most recent
amendments to the WSLA, reveals that the
same concerns motivated Congress in
passing the 2008 amendments to the WSLA.
In sending the WEFA to the full Senate, the
Judiciary Committee report repeatedly
emphasized the difficulty of investigators,
auditors, and the Department of Justice in
ferreting out fraud against the United States
during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Again, the legislative history is silent with
respect to private party relators.

During normal times the present 3-year
statute of limitations may afford the
Department of Justice sufficient time to
investigate, discover, and gather evidence to
prosecute frauds against the Government.
The United States, however, is engaged in a
gigantic war program. Huge sums of money
are being expended for materials and
equipment in order to carry on the war
successfully. Although steps have been
taken to prevent and to prosecute frauds
against the Government, it is recognized that
in the varied dealings opportunities will no
doubt be presented for unscrupulous persons
to defraud the Government or some agency.
These frauds may be difficult to discover as
is often true of this type of offense and many
of them may not come to light for some time
to come. The law-enforcement branch of the
Government is also busily engaged in its
many duties, including the enforcement of
the espionage, sabotage, and other laws.
Once again, the concern of Congress, as
expressed in the legislative history, was the

The purpose of the WSLA (as articulated by
the Supreme Court) and the legislative
history of that statute confirm what the text
reflects: that Congress was concerned with
the ability of the federal government to
police fraud when the resources of its law
enforcement were stretched thin by war.
Tolling afforded law enforcement the ability
to thoroughly investigate allegations of
fraud without compromising the ability of
the United States to fulfill its military
mission. Unlike federal law enforcement,
private relators are not "busily engaged in . .
. many duties, including the enforcement of
the espionage, sabotage, and other laws."
And extending the benefits of tolling to
private relators does not "afford the
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Department of Justice sufficient time to
investigate, discover, and gather evidence to
prosecute frauds against the Government."
Id. In sum, Congress has shown no intent to
toll the FCA's limitations period when the
United States is not a plaintiff to the FCA
action.
The complete silence as to relators in the
legislative history of the WSLA is all the
more telling when one considers that the
FCA, which was originally passed in 1863,
was on the books when the Congress
considered the WSLA in 1942 and the
WEFA in 2008. "Faced with statutory
silence, we presume that Congress is aware
of the legal context in which it is
legislating." Thus, the fact that Congress did
not mention qui tarn plaintiffs in the
legislative history of any version of the
WSLA strongly suggests that Congress did
not intend for the tolling provisions of that
statute to reach indiscriminately to any
private plaintiff pursuing a claim for fraud
against the government.
E.
Looking finally to the policies underlying
the FCA, the majority's interpretation of the
WSLA is plainly at odds with the goals of
the FCA. The policy concerns underlying
the FCA will be directly thwarted by
allowing private relators to take advantage
of the WSLA's tolling provisions. In this
case, for example, Carter's claims arose in
2005, and application of the WSLA would
extend the limitations period for his actions
well into the next decade at least, depending
on the date hostilities in Iraq are deemed
terminated. Assuming for the sake of
argument, as the district court did, that the

August 31, 2010, presidential statement of
"the end of our combat mission in Iraq" was
sufficient to end the tolling provisions of the
WSLA, Carter would have until 2019,
nearly fourteen years after his claims
accrued, to file a qui tarn action. Before the
district court, Carter argued that hostilities in
Iraq have not formally ended, meaning that
the limitations period would still be tolled
today, seven years after the allegedly false
claims were presented to the government.
When (and if) hostilities are formally
declared terminated in Iraq, it could be up
another eleven years (five years after
termination of hostilities pursuant to the
WSLA, plus the normal six year limitations
period prescribed in § 3731(b)(1)) before the
limitations period would be deemed to have
ended. Such an expansive limitations period
applicable to private qui tarn plaintiffs is
unsupported by statute, legislative history,
or precedent.
In this respect, Sanders is again instructive,
because it accurately described the differing
incentive structures that motivate relators, as
opposed to law enforcement, in the context
of FCA actions. As Sanders explained, a
lengthy limitations period would create a
"strong financial incentive" for relators to
"allow false claims to build up over time
before they filed, thereby increasing their
own potential recovery." The government,
on the other hand, always has an incentive to
quickly act to root out fraud against the
United States. The lengthy limitations period
of the WSLA, therefore, is uniquely helpful
to a government that is otherwise hampered
from enforcing antifraud laws by the
externalities of waging a military conflict.
Applying that same lengthy limitations
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period to relators is uniquely problematic
because doing so thwarts the whole purpose
of the FCA: "to combat fraud quickly and
efficiently by encouraging relators to bring
actions that the government cannot or will
not — to stimulate actions by private parties
should the prosecuting officers be tardy in
bringing the suits."
In fact, the concern identified by Sanders is
exacerbated in the context of wartime
enforcement of anti-fraud laws. As the
legislative history to the WE FA notes,
"often," during war, "the Government does
not learn about serious fraud until years after
the fact." In contrast, private party relators
will be inclined to delay, allowing their
potential recovery to increase, knowing that
the government is unlikely to discover the
fraud, and therefore unlikely to be the first
to bring a claim against the perpetrators.
Absent WSLA tolling, relators are at least
restricted to a six year window in which to
bring their claims. In the context of virtually
indefinite WSLA tolling, however, a relator
could wait a decade or more to bring a qui
tarn claim, secure in the knowledge that law
enforcement is otherwise too occupied with
the exigencies of war to discover the fraud
on its own.
F.
The majority opinion does not address the
arguments set forth above, but summarily

dismisses Sanders as inapplicable because,
"whether the suit is brought by the United
States or a relator is irrelevant to this case
because the suspension of limitations in the
WSLA depends on whether the country is at
war and not who brings the case." This is a
misreading of Sanders, the statute, and the
legislative history. Like the WSLA, the
limitations period at issue in Sanders did not
contain an express limitation on who could
take advantage of the tolling provision.
Rather, the analysis in Sanders focused on
whether § 3731(b)(2) could be plausibly
read to encompass actions brought by
private parties. Like § 3731(b)(2) in
Sanders, the WSLA should be read in
context, keeping in mind both the purposes
of that statute and the dire effects of
extending to relators a provision obviously
intended only for the government.
III.
The text, the purposes, and the legislative
history of the WSLA all counsel in favor of
holding that the government only, and not
private relators, are entitled to take
advantage of that statute's tolling provisions.
Because the majority takes the altogether
novel step of expanding the WSLA to apply
to actions by relators, I must respectfully
dissent from that aspect of the majority's
holding.
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“US Supreme Court Agrees To Address Two Important False Claims Act
Issues”
Mondaq
Jonathan G. Cedarbaum & Daniel S. Volchok
July 8, 2014
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Kellogg Brown & Root v.
United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-1497, a
case presenting two important issues under
the False Claims Act (FCA). The first is
whether the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act—which tolls the limitations
period during wartime for any "offense"
against the United States—applies to a civil
FCA claim brought by a qui tam relator. The
second is whether the FCA's "first-to-file
bar"—which provides that once a relator
brings an FCA action, "no person other than
the government may intervene or bring a
related action based on the facts underlying
the pending action"—precludes a later
action only so long as the earlier action is
still pending.
Background
Petitioner Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR)
provided logistical services to the U.S.
military during the Iraqi war. In 2006,
Respondent Carter, a former KBR
employee, filed an FCA action against KBR,
alleging that KBR had fraudulently billed
the government. After a lengthy procedural
history, the district court (Cacheris, J.)
dismissed the latest complaint with
prejudice. The court first held that the firstto-file bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5),
precluded Carter's action because another
FCA case alleging similar facts had already
pending in another federal district court

when Carter filed his operative complaint.
Although that other case had since been
dismissed, the district court here held that
the first-to-file bar depended on the state of
affairs at the time of the filing of the
complaint. The court also held that most of
Carter's claims were time-barred, rejecting
his argument that the Wartime Suspension
of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. §
3287, tolled the limitations period. The court
ruled that the WSLA does not apply to a
civil fraud claim brought by a qui tam
relator.
The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held
that although the complaint was properly
dismissed under the first-to-file bar, because
the earlier-filed case had still been pending
at the time Carter filed his latest complaint,
the dismissal should have been without
prejudice because the subsequent dismissal
of that case meant that the first-to-file bar no
longer applied, leaving Carter free to re-file.
The court of appeals also held that Carter's
claims were not time-barred because the
WSLA applies to civil FCA suits, even those
in which the government has declined to
intervene. One judge dissented from this
portion of the court's ruling, arguing that the
WSLA does not apply to qui tam suits in
which the government has declined to
intervene.
In its certiorari petition, KBR argues that the
Fourth Circuit's first-to-file rule would
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improperly allow relators to bring case after
related case based on very similar facts, so
long as they were brought seriatim. On the
WSLA question, KBR contends that the
term "offense" is limited to crimes, that the
Fourth Circuit's approach is contrary to the
WSLA's purpose, and that the Fourth
Circuit's decision would lead to enormously
long periods of tolling given the nature of
the military conflicts in which the United
States is engaged.

Next Steps
The case will likely be argued in December
2014 or January 2015. KBR's opening brief
is due August 15, 2014 and Carter's
opposition brief is due September 15, 2014,
though those deadlines may well be
extended.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of KBR over False Claims Act Lawsuit”
Young Law Group
Eric Young
July 9, 2014
Last week, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Kellogg Brown &
Root Services v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, adding
another appeal involving a whistleblower to
its schedule in the fall. The petition initiated
by KBR asked the Court to review the
appropriate statute of limitations and the
application of the first to file bar in False
Claims Act litigation.
The history of the case is a bit unusual.
Benjamin Carter, the relator who worked for
the defendant in Iraq, filed a qui tam
complaint in 2006. The complaint was
amended in 2008 to include allegations of
false billing for labor costs. This complaint
was dismissed by the district court because
of similar allegations in a pending relator
complaint filed prior to Carter’s allegations.

By the time Carter refiled his complaint,
another relator had filed against the
company with similar allegations. The
district court held that this pending
complaint barred Carter’s latest complaint.
Because a significant amount of time had
passed since the events underlying this
litigation, the district court also held that
most of the allegations were now barred by
the statute of limitations of the False Claims
Act, set forth in § 3731(b).
Carter appealed successfully to the Court of
Appeals. The Fourth Circuit held that the
statute of limitations in the case was tolled
by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act (WSLA). It also authorized him to refile
his complaint because there were no other
pending actions.

As those familiar with the False Claims Act
are aware, the statute bars a person from
bringing a “related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(5). This is commonly known as the
“first to file” bar.

The defendant now contests those issues on
appeal.

While on appeal, the complaint by the other
relator was dismissed. Carter filed a new
complaint in 2010. However, since his 2008
appeal was still pending, the new complaint
was dismissed because of his own pending
appeal. Strategically, Carter dismissed the
appeal of the 2008 complaint.

1. The WSLA does not apply to civil fraud
cases where the U.S. government is not a
party;

It contends that the WSLA applies solely to
criminal cases brought by the government. It
makes three key arguments:

2. The WSLA does not apply when the
government has not formally declared war;
and
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3. The WSLA does not modify the ten year
statute of repose in the False Claims Act. In
other words, the WSLA does not
indefinitely toll the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court will also review whether
a previous lawsuit, not dismissed on the
merits, bars a subsequent relator from filing
a qui tam lawsuit because of the “first to
file” requirement of the False Claims Act.
The defendant contends dismissal is
appropriate because the government has
already been put on notice of the fraud.
KBR is the second case involving a
whistleblower to be scheduled by the
Supreme Court. In May, it agreed to hear the
appeal of Homeland Security in the case of
TSA air marshall Robert MacLean,
Department of Homeland Security v.
MacLean. MacLean informed the media that
the TSA had discontinued posting air
marshals on certain overnight flights
because of budget concerns despite an alert
about a plot to hijack airlines. He was
terminated when the TSA learned of his role
blowing the whistle. The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals sided with MacLean in his
retaliation claim under the Whistleblower
Protection Act.

The Supreme Court has already weighed in
on two cases involving whistleblowers this
year.
A few weeks ago in June, the Supreme
Court decided Lane v. Franks. Lane, in his
capacity as director of a statewide program
for underprivileged youth, terminated an
individual on the payroll that had not been
reporting to her office. Subsequently, Lane
was compelled to testify in the exemployee’s criminal trial. He alleged that he
was terminated in retaliation for the
testimony. In a 9-0 opinion written by
Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the
First Amendment protects a public
employee
providing
truthful
sworn
testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside
the course of the employee’s ordinary job
duties.
In March, it extended SOX protections
against retaliation to whistleblowers who
work at private contractors to public
companies in Lawson v. FMR LLC. The
decision reversed the First Circuit decision
denying protection to two employees of a
privately held financial institution providing
services to mutual fund clients.
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“The Supreme Court Will Review Fourth Circuit Decision that Weakened the
False Claims Act’s Statute of Limitations and First-to-File Bar”
Vorys
Patrick M. Hagan & Brent D. Craft
July 1, 2014
Today, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari in Kellogg Brown &
Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Carter. The petition presented two
questions: (1) whether the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA)
applies to claims of civil fraud brought by
qui tam relators, and (2) whether the False
Claims Act’s (FCA) first-to-file rule is an
absolute bar or whether it permits
subsequent actions so long as the first-filed
action had been dismissed on non-merits
grounds prior to filing of the subsequent
action. The Fourth Circuit’s decision was
unfavorable to potential FCA defendants on
both issues. The Supreme Court’s decision
to grant certiorari is important news for all
companies that do business with the
government, as both issues significantly
impact potential FCA exposure.
On the first question, the Fourth Circuit held
that the WSLA applies to civil as well as
criminal cases, and applies to FCA actions
in which the government has declined to
intervene. The practical effect of that ruling
is that the statute of limitations in all FCA
cases is tolled while the United States is at
war (defined broadly to include all conflicts
for which Congress has authorized the use
of the Armed Forces) until “5 years after the
termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a
Presidential proclamation, with notice to
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of

Congress.” District courts have begun to
issue contrary rulings, with courts in both
the Eastern and Western District of
Pennsylvania holding that the WSLA does
not apply to non-intervened FCA
cases. Most recently, in the well-known
“Lance Armstrong case,” the District of
D.C. held that the WSLA does not apply to
any civil FCA cases because the FCA does
not require “proof of specific intent to
defraud.”
On the second question, the Fourth Circuit
joined the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in
holding that the FCA’s first-to-file rule does
not prohibit duplicative actions so long as
the earlier-filed actions are not pending at
the time the duplicative case was filed. That
conflicts with the approach taken by the
First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which have
held that allowing duplicative actions to
proceed, regardless of whether the
previously filed action was “pending” at the
time, “cannot be reconciled with [the
FCA’s] goal of preventing parasitic [suits].”
If the Supreme Court upholds the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling on both of these issues, the
consequences for FCA defendants could be
disastrous. The application of the WSLA to
all civil FCA cases, including nonintervened cases, essentially eliminates the
statute of limitations for FCA cases
indefinitely. Indeed, the president recently
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ordered additional troops to Iraq to address
the recent instability there, which suggests
that the “termination of hostilities” in Iraq is
not imminent. The weakening of the firstto-file rule compounds the harm caused by
the tolling of the statute of limitations by
decreasing incentives for relators to report
fraud promptly. The practical effect of the
Fourth Circuit’s “one-two punch” to
defendants is to encourage relators to delay
filing claims to maximize the potential
damages. These incentives directly conflict
with the purpose of the FCA.
When read in its entirety, the dual purposes
of the FCA are to provide financial
incentives to encourage private citizens to
promptly report fraud while limiting the
ability of those whistleblowers to profit
based on publicly disclosed, previously
alleged or stale information. Three pillars of
the FCA provide the limitations on
relators. The public disclosure bar prevents
relators from profiting from suits based upon
information that was already publicly
available. The first-to-file rule serves a
similar purpose – once the government has
been alerted to potential fraud by the firstfiled qui tam action, there is no reason to
incentivize additional lawsuits. Finally, the
vast majority of courts have correctly held
that relators cannot benefit from the tolling
provision in the FCA’s statute of limitations
and thus, that the limitations period for nonintervened cases is six years (as opposed to
up to 10 years for the government). All
three of these provisions of the FCA provide
incentives for relators to make prompt
allegations of fraud.

Unfortunately, the 2010 amendments to the
FCA have already weakened the public
disclosure bar by leaving its application to
the government’s discretion. The Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Carter undermines both
the statute of limitations and the first-to-file
rule. If the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is
upheld, companies doing business with the
government could face lawsuits for alleged
FCA violations that occurred many years
earlier. Defending old claims is often
difficult. Paper documents are often
destroyed in accordance with document
management policies or are stored in less
accessible locations. The relevant electronic
files may be stored on a sunset email or
document management system. Witnesses
may have moved away or forgotten relevant
facts. Some may even be dead. And, if the
relator alleges a continuing violation, the
potential damages and penalties that have
accumulated over a long period of time may
be astronomical.
Amicus curiae briefing on the petition for
certiorari in Carter illustrates that this case
is set for a showdown. In his amicus brief,
the solicitor general indicated that the
government would support the Fourth
Circuit’s application of the WSLA to all
civil FCA cases and its interpretation that
the first-to-file rule does not bar subsequent
actions when the first-filed action is no
longer pending. The Chamber of Commerce
filed an amicus brief in support of the
defendant to alert the Court that “the sum
effect of [Carter] will be to increase the
number of aged and duplicative cases that
serve only to inflict substantial litigation
costs on businesses.” All companies that in
some way do business with the government
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– including health care, government
procurement and banking and finance –
should closely watch this case during the
Supreme Court’s October term.
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“Halliburton, KBR Whistle-Blower’s Case Revived on Appeal”
Bloomberg
Tom Schoenberg
March 18, 2013
Halliburton Co. and KBR Inc. (KBR) must
face a whistle-blower lawsuit that was
revived by a federal appeals court, which
ruled that military operations in Iraq
exempted the plaintiff from a six-year
deadline for filing claims.
In a 2-1 ruling today, the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Richmond, Virginia, reversed a
lower-court judge’s dismissal of a case
against the companies filed by Benjamin
Carter under the False Claims Act. Carter’s
claims that Halliburton and KBR falsely
billed the U.S. in 2005 triggered the
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
even though the Justice Department declined
to intervene in the case, the judges said.

Carter first sued in 2006. That case and three
subsequent complaints were dismissed on
procedural grounds. In sending the case
back to U.S. District Judge James Cacheris
in Alexandria, Virginia, the appeals court
said Carter’s claims may still be barred
under a different provision of the false
claims law.
Dissenting Judge
U.S. Circuit Judge G. Steven Agee, in a
dissenting opinion to today’s decision, said
people might allow false billing to continue
knowing that they have more than a decade
to file a claim and that their reward is tied to
the size of a recovery.

“Whether the suit is brought by the U.S. or a
relator is irrelevant to this case because the
suspension of limitations in the WSLA
depends on whether the country is at war
and not who brings the case,” U.S. Circuit
Judge Henry Floyd wrote in the ruling.

“Private party relators will be inclined to
delay, allowing their potential recovery to
increase, knowing that the government is
unlikely to discover the fraud, and therefore
unlikely to be the first to bring a claim
against the perpetrators,” Agee said.

Carter, who worked for KBR as an operator
in a water purification unit in 2005, alleges
the companies billed the U.S. government
for purifying water for four months at two
Iraqi camps that year when it hadn’t done
so. He also alleges the he and his colleagues
were instructed to submit time sheets
showing that they worked 12-hour days on
the purification when he hadn’t worked on it
at all.

Susie McMichael, a spokeswoman for
Houston-based
Halliburton,
referred
questions to KBR, stating that the activity
alleged in the lawsuit was pursuant to a
KBR contract.
John Elolf, a spokesman for Houston-based
KBR, said in a statement that the company
was disappointed with the ruling and
“respectfully disagrees” with the majority’s
opinion.
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“KBR is continuing to study the decision
and weighing our options,” he said. “We
believe the underlying case is without merit,
and we are confident that it will ultimately
be dismissed.”

The case is United States ex rel. Benjamin
Carter v. Halliburton Co. (HAL), 12-01011,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(Richmond).
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